
Class. 



Book Jl<^^ 
Copightlj^' 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSU^ 



11 



/ 



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF 

OUR CIVIL WAR /-^^Z 

re/ 



BY 



/ 



THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE 

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR 

"the CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," " PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE" 

" A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," " GREAT CAPTAINS " " ALEXANDER" 

"HANNIBAL," " C^SAR," " GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS " 

ETC., ETC. 



NEW AND REVISED EDITION 




^^r^^-e^' 



BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

mU Mizxtihz ^u^% Cambribae 

1897 



E.470 



< 



Copyright, 1883, 
By JAMES R. OSGOOD & CO. 

Copyright, 1897, 
Bt THEODORE A. DODGE. 

Ml rights reserved. 



•fi Riverside Press, Cambridge, 3fass., U. S. A, 
Printed hy H. O. Houghton and Company. 



COK"TE]SrTS 



PAGE 

Introductory Letter vii 

I. The Casus Belli 1 

11. The Opening Situation 5 

III. The First Clash op Arms . . . . . .13 

lY. Bull Run -16 

V. The Mighty West Moves 21 

, VI. The First Confederate Line Broken . . . .25 

VII. New Madrid and Island No. 10 29 

VIII. The Blockade 33 

IX. Early Outskirt Operations 36 

X. The Advance of the Western Armies. — Shiloh . 42 

XI. McClellan Moves to the Peninsula . . . .49 

XII. The Peninsular Campaign in Jeopardy. — Fair Oaks . 55 

XIII. The Seven Days 62 

XIV. Pope's Campaign 69 

XV. BuELL AND Bragg 82 

XVI. luKA AND Corinth 89 

XVII. Grant's Failure against Vicksburg . . . .93 
XVIII. Sherman's Failure against Vicksburg . . . .99 

XIX. Lee's First Invasion. — Antietam 102 

XX. Again to the Rappahannock 108 

XXI. The Horror of Fredericksburg 110 

XXII. The Soldier of North and South . . . .116 

XXIII. RosECRANS AND Bragg. — Stone's River . . . 122 

XXIV. Chancellorsville 127 

XXV. Lee's Second Invasion ....... 132 

XXVI. Gettysburg 136 

""""-^ V 



VI CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

XXVII. Grant again Moves on Vicksburg .... 142 

XXVIII. Grant Turns Pemberton's Left .... 145 

XXIX. Grant Drives Pemberton into Vicksburg . .151 

XXX. Siege of Vicksburg 156 

XXXI. Banks and Port Hudson . . . . . . 1G2 

XXXII. Sparring for a Hold. — Mine Run. . . . 167 

XXXIII. Rosecrans Moves upon Bragg ....*. 172 

XXXIV. Chickamauga 179 

XXXV. The Battle op Chattanooga 184 

XXXVI. Further Outskirt Operations 190 

XXXVII. The Wilderness 197 

XXXVIII. Spotsylvania 204 

XXXIX. The Minor Armies 209 

XL. Again by the Flank. — Stalemate .... 213 

XLI. More Blood. — Cold Harbor 217 

XLII. Sherman Looks Toward Atlanta .... 223 

XLIII. Sherman Moves on Atlanta 227 

XLIV. On to Marietta 231 

XLV. Marietta 235 

XLVI. Kenesaw 239 

XLVII. Grant's Change of Base 244 

XL VIII. Petersburg. — The Mine Fiasco .... 248 
XLIX. Washington in Alarm for the Last Time . . 252 

L. Atlanta 255 

LI. A Protracted Siege 263 

LII. Sheridan in the Valley 269 

LIII. Hood Takes the Offensive 279 

LIV. Hood Makes for Tennessee 282 

LV. Sherman Astonishes Hood 286 

LVI. Sherman's Goal 291 

LVII. Hood Seeks to Crush Schofield. — Franklin . 293 

LVIII. Hood Broken by Thomas. — Nashville . . . 297 

LIX. Sherman Moves Through the Carolinas . . 302 

LX. The Final Campaign 310 

LXI. A Few Stray Items 320 

Glossary 327 

Index 339 



MAPS Al^B CHAETS. 



1. Bull Run, July 21, 1861 

2. Forts Henry and Donelson, Feb. 6 and 16, 1862 

3. New Madrid and Island No. 10, March, 1862 

4. Pea Ridge, March 5-8, 1862 .... 

5. Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing), April 6 and 7, 1862 

6. Williamsburg, May 5, 1862 

7. Fair Oaks, May 31, June 1, 18G2 

8. Seven Days, June 26, July 2, 1862 . 

9. Pope's Campaign (1), Aug. 24, 1862 

10. Pope's Campaign (2), Aug. 28, A.M. 

11. Pope's Campaign (3), Aug. 28, 6 P.M. 

12. Pope's Campaign (4), Aug. 29, Noon 

13. Perryville, Oct. 8, 1862 . 

14. luKA, Sept. 19, 1862 .... 

15. Corinth, Oct. 3, 4, 1862 . 

16. Memphis to Vicksburg, 1862, 1863 

17. Antietam, Sept. 16, 17, 1862 . 

18. Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862 

19. Stone's River, Dec. 31, 1862 . 

20. Chanckllorsville, May 2, 1863 

21. Chanc'Ellorsville, May 3, 4, 5, 1863 

22. Gettysburg, July 1, 1863 

23. Gettysburg, July 2, 3, 4, 1863 

24. Campaign against Vicksburg in 1863 

25. Mine Run, Nov. 26-30, 1863 . 

26. RosECRANs' Manoeuvre, Aug. 20-Sept. 17, 1863 

27. Chickamauga, Sept. 19, 20, 1863 

28. Chattanooga, Nov. 23, 24, 25, 1863 



page 

. 17 

. 27 

. 30 

. 31 

. 44 

. 53 

. 59 

. 63 

. 71 

. 76 

. 76 

. 77 

. 87 

. 90 

. 91 

. 96 

. 105 

. 113 

. 123 

. 129 

. 130 

. 136 

. 138 

. 146 

. 170 

. 175 

. 180 

. 186 



Viii MAPS AND CHARTS. 



4 



PAGE 

29. Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864 201 

30. Spotsylvania, May 8-21, 1864 204 

31. North Anna, May 23-26, 1864 . . . .• . .214 

32. Cold Harbor, May 31, June 12, 1864 219 

33. Pickett's Mills and New Hope Church, May 25-27, 1863 . 232 

34. Operations about Marietta, June 14-28, 1864 . . . 237 

35. Operations about Petersburg, June, 1864, to April, 1865 . 249 

36. Operations about Atlanta, July 17-Sept. 2, 1864 . . 257 

37. Winchester (or Opequon), Sept. 19, 1864 . . . .272 

38. Fisher's Hill, Sept. 22, 1864 273 

39. Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864 276 

40. Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864 295 

41. Nashville, Dec. 15, 16, 1864 298 



MAPS SPECIALLY PREPARED FOP THIS WORK. 

1. General Map of the Theatre of War . . Front Covers 

2. Map of the United States in 1860-61 (showing the States 

that seceded to form the Confederate States) . . . .4-5 

3. Map of the Theatre of the Western Campaigns . . 24-25 

4. Map of the Theatre of the Georgia and Carolina 

Campaigns 34-35 

5. Map of the Theatre of the South-western Cam- 

paigns 82-83 

6. Map of the Theatre of the Virginia Campaigns . Back Covtrs 



DEDIOATOET LETTER. 



To Robert Elkin Neil Dodge : — 

My dear Neil, — Few of the generation to which you 
belong will ever become familiar with the details of the 
gigantic struggle through which your father's generation 
fought. But every young American should know its out- 
lines. The following pages are what I long ago promised 
you, when you should be of an age to take an interest in the 
subject. They are too few to make any pretence to being a 
history of the war ; nor have they anything to do with its 
pohtical aspect. 

A soldier can discuss calmly victory or defeat. Politics do 
not seem to be treated with equal good-temper. Each side 
in our great Civil War believed itself in the right, and fought 
with the courage so engendered. You need not busy yourself 
with the asperities of the political field of twenty years ago. 
The causes which brought about the war have been stated in 
the briefest manner only. 

The principal military events are herein grouped in such 
sequence that a careful reading, with the maps before you^ will 
yield you a fair knowledge of what modern war is, and what 
our Civil War was. Many interesting minor operations have 
been barely mentioned ; some altogether omitted. All impor- 
tant ones have due space allotted to them as even-handedly 
as the matter and the general purpose of the work will allow. 
Many of the manoeuvres about Petersburg in the last year of 
the war were on a scale so vast that they rank almost as 
separate campaigns. But although they called for endurance 



X INTRODUCTORY LETTER. 

and skill of the highest order and for enormous sacrifices, as 
they were really parts of one great whole, less space has in 
some instances been devoted to these than to other lesser 
but independent conflicts. The skeleton thus presented, can 
readily be clothed from the standard histories. 

To know this subject well requires the diligent study of 
many volumes. I have tried to give you a good general idea 
in one. 

No claim to originality is made for this book. The facts, 
and many of the opinions, have been gleaned from the pages 
of numerous authors. Their patient labors have made the 
history of our Civil Strife the property of the public ; and to 
all of them my thanks are due. 

The maps are accurate enough for the purposes of the book. 
To convey a rapid general idea of the various battle-fields is 
their aim rather than the greater exactness which may be 
found in more extended works. The small rectangles, repre- 
senting troops, indicate general position only. Too great 
detail has been purposely avoided. 

The few technical terms, which for convenience and greater 
conciseness have been used in the book, all but explain them- 
selves. And few, indeed, are the firesides in this country 
which have not at least one member who can interpret the 
ordinary manoeuvres of grand-tactics or strategy. A short 
glossary is appended. 

Though but twenty years have elapsed since these events 
were enacted, the authorities on our Civil War constantly 
disagree as to numbers and localities ; frequently even as 
to dates. Errors have probably crept into this volume. 
But they will be found, it is hoped, neither many nor 
grave. 

The intelligent treatment of military operations necessi- 



INTRODUCTORY LETTER. XI 

tates more or less criticism. That which has here been 
indulged in is meant to be temperate as well as honest. It 
is made with a full appreciation of the unusual difficulties 
which beset our generals, with a sincere admiration of their 
qualities and services, and in that spirit of diflSdence which 
should become a soldier who bore but a modest part in the 
great struggle which they conducted to a successful issue. 

Our Civil War was full of dramatic incident. Every war 
is. But the narrow limits of this work forbid the devotion of 
any space to what others have sufficiently painted. My aim 
has been to give the layman a clear idea of the war as a mili- 
tary whole, paying no heed to individual heroism nor dwelling 
upon the war as a spectacle. Regimental histories have 
already done, and will continue to do, this. Names are given 
only to elucidate operations. 

While holding the conviction tha:t the cause of the North 
was right, I yield to no Southerner in m}^ admiration of the 
splendid gallantry of our old enemy, now our brother ; and I 
believe that no one will accuse me of intentional partiality in 
my narration of events. 

I need not ask you, my dear Neil, to study these pages, 
for you are now old enough to desire an intelligent knowledge 
of our great war. 

Your affectionate father, 

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE. 

Bkookline, Mass., 1883. 



PREFACE 



IN correcting the figures given in this new edition, the latest 
War Department publications, the invaluable work of Colo- 
nel Fox, and other well-known sources have been consulted. It 
must be remembered that no war statistics can be absolutely 
accurate. Records were not kept in the same manner in the 
Northern and Southern armies; many have been lost; some 
were never made. Should two equally competent and honest 
men figure up, from the material at hand and by the same 
rules, the combatants and casualties of half-a-dozen battles, 
they would vary more or less. Even the War Department 
has, from time to time, altered the figures in many of its 
tables. But reasonable accuracy can be attained ; and the 
author desires, among other sources of information, to express 
his peculiar indebtedness to the valuable work of Col. Thomas 
L. Livermore, whose tables of forces and casualties have been 
laid under free contribution. Colonel Livermore has figured out 
the numbers for the Northern and Southern armies on the same 
basis. His studies are intended to enrich the archives of the 
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts ; and his tabula- 
tion of figures of the Civil War is singularly accurate and 
suggestive. 

The facts stated have been diligently compared with the 
Official Records of the Rebellion by Capt. Edward B. Robins, 
for many years Secretary of the same Society; and, owing to 
his valuable labor, for which my earnest thanks are due, every 
such fact can now be substantiated from the record. 

The author alone is responsible for the opinions expressed. 

New maps have been prepared from the Government sur- 
veys and charts. These have equally passed under the 
scrutiny of Captain Robins. They are all north and south. 

The author hopes that, in its new dress, the work may con- 
tinue to give the same satisfaction which, from its constant sale 
in a more expensive form, he is assured that it has so far done. 

Brookline, October, 1896. 



THE CASUS BELLI. 

FOR many years a great political strife had been grad^ 
ually undermining the ties of tradition and mutual 
interest betwixt North and South. The rival sections had 
fought side by side in conquering our independence and in 
maintaining it. Every reason, commercial and national, 
should have held us together. The slighter differences of 
opinion had been mainly about tariff protection to the 
Northern manufacturers, and kindred financial subjects. 
Differences like these could scarcely have involved serious 
residts. The real cause of the growing animosity was 
associated with the Cjuestions attending slavery. 

AVith whatever unanimity servile labor may now be con- 
demned as a social and commercial mistake, — leaving its 
moral aspect entirely out of the Cjuestion, — the institiuion 
of slavery, in the decade preceding the war, was asserted 
by the Southern States to be the keystone of their success 
in the same measiue that paid labor was held in the North 
to have built up the wealth of its manufacturing communi- 
ties and to have opened the wheat fields of the TTest. 
The difference in climate and products yielded each section 
abimdant sources of argument for its own peculiar views. 



2 BIRD'B-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

But the matter did not stop at discussion. The South, 
to acquire additional political power, desired to extend the 
institution into the rapidly growing Territories of the 
Union ; the North, for similar reasons, desired to have it 
excluded from all but those States where it had taken such 
firm root that it could not be extirpated without too great 
upheaval. There was of course in each section a minority 
of very bitter opponents and favorers of slavery, whose 
extreme utterances and acts bred more or less ill-feeling. 
But the general question was confined to the territorial 
extension or restriction of slave labor. 

For many years the pro-slavery men North and South 
had held possession of the reins of government. But the 
party of free labor, owing to immigration, which prefer- 
ably sought the Northern and Western States, was thought 
to be on the point of dispossessing them. The Republican 
party, which desired to restrict slavery to the limits it al- 
ready occupied, existed mostly in the North. The Demo- 
crats of the South wished to extend slavery ; their political 
allies in the Northern States aimed to prevent rupture by 
concessions to the Southern idea. 

In 1860 a new President had to be chosen. The Demo- 
crats North and South outnumbered the Republicans. If 
they worked together, they could scarcely fail to elect their 
candidate. But the Southern Democrats demanded a plat- 
form which should recognize both slavery as a national 
institution, and the right of secession. This latter was no 
new doctrine. Secession had been threatened before, and 
the abstract right of a State to rupture its relations with 
the Union had been stoutly maintained and denied on the 



THE CASUS BELLL 3 

one and the other side. The demands of the Southern wing 
led to a breach in the Democratic party, the result of which 
was that four presidential candidates came into the field, — 
two Democrats, Douglas representing the North and 
Breckenridge the South ; a Whig, Bell, representing the 
party of concession ; and a Republican, Lincoln. 

Out of nearly 4,700,000 votes, Mr. Lincoln received 
1,900,000. This fell short of an actual majority, but was 
much more than any other candidate received, and the 
usual machinery of election gave the Republican candidate 
the suffrages of the electoral college. He was legally 
chosen President. 

Still, despite their defeat, the Democrats would retain a 
majority in Congress, and could assert their rights in am- 
ple measure. But this power was not ample enough. 
The ultra men among the Southern leaders determined 
upon actual secession as a remedy, hoping to retrieve 
by threats of force what they had lost by their political 
rupture with the Northern Democracy. Many opposed 
this course. But in vain. The passions of the South-- 
ern people were at fever heat. Secession measures were 
at once put in play. And as the National administra- 
tion, until the succeeding March, was still Democratic, 
the South reaped many advantages from the weakness, 
and in some instances outright dishonesty of United States 
officials. 

Compromises were attempted. But matters had gone 
too far. Before New Year of 1861 had dawned. South 
Carolina had set up as an independent power. The other 
Southern States in turn passed ordinances of secession, a 



4 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

Confederacy was formed, and Nortli and South were openly 
arrayed against each other. 

But it must be remembered that while slavery had been 
at the root of the trouble, the actual casus belli was the 
act of secession, to maintain and to prevent which our Civil 
War was really waged. As the struggle grew in intensity, 
the final extirpation of slavery became an element in the 
calculations of the North, and even a means of encouraging 
its people. But at the outset the contest was solely a War 
for the Union. 



^ ^ T a: rf J^^ 




n. 



THE OPENING SITUATION. 

A BIRD'S-EYE view of Our Civil War shows a 
threefold division of military operations. The 
mightier conflicts had their scene in the States bordering 
on the East or on the West of the Alleghany Mountains. 
Most minor hostilities were waged on the outskirts of the 
Confederacy. Many of the latter had so little, if any, 
bearing upon the general result, that they may be briefly 
dismissed from sight without aflecting an intelligent view of 
the whole. Some bore a weighty share in our eventual 
success. 

It will be remembered that, in a general way, the offen- 
sive was ours, the defensive the Confederate share of the 
struggle. But as the best defense is often a vigorous at- 
tack, so the Confederates waged sometimes an offensive- 
defensive warfare, as in the case of Lee's incursions across 
the Potomac in 1862 and 1863, or Bragg's march to the 
Ohio river in 1862. But the general policy pursued by 
the Confederates was formulated by Jefferson Davis when 
he said that "all we ask is to be let alone." 

In the East the two rival capitals faced each other at no 

great interval, and were hungrily fought for over the nar- 

5 



6 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

row territory lying between them. Here, too, was the 
great Confederate captain, and under him served the elite 
of the Southern legions. In the West there was no such 
topographical limitation. The possession of the Mississippi 
river was our primary objective, both as a base for opera- 
tions into the interior and to cut off from the enemy the 
supplies he gathered from beyond. The outskirt operations 
consisted mostly of lodgments on the coast, which were not 
utilized to any greater extent than to keep the blockade of 
the Southern ports intact. 

Munitions of war were the prime necessity of the Seces- 
sionists. Within the boundaries of each State there had at 
various times been granted to the National Government 
certain small tracts of land for forts, arsenals, and navy- 
yards. These had been kept more or less liberally sup- 
plied with arms, ammunition, and stores of all kinds. A 
large part of this material fell into the hands of the seced- 
ing States. It was claimed that the act of secession 
revested in each State the title to the land so granted to 
the Government ; and, wherever possible, the claim was 
made good by taking possession of this national property. 
In some instances the garrisons of the forts held their own, 
and preserved these coigns of vantage to the United States. 

South Carolina had been the most prominent State in 
warlike activity. But the forts in Charleston harbor were 
stiU in possession of the National Government and under 
command of Major Anderson. Without these citadels 
the new-born power of South Carolina would be unable to 
control the entrance to its only seaport. After the act of 
secession, therefore, negotiations were opened with Presi- 



1861.] THE OPENING SITUATION. 7 

dent Buclianan for yielding up their posses- 

1T -n X- xi, 1 r, 4-1 December, 1860. 

sion. Vacillating tnoiigli he was, the 
President could not consent to this. He prolonged the 
discussion. Anderson, with soldierly decision, cut the knot 
of the difficulty by abandoning the shore fortresses and 
transferring his small force of one hundred 

. , ^ ^ . December 26. 

and twenty-eight men to Fort Sumter, m 
the centre of the harbor, prepared to hold it to the last. 
Months elapsed in inaction. Anderson's commissariat 
beo^an to fail. Attempts were made by the 

T^ -, 1 , n 1 1 Jan., Apl., 1861. 

President to re victual the fort, but they were 
unsuccessful. 

Finally South CaroHna struck the blow. Always a 
leader in the South, she now had at her back the moral 
support of the other seceding States. After summoning 
Fort Sumter to surrender, fire was opened 

Aprill2. 

upon it from the rehabilitated United States 
forts, and from shore batteries erected during the inter- 
regnum of three months. A bloodless bombardment of 
two days resulted in a conflagration which, added to the ex- 
haustion of his ammunition, obliged Anderson to capitulate. 
This he did, and, marching out with all the honors of war, 
he embarked his troops for the North. This 
first act of war was, however, more a politi- 
cal than a military combat. 

The Northern people had until this moment disbelieved 
in a final rupture. But their eyes were now opened, and 
Fort Sumter was the signal for an universal uprising to 
avenge the insult to the National flag. President Lincoln 
at once issued a call for volunteers. The response was 



8 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

unmistakable in its intensity. The busy merchant, the 
plodding farmer, the mechanic and the professional man, 
each dropped his avocation to enter the ranks, and, as if by 
magic, the peaceful North became one vast camp. 

In the South preparations were much further advanced, 
but recruitment was no more speedy. Both sides donned 
their armor for the now inevitable fray. 

The navy-yard at Norfolk contained much material of 

war sadly needed at the South. By a series of blunders 

this valuable possession was allowed to fall into the hands 

of the new Confederacy, much to our'dis- 

April 20. 

comfiture and eventual danger. Harper's 
Ferry, too, an arsenal containing the most necessary ma- 
chinery for producing arms and ammunition 

April 18. 

owned by the United States, was evacuated 
and destroyed by its garrison. 

The city of Washington stood in no little peril. A 
vigorous raid from Virginia could readily have seized 
the capital at any time during the first month of hos- 
tilities. But gradually troops from the North arrived 
and rescued the seat of government from danger. In 
Baltimore sentiment was strongly for secession. The 
government of Maryland was on the point of leading the 
State in the wake of her erring sisters. The passage 
through Baltimore of the first Northern regiment occasioned 
a serious riot, and the regiments that followed had to be 
transported by way of Annapolis, until Bal- 

April 19. . 

timore was occupied by a suflacient force to 
control its unruly population. 

All these events, and many other minor circumstances, 



1861. J THE OPENING SITUATION. 9 

were mere incidents to the opening of hostilities, and need 
but a casual reference. They scarcely belong to the mili- 
tary history of the war. 

The new belligerents proposed to make their primary 
line of defense along the Ohio river and the northern 
boundary of Maryland. A glance at the map shows how 
large is the territory so covered, as compared with the 
loyal States, and quells our wonder at the opinion which 
foreigners at first held as to the probable issue of our 
Btruggle, although the census of 1860 shows nearly two 
thirds of the population to be in the North. 

But the conditions under which the Southern people 
lived were doubtless such as to enable it to organize an 
efficient army with more celerity. And this fact was over- 
estimated abroad, while the knowledge of where resided 
the sinews of war was naturally more limited than at 
present. For be it remembered that, thirty-five years 
ago, we occupied no more important place in the eyes of 
even intelligent Europeans than do at present the South 
American States in ours. 

There lurked no doubt in the minds of the Southern 
leaders that Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri would join 
the Confederacy, while Virginia was considered one body 
indivisible. But they were as early destined to disap- 
pointment as they were to eventual miscarriage of the 
bitterest. In the seething of political uncertainties, Ken- 
tucky was saved to the Union. Even the western half 
of Virginia followed her water-courses and affiliated with 
Ohio rather than with her slave-holding twin; while the 
troubles in Baltimore culminated in the half-willing re- 



10 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

demption of Maryland. The Potomac thus became a 
Northern barrier instead of a Southern base. The Con- 
federates were driven to substitute for it the Rappahan- 
nock, in Virginia ; while west of the AUeghanies, as the 
Ohio river remained in our control, they were forced to 
adopt an irregular line across the State of Kentucky, on 
which to make their first defense. 

This line was, however, weak, because it is tapped by 
the Mississippi, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee riv- 
ers ; and these became at once available to our armies as 
lines of operation and supply. And the early control by 
us of both banks of the Ohio river, together with the res- 
cue of Missouri from secession government 

April and May. 

by Blair and gallant Lyon, enabled us to 
keep the war off loyal territory. 

Confederate General Pillow had occupied New Madrid on 
the Mississippi. The intention of the Con- 
federates had been to seize upon all impor- 
^^^ ' tant points about the mouth of the Ohio 
river, and shortly a move was made from New Madrid to 
Columbus by fifteen thousand men, under Polk, who from 
thence attempted to grasp Paducah, where the Tennessee 
empties into the Ohio. This and Cairo were two points of 
, great military value. 

General John C. Fremont was at this time in command 
in the West. His ancient reputation, beyond his abilities, 
at least in regular warfare, had placed him where he was. 
Under orders from him. Grant, early appointed a brigadier- 
September 2 general, anticipated Polk by seizing Cairo, 
and a day or two later Paducah. He had a 



1861.] THE OPENING SITUATION. 11 

force of about fourteen thousand men ; Polk some five 
thousand more. This move on Grant's part checkmated 
the Confederate plans, and saved this important strategic 
centre to the Union. 

The Confederates were, hovrever, reluctant to yield up 
control of Kentucky, and were equally anxious to forestall 
our use of the, to them, all-important rivers above-named. 
They speedily fortified Columbus, New Madrid, and Island 
No. 10 on the Mississippi, erected Fort Henry on the Ten- 
nessee, and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, and estab- 
lished a strong camp of observation at the railroad centre 
of Bowling Green as an outpost to their main position at 
Nashville, while Zollicofier was sent through Cumberland 
Gap to form a flying right wing. This was the first Con- 
federate line of defense in the West, after the Ohio river 
had been lost beyond hope of recovery. 

It will be borne in mind that in a country whose sparse 
population prevents its sustaining large armies, and where 
each contestant has to be victualled from his own base, 
lines of operation must follow navigable rivers or railroads. 
These will always be observed in our war to play a larger 
part than in European campaigns, where provisions and 
forage are abundant enough for an army to live up6n the 
country through which it is operating, and roads are such 
as to allow supplies to be readily collected and troops 
moved. 

Upon our side, preparations were at once entered into 
for piercing the Confederate line in Kentucky. A river 
flotilla was built. It consisted of Eads' " turtle " gun-boats, 
which were stern-wheelers of some five hundred tons bur- 



12 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

den, light draught, and with hull barely a foot out of 
water, carrying an iron-plated casemate eight feet high 
armed with a dozen guns ; of remodelled river steamboats ; 
of flat-boats carrying heavy mortars and towed by tugs, 
and of a motley assortment of other vessels. 

On their side, the Confederates were not behind us in 
vigor, though they lacked our mechanical appliances, and 
their fleet was supplemented with several cigar-shaped 
rams. 

While in the West weapons are being wrought for con- 
flict, let us turn to the East. 



m. 

THE FIRST CLASH OF ARMS. 

HOSTILITIES were initiated in the East by General 
Geo. B. McClellan's campaign in West Virginia. 
It was essential to preserve intact the new-born State from 
the aggression of her ancient partner, and to organize her 
forces. A movement culminating in a small success at 

Philippi gave a happy inspiration to our 

June 3. 

arms, and did something to save the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad to the Federals. To recover 
possession of or interrupt this great highway, of impera- 
tive necessity to us, was the cause of constant Southern 
raids thereafter. Following upon Philippi, early in the 
summer, McClellan, with Rosecrans as his second, won an 
easy triumph over Garnett and Pegram at 

July 11. 

the battle of Rich Mountain, and definitely 
rescued West Virginia from the control of Confederate 
troops. This first success, though obtained by simple 
means, was lauded as a great strategic feat. It gave both 
McClellan and Rosecrans a reputation which did them 
eventual injustice, inasmuch as it thrust them into promi- 
nent positions which no officer in the country was equal to 

without the experience of many months and frequent fail- 

13 



14 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

ures. The nation was utterly uneducated in war. Gen- 
eral Winfield Scott, our Commander-in-Chief, whose native 
ability was unquestioned, had outlived his powers. Few 
of our officers had commanded even a regiment. Our 
only recent training had been in the Mexican War, a 
distinctly fine campaign, but of limited scope. The work 
now to be done required armies such as none since Napo- 
leon had seen under his control. Unlucky they who were 
early placed in high command. The conditions of failure 
were strong in both themselves and the people for whom 
they fought. 

Inspired by McClellan's success, General Patterson, ap- 
pointed to command Pennsylvania forces, projected a plan 
for recapturing Harper's Ferry, now held by General Jos. E. 
Johnston. This proved easy of accomplish- 

June 15. 

ment, for Johnston evacuated the place as 
untenable, destroyed the works, and retired upon Win- 
chester. Not far away, Patterson, after sundry counter- 
marchings, sat down before his opponent, under explicit 
instructions from General Scott to bring him to battle, or in 
any event to stand athwart his path and prevent his rein- 
forcing the main body of the enemy, in the movement now 
being projected toward Centreville. 

Encouraged by certain logistic successes at AnnapoHs 
and Baltimore, General Butler, who had been transferred to 

Fortress Monroe, manao^ed to make his first 

June 10. . . ' & 

military fiasco at Big Bethel. This affair, 
which was an attempt to break up a Confederate camp at 
that place, amounted to no more than to display incom- 
petency in conception and conduct. But it greatly elated 



:a€i.] 



TMS FISST CLASM OF AILMS. 



U 






il7- 



vas 



in l3ie -K^ottds far lAie 



IV. 

BULL RUN. 

IT was between the rival capitals that public opinion first 
worried our army into serious operations. The forces 
in the field at this time had grown to unusual proportions. 
On the Union side close upon two hundred thousand men 
bore arms ; on the Confederate, all but one hundred 
thousand. The Union fleet consisted of sixty-nine vessels, 
carrying one thousand three hundred and forty-six guns. 
There lay along the Potomac a full one hundred thousand 
men. But the eager champions of either belligerent were 
yet far from being soldiers. 

McDowell, who commanded the army in 

June. 

the field in front of Washington, though he 
had little confidence in the discipline of his troops, was 
constrained into action by pressure from the War Depart- 
ment and the President, who in their turn responded only 
to the clamor of the impatient North. He accordingly set 

a column of about thirty thousand men 

in motion against the Confederate general, 
Beauregard, who withdrew behind Bull Run with a some- 
what inferior force. Each was determined to measure 
swords with his ancient comrade. 

16 



1861.] 



BULL RUN. 



17 



When the armies have been brought into tactical contact, 
each commander plans a manoeuvre by which to turn the 
other's left. The Federals are earlier in the 
execution of theirs, crossing Bull Euri above 
the Stone Bridge, and come very near to crushing the Con- 




-.^ 



Bull Run. July 21, 1861. 

federate left, which has been depleted by Beauregard in 
order to strengthen his right ; for witli the latter wing he 
proposes to cross the stream at Blackburn's Ford and 
Union Mills, and to fall upon McDowell's left at Centre- 
ville. A small force of the enemy has gallantly held the 
Manassas plateau against our advance, but only with 



18 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

grievous loss. It is here that Thomas J. Jackson well 
earns the soubriquet of " Stonewall " by his solid defense. 

Victory seems to declare for McDowell. It is almost 
within his grasp. The Southern outlook is desperate. 
But Beauregard recalls his scattered forces from the right. 
The plateau is secured. The conflict is again renewed and 
with vigor. The raw troops on both sides have fought 
with a gallantry premonitory of bloodier contests. Officers 
have fallen in great numbers. Both contestants have been 
quickly exhausted, and on either side there is wanting but 
a trifling cause to incline towards victory or defeat. 

But Patterson's senility works our ruin. In lieu of 
barring Johnston's passage, his one obvious duty, he has 
left an open road for this wily soldier to escape him in the 
Valley and to march to the assistance of Beauregard. 
Johnston, with a portion of his troops, is already present. 
The rest are coming up by the railroad. 

It is 2.30 P.M. The dust of an approaching column is 
seen on the horizon. Is it Patterson ? Or is it Kirby Smith, 
with the balance of the Army of the Shenandoah ? Beau- 
regard prepares for retreat, for he fears it is the Federal 
column. But the stars and bars are finally descried. The 
Confederate hour of triumph has come. The arrival on 
the field of this last detachment throws eight thousand fresh 
troops upon the Union flank and rear, and turns the tide. 
The laurels which McDowell should have added to his 
always solid reputation are lost in a confused retreat, and 
this, before the vicinity of Washington is reached, becomes 
utter rout. The enemy is, however, in a similar strait, 
and no idea of pursuit is entertained. The losses, twenty- 



1861.] BULL RUN. 19 

seven hundred on ours and nearly as much on the enemy's 
side, show that the field has been neither won nor lost 
without stubborn contest. I Patterson, after this disgrace- 
ful lapse, retires to Harper's Ferry, where he is super- 
seded by Banks. 

After Bull Run, McClellan, fresh from his too quickly 
won laurels in West Virginia, was placed in supreme 
command, and sat down to the giant's task of making a 
mob an army. The South, lulled into the* exultant belief 
that this one victory would suffice to close the war, 
really suffered worse than the consequences of a defeat in 
allowing self-applause to take the place of a vigorous 
course of discipline. Bull Run worked benefit to the 
Union in as great measure as it damaged the Confederate 
cause. The minds of all in the Northern States were 
cemented by this disaster into the one purpose of crushing 
out the heresy of secession. 

Generals Rosecrans and R. E. Lee lay 
facing each other in West Virginia, with 
some ten thousand men apiece. There are but three roads 
across the Alleghanies in this State. One, near the 
Potomac, the Federals had kept; one, further south, at 
Great Pass, McClellan's campaign had secured ; the 
third, by way of Sewell's Mountain, was still open. While 
Rosecrans had moved south, against Floyd, 
at Gauley river, who retired after a combat 
at Carnifex Ferry, Lee sought to overcome J. J. Reynolds' 
brigade, which alone was left in his front at 
Great Pass. But his method showed none ^^ ^^ ^^ 
of the wonderful vigor he later on exhibited, and, after 



20 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

fairly surrounding Reynolds, he failed to attack him, and 
returned to make head against Rosecrans. He thus 
enabled Reynolds to assume the offensive against his 
lieutenant. But Reynolds' attack at Green- 
brier River had no results. Meanwhile 
Rosecrans, though with a weaker force, had succeeded in 
shutting Lee up in the defiles of Sewell's Mountain, 
but lacked numbers sufficient to warrant attack. Lee 
was recalled to other duties. After a couple 
of minor engagements on the Greenbrier, 
New, and Gauley Rivers, which had small importance, 
winter put an end to operations in this barren region. 

This disjointed campaign proved of value in that it 
enabled us to maintain our hold on the new State of West 
Virginia. But the tools of war were in raw hands, and 
the operations were as incomplete as the country was 
rugged, and the means of transportation difficult. 

We must now turn to what the active West has 
accomplished. 



V. 



THE MIGHTY WEST MOVES. 

THE operations in Missouri command but a passing 
notice, as all trans-Mississippi manoeuvres bore small 
relation to the general strategy of the more important 
fields. Yet, as the possession of any part of that State 
by the enemy would have made the opening of the Mis- 
sissippi river a much more onerous task for us, the work 
of rescuing its entire territory from Confederate control 
deserves its due credit among the efforts of the war. 

General Lyon had assumed control of affairs in Mis- 
souri, and had dispersed the forces of seced- 

. . June 17. 

ing Governor Jackson at Boone ville, while 

Sigel, an ancient German officer, had been very active in 

raising a small force of volunteers in the lower counties, 

and had crossed swords with the enemy at 

July 5. 

Carthage ; but, meeting with a reverse, he 
was fain to retire to Springfield under the aegis of his 
chief. The effect of these and other lesser operations 
had narrowed the control of the Confederates to the 
south-west corner of the State, whither Lyon had pushed 
his little army. It was not long, however, before 
Lyon, unsupported by his superior, Fremont, found 

21 



22 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [18G1. 

that the advance of the Confederates Price 
^' and McCulloch upon his position at Spring- 

field with a large force was seriously compromising his 
safety. 

To rescue himself he boldly assailed the enemy at 
Wilson's Creek. Sigel was sent by a circuit to fall 
upon the enemy's rear, but his men, 
largely three months' volunteers, whose time 
was nearly up, fought half-heartedly, and his own lack 
of conduct resulted in defeat. Lyon was outnumbered 
two to one. The battle fought here was one of the 
most stubborn minor contests of the war. The Federals 
lost the field, and gallant Lyon his life, while heading a 
charge to retrieve the disasters of the day. The little 
army was barely rescued from destruction by a summary 
retreat, happily without pursuit, to Springfield, under 
command of Major Sturgis. Out of six thousand men 
our casualties were twelve hundred. The enemy lost a 
less number out of twelve thousand. The Southerners 
have named this victory "Oak Hills." 

The Confederates were soon able to score an additional 
triumph in Missouri by the capture of Lexington, of 
which place Colonel Mulligan was in com- 
mand. Price advanced from Wilson's 
Creek. With some three thousand men, Mulligan bravely 
held the town against Price with twenty thousand, until 
his water supply was cut off, when he surrendered 
what remained of his force. The enemy had thus re- 
covered for a time a substantial part of the State. 

After many delays Fremont finally took the field 



1861.] THE MIGHTY WEST MOVES. 23 

with forty thousand men, and advanced to Springfield, 
the Confederates having already retired. He seems to 
have expected to fight a battle here, though the enemy 
was actually some sixty miles away; but on the eve 
of this hypothetical combat he was super- 

1 1 1 TT 1 • T o T • November 2. 

seded by Hunter, and retired to ot. JLouis. 

Fremont undoubtedly possessed ability, and had in 
former days exliibited brilliant qualities in irregular war- 
fare ; but his conduct in the Civil War lacked every 
element of usefulness. 

Meanwhile, in July, General Pope took command in 
Northern Missouri, which, by a few vigorous blows with 
sword and pen, he cleared from open and secret rebels. 
He later rescued the region between the 

r\ 1 1 A/T' • • n /-^ July-December. 

Osage and the Missouri rivers from Con- 
federate control. He was building for himself the repu- 
tation which soon placed him in command beyond his 
powers. 

All these stirring events in Missouri evinced the 
greatest activity ; but their only effect on the general 
struggle lay in the moral weight the possession of this 
State gave to our arms. 

In the shifting of commanders, so constant in the 
first years of the war. General Halleck early became 
chief player on the chess-board west of the Appalachians, 
while his subordinates accomplished, in 

November. 

great part, the results attributed to his 
strategic ability. Halleck was a most scholarly soldier. 
In the cabinet none was more astute. But his action 
was slow. In the field he personally brought to pass 



24 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861. 

nothing. Subsequently, as Commander-in-Chief at Wash- 
ino-ton, his peculiar methods more than once induced 
disaster. 

General Sherman had succeeded Anderson in Ken- 
tucky. General Grant began to display 
his activity, and enabled the troops under 
his orders to learn something of warfare, in an expedition 
against Belmont. With a force of three 
thousand men he moved from Cairo against 
the Confederate camp at that place, and, though obliged 
after a day's skirmishing to retire with a loss of five 
hundred men, he nevertheless broke up the insurgents' 
stronghold. The Confederates may lay such claim to 
victory as the possession of the field of battle always 
gives. No permanent gain was accomplished by Grant, 
and he was forced to retire to Cairo. 




Longitude 



^RS! 



VI. 

THE FIRST CONFEDERATE LINE BROKEN. 



A. 



T the beginning of the new year the Union armies 
were five hundred and seventy-six 

January, 1862. 

thousand strong, backed by a fleet of two 
hundred and twelve vessels. McClellan lay quiet upon 
the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing, disciplining 
the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe Johns- 
ton, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with 
equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. 

The Western generals were more actiye. Albert Sid- 
ney Johnston, perhaps the most promising Southern offi- 
cer,was in command in the West, with head-quarters at 
Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's jsTovember 
front, having superseded Sherman, whose (I86I.) 
("crazy" suggestion that two hundred and fifty thousand 
men would be required for operations on the Western field 
had lost him the confidence of his superiors. There was 
^bundant method in his madness, as time all too fully 
jhowed. 

Sin Eastern Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey Mar- 
all had been creating more or less political trouble, and 
f eneral Garfield was sent against him with some two 

1 25 



26 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

thousand men. Marshall somewhat outnumbered Gar- 
field ; but in a vigorous January campaign, 
culminating at Prestonburg, Garfield quite 
dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains. 

About the same time, Zollicoffer, who had held the 
extreme right of the Confederate line in advance of Cum- 
berland Gap, had retired from his post and joined Crit- 
tenden near Mill Springs, in Central Kentucky ; and to 
General George H. Thomas was committed the duty of 
disposing of them. With a somewhat superior force 
Thomas moved upon the enemy, and in a sharp engage- 
ment at Logan's Cross Roads, utterly broke 
up their army. Zollicoffer was killed. This 
first of our substantial Western victories (called " Fish- 
ing Creek" by the enemy) was a great encouragement 
to our arms. Our loss was two hundred and fifty, to 
the enemy's five hundred. Crittenden withdrew his troops 
across the Cumberland, abandoning his 
anuaiy^ . j^^.^Qjgj,^ ^j^j trains. Eastern Kentucky 

was thus freed from the Confederates. 

Halleck's first task as commander of the Western armies 
was to penetrate the Confederate line of defense. This 
could be done by breaking its centre or by turning one of 
its flanks. The former appeared most feasible to Grant 
and Commodore Foote, who commanded the naval forces. 
Under instructions from Halleck, seven of 
the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's seventeen 
thousand men in reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to 
attack Fort Henry and essay the value of gun-boats in am- 
phibious warfare. Grant landed below the fort, and Foote 



1862.] 



FIRST CONFEDERATE LINE BROKEN. 



27 



then opened fire upon it. Tilghman, in command, fore- 
seeing its capture, was shrewd enough to send off the bulk 
of his force to Fort Donelson. He himself 

February 6. 

made a mock defense with a handful of men, 
surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way. 
Without the twin citadel of Donelson, however, Fort 
Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could ad- 
vance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threat- 
ened its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first 
laurels as a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn 
fight, the surrender of this second fortress with its entire 



Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the 
place. He must here fight for the possession of Nashville. 
Fort Donelson was strongly fortified and garrisoned. 




Forts Henry and Donelson. Feb. 6 and 16, 1862, 



Grant moved against it from Fort Henry with fifteen thou- 
sand men, six thousand less than the enemy. 

The ground is difficult ; the troops are green. But heavy 



28 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's aid. The 
fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity 
of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily 
there is not much ability in the defence. Floyd, the 
senior officer, determines to cut his way out. He falls 
heavily upon Grant's right, held by McClernand and 
backed by Wallace, thinking to thrust them aside from the 
river and to escape over the road so won. A stubborn 
resistance defeats this sortie, though but narrowly. A 
general assault is ordered, which effects a lodgment in the 
works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd, Buckner, 
and Pillow weaken the defense so as to oper- 

February 16. 

ate a surrender. 
Our loss was two thousand eight hundred. The Con- 
federates captured were nearly fifteen thousand men. 

These successes broke through the centre of the Con- 
federate line, established with so much pains, and compro- 
mised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to a 
new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowhng 
Green on receipt of the news of the fall of 

February 14. 

Fort Henry, and was forced thereby to cede 
to Buell possession of Nashville, and practically of Ken- 
tucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi at Colum- 
bus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the 
armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some sixty 
miles below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon 
a very substantial gain. 



yii. 

NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10. 

THE left flank of the Confederate line, thus entrenched 
at New Madrid and Island No. 10, is still too far 
advanced to be safely held more than a short time. Pope 
receives orders to reduce the place, and in 

^ March 3. 

less than two weeks puts in an appearance 
at New Madrid. He has some twenty thousand men, well 
equipped and officered. The enemy is under command 
of General McCown, later replaced by General Mackall, 
with a much inferior force. 

The Mississippi here makes one of its gigantic double 
loops. Island No. 10 lies at the bottom of the southerly 
loop, and New Madrid at the bottom of the northerly. 
Across the isthmus of the upper loop is about three miles ; 
across the lower, four. In rear of Island No. 10 on the 
mainland to the south is swampy ground, making exit pos- 
sible only by the river, by New Madrid, or by a single road 
at Tiptonville. Pope's first effort is devoted to rendering 
New Madrid untenable, by effecting a lodgment at Point 
Pleasant below the town, and by erectino" 

March 6. 

siege batteries near New Madrid so as to cut it 

off from its source of supply. By this action he compels its 



30 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

surreoder. Commodore Foote now comes 

March 14. pit 

upon the scene from above, and supplements 
Pope's efforts, by attacking the defenses of Island No. 10 




New Madrid and Island No. 10. March, 1862. 

with his heavy guns. The river is exceptionally high ; 
gun-boats can fire across country. The possession of 
the river and of New Madrid has left the enemy only 
the Tiptonville road to escape upon. To secure this, 
Pope must procure transports to get his men across the 
river. The transports are all above Island No. 10 and 
cannot be run past the batteries. With gigantic labor a 
canal is cut across the isthmus, through heavily wooded 
country, from a point opposite New Madrid to that place, 



1862.] 



NFW HAD RID AND ISLAND NO. 10. 



31 



and the transports are floated through, thus 
escaping Island No. 10. Two gun-boats ^^ 

run the batteries. Pope transfers Paine's division to the 
Tennessee shore, and Foote again attacks with his flotilla. 
Entirely cut off" from succor or retreat, the w^hole force 
surrenders, consisting of seven thousand men. 

Pope received hearty congratulations for this brilliant 
exploit, which had lasted but thirty days, and accomplished 
such excellent results. 

In Missouri General Curtis still held all the ground 
which had been gained, against Price and Van Dorn, 
defeated the insurgents, and drove them into the Bos- 




Pea Ridge. Mapch 5-8, 1862. 

ton Mountains in the north-western part of Arkansas. 
They here accumulated a motley force of not far 



32 BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

from thirty thousand men. Curtis had but eleven thou- 
sand. But in a two days' conflict at Pea Ridge (Confed- 
erate " Elk Horn ") in which Van Dorn 
March 7-8. ^ 

commanded the enemy, Cm^tis defeated him 

with a loss of three thousand men. Ours was much less. 

Price, before the commencement of the battle, had 
managed to get into Curtis' rear, and stood across the 
post-road, his only line of retreat. This obliged Curtis 
to change front to rear. The first day's combat was dis- 
advantageous to the Federals ; they were placed where 
they must beat the enemy or surrender. The Confeder- 
ates had met with heavy losses, and on the second day 
did not exhibit the discipline of the first. Sigel was 
thrown upon their flank, and after brilliant conduct on both 
sides, Curtis wrested victory from a desperate strait. 

This good fortune definitely relieved the Federals of any 
anxiety regarding Missouri, and did great credit to Curtis' 
endurance and capacity. 

After this campaign the enemy never made his appear- 
ance in force in that State. Curtis shortly undertook a 
march across country to the Mississippi 
river, and arrived in due time at Helena, 
Ark. 

During the spring and summer of this year the Depart- 
ment of Missouri was under command of 

June to September. i o i n ii -r» 

Greneral ochofield. But there were no 
larger operations, though numerous bodies of guerillas, and 
some organized forces, were dispersed, and the State was 
brought to a condition of greater quiet under his sensible 
and vigorous administration. 



YIII. 

THE BLOCKADE. 

WITHIN the territory of the Southern Confederacy- 
there was an abundance of corn and cotton. The 
former sufficed to feed the people and the armies. The 
latter was useless unless it could be marketed ; for there 
were no cotton factories in the South. If the Confederacy 
could sell its cotton at its vastly appreciated price in the 
English marts, it could buy materials of war which might 
help it indefinitely to prolong the contest. Cost was the 
last thing thought of in the manufacturing towns abroad, 
which must have the raw material, or starve; and the 
exceptional profit to be made in this traflac induced 
numberless vessels to ply from European ports, or 
from Nassau, Havana, and Bermuda, to the Southern 
outlets, laden with all manner of goods, from Arm- 
strong guns to quinine, which they could exchange for 
cotton. 

The United States adopted the usual military means of 
preventing this trade by employing its abundant naval 
resources to blockade the Southern ports ; and the embargo 
was more or less effective during the whole war. Still, 

many merchantmen did manage to run in and out of 

33 



34 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

Southern ports, and yet other vessels, built and armed in the 
Confederacy and abroad, preyed upon our commerce under 
letters of marque from the Confederate Government. By 
the latter these cruisers were regarded as men-of-war. 
We called them pirates, because we denied the validity of 
their commissions. These vessels captured all merchant- 
men sailing under American colors, and sold or destroyed 
them and their cargoes. We kept a fleet on all the great 
highways of commerce to prevent this depredation, but 
only partially succeeded. The eventual result was that our 
merchant marine was ruined. In 1861 we were the great 
ocean-carriers of the world ; by 1865 nearly all freight 
was carried in English bottoms. 

Our navy at the outbreak of the war was in very poor 
condition ; but with the greatest vigor it was at once 
taken in hand, and the gaps filled temporarily, until more 
substantial vessels could be constructed. Craft of all 
kinds were pressed into service ; even ferry-boats made 
up into eiFective men-of-war. A converted Fulton ferry- 
boat captured the "Circassian" off Havana, — an ex- 
ceedingly valuable prize. The types of vessel which came 
mostly into use were converted merchantmen, sloops, gun- 
boats, double-enders, and iron-clads. 

To declare the Southern ports blockaded was a bold 

step with the limited means at our command. The recent 

Declaration of Paris had been to the effect that, to be 

binding, a blockade must be a substantial danger to the 

passers in and out. Still, with our national 
April 27, 1861. -^ . 

adaptiveness to circumstances, we managed, 

after announcing the blockade in the spring, to make it 




t.Eislier 

3 ^ 



1 . Valkezhi ^^ 

i't.Pxilaski ^^^D 






,TYBEE ISLAND 



^^S ^ THEATRE OF 

Ft.Wagnj^r;^ Sumter ^ GEORGIA AND 

^ CAKOI.INAS CAMPAIGNS 



SOALE OT MILES 



25 50 



V^Ossabaw Sound- 



THE BLOCKADE. 35 

de facto during the summer, and at the most important 
points within a month. 

The theory of the United States was, of course, that the 
Southern hostilities were an insurrection, and not a war. 
But the enormous extent of the uprising obliged us to 
construe this theory very liberally, and to do many things 
on a war scale. The position was often inconsistent, but 
was fairly well maintained. By 1864 we were blockading 
a coast three thousand miles in extent, — a thing utterly 
unprecedented. 

The blockade was naturally not heard as much of as the 
land operations, nor had it the same effect in suppressing 
insurrection ; but it necessitated a vast amount of hard- 
ship and danger. Nor must its services be under- 
rated. There were often naval fights of importance with 
vessels built in the blockaded ports to run out and break 
up the embargo. A typical combat was that between the 

Atlanta and Weehawken. The former left 

o 1 11111-.. n '^"^^ 17,1863. 

feavannah to attack the blockadmg fleet. 

Much was expected from her efforts. But she fell foul 
of the Weehawken, whose heavy ordnance proved quickly 
too much for her. In fifteen minutes, and with but five 
shots from the 15-inch guns, she was disabled and capt- 
ured. 

It must not be forgotten that this was still the day of 
the old naval regime. To-day a navy cannot be created 
in less than a dozen years ; then, the wooden ship was 
still the type of fighting craft, and a few weeks sufliced 
to convert a merchantman into a very useful man-of-war. 



IX. 

EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 

THE briefest mention of the principal outskirt opera- 
tions must suffice. 
Hatteras Inlet had become a place of much resort for 
Confederate cruisers and blockade runners. To break up 
this rendezvous, General Butler, whose military reputation 
was then still reasonably intact, and Commo- 
dore Stringham, with a land force and small 
fleet, were despatched thither from Fort Monroe. After 
a bombardment of two days, the forts protecting the 
Inlet were captured and garrisoned by our troops. Be- 
yond this nothing was undertaken. 

Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, had at the outbreak of 
the war been preserved to the Union, and was held by a 
October 9, small force of troops. Some interchange of 

November 22-23. hostilities took place at this point, with no 
result beyond giving us a yet firmer foothold, which was 
not," however, utilized to push operations into the interior. 
In this same month fifteen thousand men, under com- 
October and mand of General T. W. Sherman, and in con- 
November, yoy of Admiral Dupont, were sent to Port 

Royal, S.C. Fort Walker, on Hilton Head, was capt- 
36 



1861-2.] EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 37 

ured by the fleet, and Beaufort, S.C., abandoned by the 
enemy. Sherman fortified Hilton Head, and Dupont took 
Tybee Island at the entrance to Savannah. But no orders 
were issued for following up these successes, and whatever 
could have been accomplished was forfeited. General 
Parke captured Fort Macon, defendinor 

T^ P AT r^ 1 M -r. -^P^'il 26, 1862. 

Beaufort, rs.C, while Reno made a 
barren expedition towards the rear of Norfolk. 

Early in the new year Burnside and Goldsborough, with 
twelve thousand men and a fleet of light- 

January, 1862. 

draught gun boats, set sail for Pamlico and 
Albemarle Sounds, N.C., with a purpose similar to the 
Port Royal expedition. General Wise commanded the 
Confederates at this point. After much danger from 
storms, and delay from the difficulty of passage into the 
Sound, Roanoke Island was captured, and a portion of 
the fleet took possession of Elizabeth City. February and 
Later New Berne was taken by Foster, as March. 
well as the town of AYashington near by. But again no 
sensible demonstration into the interior was attempted. 

About the same time Capt. C. H. Davis made a recon- 
noissance of Fort Pulaski, the main defense 

. January, 1862. 

of the city or i^avannah. As a consequence, 
some works were erected on adjacent islands, for the pur- 
pose of isolating Pulaski ; and, two months after, Wright 
and Dupont visited and garrisoned several 

March, 1862. 

points on the coast of Florida. 

General Hunter succeeded Sherman. Gilmore was the 
enojineer officer in immediate charge of the 

. March, 1862. 

operations against Fort Pulaski. After 



38 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2. 

some time spent in preparation he got ready 
' to begin his bombardment from Tybee Island, 
and two days sufficed to reduce the place. Thenceforth 
Savannah was isolated from the outside world. 

The fisrht between the Merrimac and the Monitor — 
the first combat of iron-clads — opened a new era in naval 
warfare. The Merrimac had been built in Norfolk. She 
was a huge, iron-plated, casemated hulk, whose armor could 
resist all artillery then known. She was probably not 
seaworthy enough for a cruise ; but she could make her- 
self mistress of the Chesapeake ; she would have prevented 
troops from landing on the Peninsula ; and she might have 
approached and bombarded Washington. Great apprehen- 
sion was felt about her. The only worthy antagonist of 
this terrible vessel was the Monitor, — a low-decked craft 
with a turret, " a raft with a cheese-box on it," as she was 
laughingly called, — which was building at the same time 
in Brooklyn. The contest was as much a race between 
mechanics at the start, as between seamen at the close. 
The earliest constructed vessel should win the laurels. 

The Merrimac made her appearance first. Leaving Nor- 
folk she steamed for Newport News, near 

March 8, 1862. ^ 

Fort Monroe, destroyed the United States 

frigates Cumberland and Congress, and forced the Min- 
nesota aground, before the Monitor came up. The latter 
reached the scene of action during the night. Next day a 
gallant struggle ended in what has been called a drawn 
battle ; but the Merrimac put back into Norfolk disabled. 
She had been "neutralized," and the class of iron-clads, of 
which the Monitor was the first, became the type from 



1861-2.] EARLY OUT SKIRT OPERATIONS. 39 

which grew a large fleet. We could fah'ly claim the 
victory, as the Monitor had nipped the career of the 
Merrimac in the bud. 

The blockade at New Orleans had been peculiarly dif- 
ficult to keep intact, and several privateers, as well as many 
merchantmen, had been able to break 

Oct.-Dec, 1861. 

tlu-ough. Among these the ram Ma- 
nassas steamed down the river, and made a sudden diver- 
sion among the blockading squadron ; but it was of no 
great duration, and quite without result. 

December. 

Towards the close of the year Ship Island, 
near New Orleans, had been occupied by Union troops. 
General Butler had charge of this department, but had 
brought nothing to a head. Admiral Farragut, with 
Porter second in command, reached the place 

^ February, 1862. 

in the early spring to see what could be 

done. The capture of New Orleans would not only exert 

a very depressing effect upon the Confederates, but the 

city would also serve as a base for operations up the 

Mississippi, in connection with those already moving 

down. 

The approaches to New Orleans by the main channel 
were held by two strong works. Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip, and the river was patrolled by a flotilla. Farragut 
moored his mortar-boats below the forts, 

April 18. 

back of a bend in the river, and for six days 
bombarded Fort Jackson ; but, impatient to secure the city, 
he determined to try the experiment of running his fleet 
past the forts, and thus to isolate them. This was a feat 
never before attempted and of questionable result. But, to 



40 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2. 

the utter astonishment of the Confederates, it was success- 
fully accomplished, and the next day Farra- 

April 25. 

gut took possession of JSTew Orleans, evacu- 
ated by General Lovell on his approach. 

Porter shortly afterwards received the surrender of the 
forts, — it is claimed, on account of a mutiny 

April 28. . 

of the garrison of Fort Jackson, — and they 
were duly occupied. Butler then took possession of the 
city with his troops. 

It must be said in praise of Butler, that in provost-mar- 
shal work, such as he was called upon to perform in New 
Orleans, he showed remarkable capacity. The city was 
never healthier or in finer condition than under his regime. 
There was, however, just complaint against him in matters 
connected with trade ; nor did he make the least attempt 
to mix suavity of method with strength of action in his 
government of the city. 

This long series of coast operations, none of which, 
except Farragut's, had any immediate effect upon the war, 
was yet not without its uses. It was essential to keep up 
a strict blockade, for, by the law of nations, none but an 
effective one is a blockade at all ; and it was a sine qua non 
to forestall any disposition on the part of foreign nations to 
aid the enemy. All these ends were subserved to a con- 
siderable extent. And as the only enlightened military 
policy is to concentrate against and destroy the large armies 
in the field, it is perhaps well that no greater numbers 
were taken from the all-important work, to be frittered 
away on minor operations on the coast. Still some of the 
expeditions were in such force that they really drained 



1861-2.] EARLY OUT SKIRT OPERATIONS. ■ 41 

the large armies ; and it seems as if they might have 

annoyed the enemy by frequent incursions on a large scale 

into the country, thus drawing troops from the armies in 

front of those of their comrades who w^ere fighting the 

more sanguinary battles of the war, but often to no good 

pui'pose. 

In the early part of 1862 the Confederate general, 

Sibley, undertook a campaign against the 

t-r ' n • 1 p • XT February. 

Umon forces, occupying the forts m New 
Mexico under command of Canby. He advanced up the 
Kio Grande, with considerable physical labor, but met with 
brilliant success in several combats where his hardy Texans 
proved more than a match for Canby 's regulars. The con- 
duct of the regulars did on this occasion no justice to the 
splendid record they made for themselves during the war. 

But Sibley's triumphs were resultless. He found that 
he could not maintain himself in that territory, and he was 
eventually forced to abandon it to the Federal forces and 
make a disastrous retreat. 



X. 



THE ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. — 
SHILOH. 

nVTO sooner liad untiring Grant ruptured the Confeder- 
al-^ ate line at Donelson, than he proposed to ascend the 
Tennessee and essay to break their new defence along the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The key points of this 
line were Memphis on one flank, with Fort Pillow up the 
river as an outpost ; Chattanooga on the other flank, and 
Corinth as a centre. While McClellan was making vast 
preparations for his Peninsular campaign. Grant quietly 
transported his army to Pittsburgh Landino^, 

March, 1862. / ^ -. -rx n , -. . . 

on the Tennessee, and Halleck despatched 
Buell, vdth thirty-seven thousand men, from Nashville 
across the country to join him. General Mitch el, with a 
division, was sent out as a flying left flank to seize and 
hold some point on the Memphis and Charleston Radroad, 
where the Confederates were not in force. This railroad 
was the great central east and west artery of the Confed- 
eracy. South of it all railroad transportation had to go 
by way of Mobile. And it was of the last importance to 
the enemy. 

Mitchel, with great celerity, proceeded upon his task, 
42 



1862.] ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 43 

captured Huntsville, and despatched parties 
along: the road east and west to hold bridojes 
and destroy material of war. Alarmed at his movements, 
Beauregard sent a cavalry detachment to operate against 
him, while Halleck, apparently unable to handle two 
simultaneous problems, afforded him no support. His 
position was precarious ; but, burning the bridge at 
Decatur, he moved eastward, and occupied Bridgeport. 
With proper reinforcements Mitchel could have seized 
Chattanooga, and have even raided on Eome and Atlanta, 
and there destroyed the foundries and arsenals, — an inter- 
ruption which would have been of grave consequence to 
the insurgents ; but his operations were neglected by 
Halleck, as of secondary importance. 

Beauregard, who held a species of second command 
under A. S. Johnston, had formed certain ambitious plans 
for an advance on Cairo and St. Louis. Not so Johnston, 
whose soldier's wit told him that the armies in the field 
must be first beaten before conquest could follow, and who 
preferred to make solid preparation for a decisive struggle 
near Corinth. 

These movements lead to the first of those desperately 
contested battles in which Americans have shown them- 
selves preeminent. While McClellan is laboriously dig- 
ffino; his way into Yorktown, Johnston ad- 
vances from Corinth, purposing a descent 
upon Grant's army at Pittsburgh Landing, before the 
arrival of Buell. Grant has under his command forty- 
five thousand effectives. Buell is yet two marches dis- 
tant. Johnston's force is forty thousand men. With a 



44 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1862. 

suddenness we had in those early days not learned to 
guard against, Johnston falls upon our 

April 6. ^ 

army. The onslaught bears our lines back. 
We have been taken unawares. The troops are not 
well in hand. Grant is, for the moment, absent. Wal- 




Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing). April 6 and 7, 1862. 

lace is at Crump's Landing, with seventy-five hundred 
men, useless for the emergency. 



1862.] AD VANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 45 

Johnston's plan is simple. Attack constantly by the 
right and drive the Federals from the Landing and into 
the angle made by Snake Creek and the river. Beaure- 
gard, Hardee, Bragg, his lieutenants, are well able to 
second him. The onset is full of fire. Sherman, on our 
right, struggles manfully to hold Shiloh Church ; but it is 
wrenched from his grip. Prentiss is surrounded and 
captured. The left is almost crushed. Recognizing the 
serious emergency, Sherman, with McClernand to back 
him up, fights desperately to hold the road across Snake 
Creek, by which Wallace can join them. At this juncture 
Johnston is killed. His place there is no one to fill. The 
Confederate lin«es begin to show huge gaps from casualties, 
and yet greater ones from stragglers, tempted by the prizes 
in the abandoned Federal camps. But the army, still in 
line, strikes lustily for its goal almost won, — Pittsburgh 
Landing. 

Happily for us, success itself has disorganized the 
enemy's ranks. A number of heavy guns have been 
massed at the Landing, The ground is favorable. The 
advance brigade of Buell's army puts in an appearance. All 
is not yet lost. And Beauregard, who succeeds to the 
command, under the impression that Buell is still distant, 
and wishing to reform his troops and complete the victory 
on the morrow, suspends the battle. 

But the situation yet is critical. Buell is near at hand, 
but he must be got across the river and on the field. 
Sherman, on the right, is in much disorder. The rest of 
the Union Army is fairly huddled into a narrow space 
near the Landing. Our fortunes still bear a questionable 



46 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

aspect, but faint-heartedness possesses no one. Happily, 
transports can be procured for Buell ; and by early dawn 
on the morrow he is able to put twenty-four thousand fresh 
soldiers in array against the wearied Confederates. 

The second day dawns. Beauregard 
struggles hard to keep what has ah'cady 
been fairly won ; and his troops, though decimated, second 
his purpose nobly. At one moment, though greatly out- 
numbered, he succeeds in all but turning the Union left 
by the same tactics which won so much on yesterday. 
But Buell's men have profited by their rigid discipline. 
Their ranks are adamant. They will not be denied. An 
order for a general advance is given. Wallace comes 
up on the right. Victory shifts to the stars and stripes. 
The exhausted Confederates are forced in confusion from 
the field. 

The losses at Shiloh were thirteen thousand on our side, 
two thousand less on the Confederate ; but this does not 
count the grievous loss by the death of Johnston. With a 
reputation for skill which experience in the Black Hawk 
and Mexican Wars, and the expedition to Utah, 
had fully warranted, he was deemed by the South the 
choicest of her soldiers ; and better could the enemy 
have spared thousands of her sons than this one. 

Eeturning to Corinth, unpursued by Grant, Beauregard 

heavily fortifies the place. He is leisurely followed up by 

Halleck, who has assumed personal command of the forces 

under Grant, Buell, and Pope, the latter 

May 1. 

having joined from a projected attack on 
Fort Pillow. Halleck very deliberately opens the siege. 



1862.] ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 47 

with his forces recruited up to one hundred thousand men, 
while Beauregard numbers fifty thousand effectives. Op- 
erations would have sooner culminated had Halleck left 
their direction to his more energetic second in command, 
Grant. 

Corinth was naturally strong, and easily victualled. 
By very slow degrees the several divisions worked their 
way nearer the town. Beauregard contested every inch, 
while preparing constantly for evacuation. Finally our 
troops had reached a position from wliich assault was 
feasible. But Beauresrard, who had har- 

May 30. 

bored no idea of permanent defense, aban- 
doned the place as untenable. 

This was alleged to be a strategic manoeuvre on his 
part ; but in what manner is not clear, for, beyond 
detaining Halleck some weeks, he can scarcely claim to 
have accomplished any good end by the defense of Corinth, 
and the Confederacy lost with Corinth its main line of 
communication east and west. Its voluntary evacuation 
seems to be without purpose. A stubborn defense might 
as well have been made here as at any other point ; and 
to yield the Memphis and Charleston Kailroad without a 
struggle was surely a lame military proceeding. 

The natural result of these successes fol- 

June 5. 

lowed. Fort Pillow was evacuated, and 

Memphis surrendered to Davis and the flotilla, after a 

smart battle with the Confederate fleet. The 

-_ June 6. 

Mississippi river was now open down to 
Vicksburg. 

In little more than a year the western armies had accom- 



48 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 1862. 

plished a task to wliicli they could point with just pride. 
The public could see the result of their labors, and natu- 
rally yielded to them the palm. In the East apparently 
no gain had been made. The different conditions under 
which each army worked were not fully considered. As 
in all human affairs, the victor wore the crown. 



McCLELLAN MOVES TO THE PENINSULA. 

OUR attention is now due to the Army of the Potomac. 
Since McClellan had been in command the army 
had grown rapidly in discipline and efficiency. As an 
organizer McClellan was in his element. Few have ever 
done more substantial work than he ; and well did the 
Army of the Potomac testify to his ability in its subsequent 
campaigns. Little memorable had occurred for months, 
save the Ball's Bluff disaster narrated below. The 
enemy had lain encamped at Manassas and Centreville. 
Geary's brigade had obtained a slight success at Harper's 
Ferry. Every one was impatient to cross swords in ear- 
nest. Seven strong divisions garrisoned the fortifications of 
Washington, or occupied the banks of the Potomac from 
Alexandria up, in all some one hundred and fifty thousand 
men. 

McClellan has seventy-five thousand efiec- 

-, n , ^ 1 -, XX October 16, 1861. 
tives who can be spared for the field. He 

reconnoitres with his right wing across the Potomac. No 

enemy is found north of Centreville. Stone is ordered to 

patrol his front, to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy 

j and develop his strength. He sends a regiment across the 

49 



50 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2. 

river at Ball's Bluif, with Baker's brigade in support, to 
capture Leesburg. But with singular blindness he fails to 
provide a sufficient means of recrossing in an emergency. 
The river is high and the current strong. The advance 
regiment feels the enemy near Leesburg and falls back. 
Stone insanely crosses more men, two thou- 

October21. . ^ 

sand in all, to follow up what he deems a 
success. Without means of retreat, these troops are 
attacked by the enemy in force, driven back to the 
Potomac, and, before they can cross or scatter, are crowded 
upon the narrow banks of the river, below a bluff on 
which stand the Confederates. After a gallant attempt at 
defense barely one-half the force are able to save them- 
selves from this slaughter-pen, — a success wliich greatly 
inspirited the South. General Stone is imprisoned to 
appease the Northern public. 

A handsome combat and victory by Ord, 

December 20. 

at DranesviUe, a tew weeks later, where 
about an equal number on each side came in collision, com- 
pensated partly for this defeat. 

After a variety of plans discussed, and manifold delays in 

arriving at one satisfactory to the President 

MarcliS, 1862. -, , . ,^ ^^ ^, ,, , -, , -, -, 

and himself, McClellan had concluded to 
transfer his forces to the Perinsula between the York and 
James rivers, and had received the President's sanction to 
the scheme. No sooner was this decision reached than Joe 
Johnston, who had been in command of all the troops in 
front of Washington since Bull Run, evacuated Manassas, 

and anticipated McClellan in his march. 

March 9. ^ 

Secrecy was not one of om' then virtues. 



1862.] MgCLELLAN MOVES TO THE PENINSULA. 51 

The newspapers were able to publish all prospective move- 
ments with scandalous accuracy ; and what these were 
unable to learn, secession sympathizers at the capital 
appeared constantly to unearth for the benefit of their 
Southern friends. 

Stonewall Jackson, now in command in 

o, -.111 1 . Januaiy, 1862. 

the ohenandoah, had essayed a wmter 
campaign against our General Lander, but when Manassas 
was evacuated he fell back up the Valley. General 
Shields succeeded Lander, and, desiring to engage Jack- 
son, devised a plan to lure him back by a simulated retreat. 
Followed up by Ashby's cavalry, a stand is made at Kerns- 
town. Jackson arrives, expecting to crush a small 
detachment. Banks is absent. Shields has been wounded ; 
but our troops, well led by subordinates, invite attack, and 
inflict on Jackson a smart defeat, with a loss 
of five hundred men on each side. Jackson 
again retires up the Valley. Even the Confederates 
admitted that this eminent soldier had for once been 
entrapped, — a thing of rare occurrence. 

Vigor half equal to his ability should months ago have 
enabled McClellan to crush his enemy at Centre ville ; for, 
with sixty thousand men, Johnston had for eight months 
, bidden defiance to our capital, surrounded with one hundred 
and eighty thousand armed men. Such vigor should have 
cleared the Potomac of the impertinent blockade. It 
should have captured Norfolk, — that nest of Merrimacs 
and gun-boats. It should have brought him to the very 
gates of Richmond. Had but a part of these results been 
accomplished, MoClellan would have enjoyed the full con- 



52 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1862. 

fidence and support of all in power. But now other 
influences were beginning to work. Fremont, for whom 
some harmless place must be made, was put in command 
of the "Mountain Department," in West Virginia, and 
furnished with an army to confront an imaginary enemy. 
Banks kept twenty odd thousand men to defend the Valley 
against Jackson's eight thousand ; and the President wanted 
at lowest fifty thousand men in the immediate vicinity of 
Washington, heedless of the fact recognized by all military 
minds that to keep the enemy busy was the only sure 
defense of the capital. 

In consequence of all this no sooner had McClellan 
fairly embarked on his expedition than he found a large 
part of his available force taken from him. He had 
planned a " rapid movement," and had been led to expect 
the cooperation of the navy on the York river, as well as 
that of McDowell's forty thousand men on the Fredericks- 
burg route. Both these were to fail him. 

With early spring McClellan embarked his troops, 
transferred them to the vicinity of Fort 

March and i -r» • 

Monroe, and began to move up the Penin- 
sula. But no sooner was he on the way 
than his progress was arrested by some twelve thousand 
men, under Magruder, on the banks of the Warwick river. 
The position could have been forced without 

April 5. 

great effort. In fact, a small body did cross 
and effect a lodgment on the other side, and, if supported, 
could have held it. But the conduct of affairs was weak, 
and this slight check enabled the enemy to arrest the 
progress of the entire Army of the Potomac, and cul- 



1862.] 



McCLELLAN MOVES TO THE PENINSULA- 



53 



minated in the defence and siege of Yorktown. Indeed, 
McClellan seems to have anticipated such an event, for he 
was accompainied by siege artillery, which in a "rapid 
movement " would seem superfluous. 

But, being checked, he sat down to capture Yorktown by 
regular investment, all of which was done with scientific 
accuracy. Still, no sooner had he completed his parallels 
and got ready to bombard the place, than the 
enemy evacuated it. They had detained us 
a precious month. Our columns followed on in pursuit, 
McClellan remaining in Yorktown, busy with questions 
of transportation. 



May 3. 




Williamsburg. May 5, 1862. 

The enemy under Longstreet had awaited our approach 
at Williamsburg. Hooker first attacked, having been 
brought to a stand by a work known as Fort Magruder, 
and kept up a heavy pounding all the fore- 
noon. Kearny came to his rescue when 
Hooker's men were all but spent. Hancock moved 



May 5. 



54 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

around the enemy's left, seized some abandoned redoubts, 
and made a brilliant diversion. But there was no coopera- 
tion in our attack ; no one on the field was in supreme 
command, and the day was fruitlessly spent in partial blows. 
The enemy retreated at night. Our loss was two thousand 
two hundred ; theirs some six hundred less. McClellan then 
leisurely moved up the Peninsula on the east side of the 
Chickahominy. Franklin moved as a separate body up the 
York river, intending a demonstration from White House. 
None was made, the enemy having passed 
May 7. this vicinity in his retreat before the Fed- 
erals were ready to attack. 



xn. 

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY.— 
FAIR OAKS. 

WHILE all this is taking place, Jackson, who seems 
to have been created especially to 
become the unknown quantity in the problem 
of the Army of the Potomac, again begins, with twenty-five 
thousand men, his restless manoeuvring in the Valley. 

A glance at the map will show the peculiar relation of 
the Shenandoah Valley to the Virginia campaigns. Lying 
between the two ranges of the Alleghanies, and running 
down in a north-easterly direction towards the Potomac, 
this valley not only afforded the enemy a hidden and secure 
means of marching from their base at the upper end down 
towards Maryland and Pennsylvania, at the mere expense 
of watching the eastern gaps to hold in check detachments 
J from the Army of the Potomac, but led their column for 
every day's march closer to the rear of Washington ; 
while a march up the Valley, on the contrary, was taking 
a Federal army further away from the vicinity of Rich- 
mond. To the Confederates the Valley was a sally-port 
which we must be constant in watching. Its strategic 
value to the Confederates was often great ; but this was 

55 



56 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

not all. The Yalley was also the granary of Virginia ; 
for no portion of her soil yielded such abundant harvests 
as the smiling plains along the Shenandoah. No wonder 
the Confederates clung tenaciously to its possession. 

As usual in the Valley, our forces were on this occasion, 
also, scattered about in detachments which could not sus- 
tain one another. Moving the Army of the Shenandoah 

sharply upon Milroy and Schenck, Jackson 
May 8. , 

inflicted upon them near the town of 

McDowell, despite four hours' resistance, a defeat which 

forced them sharply back. He then turned upon Banks, 

who prudently and promptly retired. Following him up, 

Jackson fell upon one of his detachments at 

May 23. . 

Front Royal, destroyed it, and sent Banks, 

May 25. ... 

after a stinging defeat at Winchester, whirl- 
ing back to the Potomac. 

Bred of unreasoning fears for the safety of Washing- 
ton, action was immediately taken by the President, 
upon receipt of the news of Banks' defeat, to deprive 
McClellan of the assistance of McDowell, against the 
protest of both. The latter, who with his forty 
thousand men was to have reinforced McClellan's 
right as a flying wing, and would have added moral 
strength far beyond the actual assistance, was hurried to 
the Valley to assist in "trapping Jackson." This blow to 
the morale of the army, or rather of its commander, weak- 
ened still more the conduct of this campaio^n. 

May 20. . ^ ^^ 

McClellan had reached the Chickahominy, 
and crossed with his left wing. He had been building all 
his hopes upon McDowell's aid on his right. 



1862.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY. 57 

Nor was McDowell's march to the Valley of any avail. 
Jackson was the last man to be trapped. Fremont moved 
upon him from the west ; Shields from the east. But the 
bold raider, determined to complete the scare at Washing- 
ton, which was so rapidly spoiling the prospects of the 
Peninsular campaign, made a diversion on Harper's Ferry, 
paused but to make capture of abundant stores, and 
reached Strasburg in advance of Fremont, who was to have 
closed that outlet as Shields actually did the one at Front 
Royal. Jackson amused Fremont by a few demonstra- 
tions, while he got his columns and trains beyond reach, 
and started up the Valley. Pursuit was made ; but Jack- 
son's marching capacity was beyond theirs, as it was 
beyond that of any other soldier during the war, 
and, though harassed by our cavalry, he reached 
in due time Port Republic. Here he was antici- 
pated by Carroll's brigade, and had this 

June 7. 

officer destroyed the bridge across the 
Shenandoah at that point, Jackson's safety would have 
been seriously compromised. But in war no man's judg- 
ment is infallible, and the situation at other points is rarely 
known. The bridge was left standing. This mistake gave 
Jackson the opportunity to drive Carroll away and occupy it. 
Jackson was now beyond danger, his means of retreat 
being assured. But, like himself, he could not leave 
without dealing a final blow. While his lieutenant, 
Ewell, defeated Fremont at Cross Keys, 

June 8 and 9. 

with a loss of seven hundred men, Jackson 

crossed the Shenandoah river at Port Republic, burned the 

bridge behind him, and attacked Tyler and Carroll, who 



58 " BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

had a bare quarter of Jackson's twelve thousand men. 
These brigades held him in check many hours, but were 
finally driven into retreat. 

In this short passage of arms Jackson had lost but six 
hundred men, and had kept three armies playing at hide- 
and-seek, the presence of but one of which might have 
turned the tide of victory towards the banners of the Army 
of the Potomac. So soon as the enemy had left the Valley, 
Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, each retraced his steps, 
disheartened and decimated by useless countermarching. 

The effect, meanwhile, of this brilliant campaign was to 
sink McClellan's offensive on the Peninsula to the rank of 
mere self-protection ; and the Battle of Fair Oaks, which 
occurred at this time, was but the prelude to the Seven 
Days' Retreat. 

Following the thunderclap of McDowell's detachment, 
McClellan sent Fitz John Porter to clear away a Confed- 
erate force threatening his right at Hanover Court House, 

under command of Branch. This was ac- 
May 27. 

complished in Porter's usual good style ; 

the road to our forces at Fredericksburg was opened, and 
some bridges over the Pamunky and South Anna rivers, 
by which the enemy could approach our rear, were 
destroyed. 

McClellan had thrown Keyes' corps across the Chicka- 
hominy, followed by Heintzelman's, leaving Sumner's, 
Franklin's, and Porter's on the left bank. Unless the 
means of crossing the river were reliable, and so ample 
that the wings could have mutual support in any emer- 
gency, this was a dangerous division of the army. The 



1862.] 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY. 



59 



reports showed a total of .one hundred and twenty-five 
thousand men and two hundred and eighty guns. 

Johnston, whose forces had been recruited from every 
section of the Confederacy to help him meet the imminent 
danger to its capital, found himself in command of about 
ninety thousand men. For the defense of Richmond this 
was a fair match for the Army of the Potomac. Johnston 
wisely determined to take summary advantage of McClel- 
lan's perilous situation astride the river, and to attack the 
isolated left wing. He had just received information that 




Fair Oaks. May 31-June 1, 1862. 

McDowell had been arrested in his movement to McClel- 
lan's aid, and sent to the Valley. He ordered the bulk of 
his force to fall upon Keyes and Heintzelman, while a 
small body watched the crossings of the Chickahominy 
above to prevent a junction by the other three corps. Our 
left wing had entrenched at Seven Pines, just beyond Fair 
Oaks, and had daily indulged in picket skirmishing with 
the enemy. 



60 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

In pursuance of these orders Longstreet 
and Hill fell heavily upon Casey, whose divis- 
ion was in the advance. Huger was to have attacked the 
left flank of Casey, by a circuit ; but his progress was ar- 
rested at streams swollen by a heavy storm of the previous 
day . It is now well proven that Casey's men fought stanchly ; 
but they were overmatched and soon driven in ; sad con- 
fusion took possession of their ranks ; destruction seemed 
imminent ; and only by heavy reinforcements from Heint- 
zelman were we able by nightfall to reform and hold a line 
near Savage Station. We had been driven back more 
than a mile. The enemy could claim a brilliant victory. 
Had he been more vigorous, the two corps, so largely 
outnumbered, might have been driven into the Chicka- 
hominy. Happily, at the outbreak of the action, McClel- 
lan had ordered Sumner across the river to sustain the 
right of Keyes and Heintzelman, and the brave old 
sahreur, after many difficulties and a heavy fight, man- 
aged to join his line to that formed of the relics of the two 
defeated corps, and held Smith in check. 

The following morning the battle was 

June 1. 

renewed. Longstreet soon comprehended 
that the chance of completing his triumph had been for- 
feited, and did not attempt much ; the Federals not only 
held their own, but drove the enemy from the ground 
occupied the day before. Had Franklin and Porter 
crossed on this day, a vigorous push might have carried 
us into Richmond ; but a rise in the river prevented 
their so doing. Our loss had been five thousand out of 
forty-five thousand engaged ; the enemy's in excess of six 



1862.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY. 61 

thousand out of an equal force ; three thousand men on 
each side was the loss of the first day. General Johnston 
was wounded. G. W» Smith, who had commanded the 
Confederate left, replaced him. 

For a term of three weeks' bad weather, McClellan now 
waited for the again promised reinforcement of McDowell. 
During this period great excitement was created by a bold 

cavalry raid of Stuart's, during which he 

-, . 1 -, 1. 1 -. J^^^ 13-15. 

I roue entirely around our lines, and escaped 

unharmed after doing some damage to om^ supplies. Mc- 
Clellan was still pressing forward his lines toward Kich- 
mond inch by inch, and every day promising himself an 
' assault for the morrow. And the last hea^y 

I ^ , , June 25. 

I picket fight enabled him to gain ground to 
( within four miles of the Confederate capital. To the» un- 
( initiated, success seemed already within our grasp. To 
I those in a situation to know, the outlook appeared far 
I from promising. 



m 



xm. 

THE SEVEN DAYS. 

/^ ENERAL Lee, who had succeeded wounded John- 
VU" ston, took advantage of the lull following Fair Oaks, 
and not intending to afford McClellan breathing-time to 
recover from the weakness engendered of McDowell's 
removal, called upon Jackson to rejoin him from the 
Valley ; but at the same time he actually sent him rein- 
forcements as a blind. Troops were put on the cars in full 
view of some of our prisoners in Libby, who were just 
about to be exchanged, and these, on reaching our lines, 
spread the story of a new operation by Jackson in the 
Valley. 

The corps of the Army of the Potomac lay as follows : 
Porter, north of the river at Gaines' Mill, Franklin joining 
him on the south, with Sumner on his left as far as Fair 
Oaks ; then Heintzelman, on to White Oak Swamp, and 
Keyes in reserve. This line was in the arc of a circle, 
whose centre was at Bottom's Bridge. The ^ye corps 
numbered some one hundred thousand men. 

Lee had the divisions of Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Huger, 
Magruder, and D. H. Hill, about seventy thousand, not 
counting Jackson, who was to join with twenty-five thou- 

62 



1862.] 



THE SEVEN DAYS. 



63 



r1E.CHANlCSyVH.LC 



'ail 
d 
cle, 

ffer. 

DO! 




Seven Days. June 26- July 2, 1862. 

sand more. Hager and Magruder were opposite Sumner 
and Heintzelman. A. P. Hill confronted Franklin, while 
Longstreet and D. H. Hill lay in reserve. Jackson, 
never loth to be afoot, leaving a simple rear-guard at 



64 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Harrisonburg, to keep up appearances and decelt^e some 

sixty or seventy thousand men who were watching him, put 

his men aboard the cars, joined the Richmond 
June 26. "^ 

forces, and marched around McClellan's right 

at Mechanics ville, ready to further Lee's plan of crushing 
his opponent's flank. 

Meanwhile A. P. Hill fell upon our right at Meadow 
Bridge. McCall made a stubborn resistance, inflicting 
grievous loss upon the enemy, but at night he was with- 
drawn to Gaines' Mill. Next day McClellan received the 
enemy's assault at the latter place. The blow lit on 
Porter, whose task was to prevent the Confederates from 
crossing the river. Lee was manifestly in earnest. He 
intended no child's play. Porter was reinforced by 
Slocum's division, and had nearly thirty thousand men, 
including a body of regulars. Longstreet, A. P. Hill, 
D. H. Hill, and Jackson were twice as 

June 27. -r^ i -, i -, o - 

many. Porter had the advantage of posi- 
tion on heights in front of Grapevine Bridge ; but was 
isolated, and with a defile in his rear, — a critical 
situation in case of disaster. The enemy's attacks 
were furious to the last degree, but Porter's line was 

tempered steel. Not until niojhtfall was any 
June 27. . , 

breach made in his ranks ; nor could the 

enemy penetrate the one they made. His loss was seven 

thousand men ; Lee's, seven hundred more. Stancher 

defence to more brilliant assault was never made. 

While this was going on beyond the river, Magruder 

hammered away at the force south of the Chickahominy, to 

engage McClellan's attention, and prevent his sending 



1862.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 65 

reinforcements to sore-pressed Porter. In this he was 
successful. Porter withdrew during the night and burned 
the bridges. 

While the battle of Gaines' Mill was in progress 
McClellan might have swung his left into Richmond, 
whose defences were sparsely held while the bulk of Lee's 
army was in action north of the Chickahominy ; and it 
was for this object that gallant Porter believed that he was 
fighting his single corps against Lee's army. But, still 
again, McClellan was misled by his secret-service chief as 
to the number of the enemy, as he had been often before ; 
and believing that he had one hundred thousand men 
between himself and the Southern capital instead of Magru- 
der's mere handful, he sat down to figure out the itinerary 
of the predetermined retreat to the James river, in lieu of 
pushing through this film of troops and into Richmond. 

It is true that McClellan always contemplated as a 
possibility a change of base to the James ; but he surely 
never dreamed of making it under such immense pressure. 
Lee had based all his estimates upon McClellan's retreat- 
ing by his right over the road he had come. But 
McClellan's manoeuvre was by his left, thus frustrating his 
opponent's calculations and robbing his pursuit of two 
days' initiative. This was a great, but very natural, error 
on Lee's part. His intuitions were, as a rule, singularly 
near the truth. 

The base at White House was abandoned ; supplies 
were sent round to the James by transports, and all 
unremovable stores were burned. Eight days' rations and 
a large drove of beeves were sent on ahead. The hospital 



Q6 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

at Savage Station had to be abandoned. It contained some 
twenty-five hundred sick and wounded, with surgeons and 
attendants, who had not yet been transported to White 
House. The enemy behaved with humanity to these men. 
Keyes led the advance, protecting the right flank of the 
interminable line of wao^on-trains. The 

June 28. ... 

first day passed without any serious action. 
To the enemy it was a wasted day, owing to Lee's error. 
He had put his forces still further down the left bank oP 
the Chickahominy in imaginary pursuit. 

Porter followed Keves. Next mornino^ 

June 29. . " ^ 

these two corps, with McCall and Slocum, 
stood at Glendale. Huger alone was in their front, and 
throughout the day no shot was fired. Huger was kept 

diverted by a curtain of horse. But Lons;- 

June 29. -^ . ^ 

street and Hill, as soon as Lee had dis- 
covered his mistake, retraced their steps by forced marches, 
crossed the Chickahominy by New Bridge and took post 
in rear of Huger ; while Jackson still remained at work, 
rebuilding Grapevine Bridge. 

Sumner and Smith, of Franklin's Corps, could not 
escape a heavy combat with Magruder at Allen's Farm, 
and another at Savage Station. They must fight to secure 
the retreat. Heintzelman, who was on Sumner's left, 
extending down to White Oak Swamp, in lieu of sus- 
taining them, left his two brother-officers to bear the 
brunt of the action, and began, before he was so 
ordered, to move his corps through the swamp, along 
a second road which had been happily discovered 
by Kearny. As good luck would have it, Jackson 



1862.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 67 

had not reached the ground. Rebuilding Grapevine 

Bridge was an all day's job. At night- 
June 29. 
fall, Franklin crossed the swamp, and, last 

of all, old Sumner, loth to leave. 

Lee's cavalry was absent at White House, — a circum- 
stance which saved us much complication. As soon as the 
other corps began to arrive at Glendale, Keyes was moved 
, down to Turkey Bend. Porter edged to the left, making 
I room for the third corps. Franklin defended White Oak 
Bridore ao^ainst Jackson. Lee now hurled Lonojstreet and 
Hill, with Huger and Magruder in support, down the 
I three avenues which tapped our line, massed along the 
J Quaker Road. Foreseeins; the imperative 
i need of securing Malvern Hill, McClellan 

moved Porter down to that point. 
'i Our line, well posted at Glendale (Confederate 
. " Frazier's Farm ") , stoutly resisted the attacks of the 
I enemy, which fell particularly upon McCall. But once 
I during the day was a break effected by the Confederates, 



and Kearny promptly filled the gap. Thus Franklin was 

holding Jackson at bay at White Oak Swamp, while 

Sumner and Heintzelman repulsed the vigorous onslaught 

of Longstreet and Hill. 

At night all the corps retreated to Malvern Hill. The 

seven bloody days were to end here. Our 

July 1. 
troops occupied a high plateau, and were 

disposed in convex order, with the flanks resting on the 
river. We were warmly sustained by the fire of the gun- 
boats in our rear, whose heavy shell passed over our heads 
and exploded far beyond in the enemy's columns. It was 



68 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

here that the Army of the Potomac received the parting 
onsets of the enemy. These were delivered in an isolated 
manner, though full of Southern 6la7i. But, desperate as 
were these assaults, repeated at intervals during the entire 
day, and hardy as was the courage of the assailants, no 
impression could be made upon our ranks. Lee retired, 
weary and in confusion, from the field. The Army of 
the Potomac had been saved. 

During the seven days' operations the enemy, who had 
been the attacking party, lost over twenty thousand men. 
Our loss was under sixteen thousand. Brilliant as had 
been the conduct of the Confederate army, its performance 
fell short of satisfying the Richmond public, which 
demanded the annihilation or capture of the Army of the 
Potomac. The insatiability of nations for the results of 
military skill and endurance is hard to be explained. 
The impossible alone appears to equal the anticipations of 
laymen ; and, were the impossible accomplished, more 
would be apt to be demanded. Even old soldiers, famil- 
iar with the difficulties which hedge about all military 
exploits, will often join in this unreasoning clamor, when 
not themselves engaged. 

In this retreat McClellan showed undoubted ability. 
But it was not the ability which accomplishes results. 
He could fight for existence, and fight stanchly ; but not 
for conquest. And when Halleck, wearing the laurels of his 
Western lieutenants, became general-in-chief, it was all 
over with the Peninsular campaign. Lee quickly appreci- 
ated this fact, and at once set on foot a new campaign 
towards the old battle-ground of Bull Run. 



XIV. 

POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 

THE Army of Virginia, under Pope, is now to bear the 
brunt of I^ee's assault, while the Army of the Poto- 
mac is dismembered and sent back whence it came, to add in 
driblets to Pope's effective. To the provoking changeable- 
ness of the President and his advisers, during McCIellan's 
campaign, may be largely ascribed its failure. Who does 
not recognize Mr. Lincoln's keen perception of the gen- 
eral bearing politics should have on the operations in 
the field, as well as his military obtuseness? Harassed 
by a people at his back which demanded action, he was 
naturally unable to preserve his confidence in a general 
who would not act. And before McClellan did act, the 
confidence had ebbed away. " General McClellan did not 
give to the will of the President and the demands of the 
people that weight in the formation of his plans of cam- 
paign to which they were entitled." (Webb.) 

The Western armies are resting on their laurels, well 
earned by the recovery of Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, 
and so material a part of the Mississippi river. General 
Pope's overestimated if brilliant success at Island No. 10 

has persuaded Halleck to call him to the command of the 

69 



70 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Virginia forces. A new army is created for him, and he 
is unfortunate enough to open his Eastern 

July 14. 

career by a general order so ill-judged as to 
rob him from the start of the confidence as well as sympathy 
of his subordinates. The new Army of Virginia consists 
of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel — the latter 
having been Fremont's — which are all assembled from 
their several departments. 

McClellan has under his command ninety thousand men. 

They are in a position which must compel Lee 

to stay in Richmond. He ro-ges the capture of 

Petersburg, at the portals of which two years later so much 

blood will be spilled, and is allowed to believe that his 

operations are to be continued from his present base. But 

Halleck's will is now law, and Pope is his favorite. The 

sacrifices and labors of the Army of the Potomac are 

abandoned, and the troops put in motion for Acquia Creek. 

Gordonsville is the key to the southern entrances of the 

Shenandoah Valley. Anticipating a new march by Jackson 

towards his favorite campaigning ground, 

Pope directs his scattered forces on this 

town. But Jackson gets ahead of him. Lee has been 

filling up his attenuated ranks ; he has got together eighty 

thousand men. He sends A. P. Hill to reinforce Jackson. 

So soon as Lee ascertains that McClellan's forces are 

certainly to leave the James, he orders Jackson to assail 

Pope's van, at Culpeper, without further delay. Jackson 

advances with twenty-eight thousand men. 

August 9. 

Banks meets him near Cedar Mountain 
(Confederate " Cedar Run ") with less than half this 



1862.] 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



71 



force, and, attacking without discretion but with much 
vigor, he ahiiost compasses a victory. Jackson retires 
across the Rapidan. Our losses are twenty- four hundred, 
against thirteen hundred of the enemy's. 

Lee now moves Longstreet to the new field of operations, 
while one-third of the Army of the Potomac is on the march 
to sustain Pope. Overratino^ the numerical 

P -r -r* r 1, i August 17-18. 

superiority of Lee, Pope follows up the 




Pope's Campaign. (L) August 24, 1862. 



opening boast of his campaign by a retreat to the Rappa- 
hannock. Here, under Halleck's orders, he is committed 
(to the very hazardous policy of protecting two divergent 



72 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862 

lines in his rear, — one to Washington, whence come his 
supplies ; one to Acquia Creek, whence are to come his re- 
inforcements from the Army of the Potomac ; and he is 
promised immediate and large accessions of troops. If 
from defeat, or for good tactical or strategic reasons, he is 
constrained to abandon the position so taken up, it need not 
be pointed out that he thus uncovers either one or both of 
these lines. Such a scheme is full of disadvantages if not 
positive dangers. It is rarely permissible. 

Lee, with Jackson on the left and Longstreet on the 
right, advances upon him. Seeing no chance 

August 21. . . 

of forcing the river to advantage, Lee orders 
Jackson far around the Bull Run range to the left, to fall 
upon Pope's flank through Thoroughfare Gap. 

It must be remembered that Halleck was keeping both 
McClellan and Pope ignorant of the true state of affairs, 
while promising the latter reinforcements beyond his power 
to send. Pope had partially divined Lee's tactics, but 
believed Jackson's destination to be the Shenandoah Valley, 
and proposed to counter this manoeuvre and attack Lee by 
crossing the river while he was isolated from his lieutenant. 
But the river rose, — as rivers can rise only in Virginia, — 
August 22. by a heavy storm, and Pope had again to 
August 23. change his plan. This was done under the 
excitement of a swoop by Stuart on Catlett's Station, which 
carried off Pope's head-quarter papers, spread alarm among 
the whole body of camp followers, and set the War Depart- 
ment in a panic. 

McDowell had arrived at Warrenton. Porter was 
marching along up the Rappahannock from Acquia Creek. 



♦? 



1862.] POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 73 

Sigel was at Waterloo ; Banks at Sulphur 

Springs. Heintzelman sent part of his corps 

on from Alexandria. The men were already leg-weary 

and disheartened. 

Lee meanwhile had given his troops a long rest while 
waiting for Jackson to complete his flank march, and the 
rise in the river had enforced some quiet upon Jackson near 
Waterloo, before he could safely ffet his 

-^ ^ August 25. 

corps across. 

Pope had it in his power to neutralize Jackson's march 
by occupying Thoroughfare Gap. But again he was 
slower than the Confederate general. Anticipating a 
crossing by Lee, as the waters were subsiding, he began 
a new movement to place himself on the Orange and Alex- 
andria Railroad facing westerly to protect his communi- 
cations with Acquia Creek. While thus manoeuvring, 
new advices as to Jackson being on the march reached him 
and almost induced him to make another attempt on Lee 
across the river. But his forces were happily too much 
scattered to be got in hand. 

Meanwhile Jackson, with Stuart protecting his right and 
front, after a march of fifty miles in thirty-six hours, de- 
bouches from Thoroughfare Gap and descends upon Bristoe 
and Manassas Stations. Here are Pope's supplies and 
munitions of war. Jackson makes an utter wreck of them 

all. Up to this moment Pope has appar- 

August 26. 
ently never thought of Thoroughfare Gap. 

His consternation is complete, while Washington is at the 

end of its wits. 

eTackson had placed himself in extreme peril. In all the 



74 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

campaigns he conducted under the orders of Lee, he showed 
himself peculiarly fond of manoeuvres which can not but 
be condemned by the logic of warfare, and which an 
opponent who was his equal in audacity and skill could 
repeatedly have turned to his all but destruction. But the 
celerity of Jackson's manoeuvres, and the fact that he was 
never pitted against any antagonist ready to take summary 
advantage of his breach of the rules of strategy, saved him 
and his reputation harmless. His genius was as eccentric 
as he himself was daring ; his soldierly qualities were of the 
highest, and brilliant success stamped him the ablest lieuten- 
ant of the war. And after all must not the strictest methods 
of strategy subordinate themselves to the one rule of doing 
the most apt thing at the proper moment ? This Stonewall 
Jackson invariably did. 

But if Jackson was in danger, so was Pope cut off from 
his base. Halleck, aghast, w^as utterly ignorant as to what 
force was in Pope's rear. Franklin had arrived at Alexan- 
dria and a brigade was sent out to Bull Run to reconnoitre. 
Here these troops were waylaid by Jackson and fell back to 
Centre ville, spreading consternation on every side. 

This flank march accomplished in his usual splendid style, 

Jackson occupies the old Bull Run battle 
August 27. 1 1 • r- i 

ground and gives his men an ample rest 

while he awaits the arrival of his chief. His corps is in the 

highest spirits, and each man's haversack is filled with rare 

good provender. Pope hurries hither and yon in the hope 

of striking the, to him, invisible foe. The two armies are 

about to close and wrestle over the familiar ground. 

Pope has had good reason to rely on Halleck to pro- 



1862.] 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



75 



tect his right and rear. The capture of Manassas unde- 
ceives him. But he can now make Jackson pay dearly for 
his venture by striking him before his chief comes up to 
his aid ; for Longstreet has set out to march towards him by 
the same lono^ circuit. But he o^oes to work in the wrono^ 
way. Pope should evidently plant himself between Jack- 
son and Thoroughfare Gap. This is the one thing needful 
to be done, and Gainesville is the strategic key of the op- 




Pope's Campaign. (2.) August 28, A.M. 



eration. McDowell appreciates the fact and does occupy 
both Gainesville and Haymarket. He then proposes to 
demonstrate on Jackson and develop his position. All this 
is well to the purpose and shows foresight and activity. 
Longstreet is thus cut off from Jackson. The Army of 



76 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 



August 28. 



Nortliern Virginia is actually in bad case. 

Pope only needs to advance his left to com- 
pass absolute success. But a strange infatuation makes him 
again conceive a fear for his right flank and robs him of the 
power of gauging his advantage. He vy^ithdraws McDow- 




Pope's Campaign. (3.) August 28, 6 P.M. 



ell vs^ith other troops from Gainesville to the vicinity of 
Manassas. Exhausted, confused, and dispirited, this new 
and puzzling march is made by the divisions concerned. 
Only Ricketts remains at the key-point, McDowell having 
left him to observe Thoroughfare Gap. 

Jackson could ask no better treatment. He has taken 
position from Sudley Springs to Groveton, and utilizing 
a new railroad grade as defence, he sends Hill towards Cen- 



1862.] 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



77 



Auffust 28. 



treville as a ynise to draw Pope away. Ricketts is driven 

from Thoroughfare Gap at the same moment 

he is recalled. King, of McDowell's corps, 

has a sharp battle with Jackson's right, but retires at night. 

The Federals have lost all they possessed the day before. 

Jackson and Lee can now shake hands, while 

Poj^e scarcely knows what has become of all 

his troops. 

Having blundered away his advantage, the thing for Pope 
to do now is to take position north of Bull Run and receive 



Aucfust 29. 




Pope's Campaign. (4.) August 29, Noon. 



the enemy on strong ground, where he can be securely 
joined by the balance of the Army of the Potomac, and can 
rest and victual his men. But he now, at this late hour, 



78 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

endeavors to reoccupy Gainesville, so as to separate Lee and 
Jackson. Heintzelman and Reno are to pass the stone 
bridge. McDowell and Porter are to go to Gainesville. 
Sigel and Reynolds will be the centre. All this is too late. 
Pope is already tactically defeated. 

Sigel arrives and attacks Jackson's right. 
Starke holds him off; reinforcements come 
up, but the combat is not heavy. Longstreet puts in his 
appearance. Groveton becomes the centre of the Confed- 
erate line, while Longstreet works gradually around our left. 

McDowell and Porter are barred from the road Pope has 
ordered them to pursue. Porter faces Longstreet astride 
the railroad. McDowell gets his corps together and 
marches towards the booming of the guns at Groveton. 
Pope still hugs the delusion that Longstreet is far away, and 
that McDowell and Porter can turn Jackson's right. As- 
suming that they have actually got at this work. Hooker 
and Kearny are thrown upon Jackson's railroad defences, 
but repulsed by Hill and Early. Pope again sends an order 
to Porter to attack Jackson's right, and again assuming 
that he has received and acted on it, once more hurls Kearny 
and Reno on the embankment. These divisions capture it, 
but being without reserves, must fall back with useless 
slaughter. McDowell appears at Groveton and attacks, 
but he falls foul of Longstreet's veterans and can make no 
impression. Porter remains inactive. He might create a 
diversion in Pope's favor by attack, but the operation is deli- 
cate. His orders are nullified by the facts which Pope ig- 
nores. 

While our troops have had the advantage of the fighting 



1862.] POPE'S campaign: 7^ 

on this day, they are now out of rations and 
should be withdrawn. But Pope determines to '^ 

fight again on the morrow, with the fifty odd thousand men 
left him. He strengthens his right wing by de- 

1 • T • 1 p 1 -Tk • August 30. 

pie ting his left, and attacks at noon. Porter is 
brought to the centre and launched upon the enemy. His 
gallantry, which no one has ever questioned, can effect 
nothing. Lee assumes the offensive. Despite hard blows 
the Unionists are forced back all along the linCo Had not 
a successful stand been made by a hurriedly assembled force 
massed on the Henry House Hill, the disaster would have 
been fatal to the Army of the Potomac. 

Pope retires to Centre ville. August 30. 

Here Jackson again outflanks him. By a August 31. 
march around his right to Chantilly, he is nearer Fair- 
fax than Pope. A still more hurried retreat towards 
Alexandria follows. Pope is barely saved from this new 
destruction by the successful head made against Jackson at 
the battle of Chantilly by the divisions of Kearny (in 
makino^ which this preux chevalier^s life ^ , , 

^ -^ September 1. 

is lost) and Reno. 

During this campaign we lost fourteen out of eighty 
thousand men ; the enemy nine out of fifty-four thousand. 

Thus, despite the gallantry of the troops, the Federals 
have been sent whirling back towards the capital, having 
fought half-a-dozen battles to no purpose whatsoever. Lee 
can not further follow Pope. He must also revictual his 
army, and give his gallant men time for recuperation. 

Pope should not be held alone to blame for the issue of 
this campaign. He was brave, light-hearted under adver- 



80 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

sity, and sanguine. That he was unable to cope with Lee's 
steady purpose and Jackson's splendid marching capacity 
must not rob him of what he fairly deserves. He was 
utterly outgeneralled ; he never knew where his enemy 
was ; he fought to no purpose. But when he did fight, it 
was with a will beyond his discretion ; and he would have 
cheerfully marched out again to meet his late antagonists so 
soon as he had reached the protection of the defences of 
Washington. It was Halleck's secretiveness, and his 
illusory promises of reinforcements, dangerous because he 
kept the actual facts both from Pope and McClellan so that 
neither could sustain the other, that were the actual causes 
of failure ; while Poj)e's lack of power to divine Lee's 
manoeuvres and his exhausting energy in parrying the 
thrusts he vainly in;agined to be aimed at him, were im- 
mediately at fault. But from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly, 
the conduct of our troops stands out in brilliant relief from 
the tactics of their commander ; while we cannot sufficiently 
wonder at the courage, patience, and muscular legs of the 
Southern veterans. Mere words cannot do them justice. 

Pope attributed his overthrow to the failure of Fitz John 
Porter to obey orders to attack Longstreet on August 29. 
Facts now well known exonerate this officer, and his 
splendid service whenever called upon has deserved better 
of the nation. That Porter should have more definitely 
developed, by a reconnoissance in force, the fact, which he 
knew by scouts, of Longstreet's presence in his front, or 
perhaps have attacked him as a diversion, is almost the only 
criticism that can be honestly and intelligently brought 
home to him by his opponents. And, confronting as he 



1862.] POPE'S CAMPAIGN, 81 

did, half of Lee's army, unknown to Pope, such a cotirse 
might have proved highly disastrous. What other citizen, 
during our entire history, ever suiFered for so slight an 
error ? Moreover every corps commander in the army was 
at that time in utter daze at the eccentric tactical combina- 
tions of Pope ; while the troops were exhausted, hungry, 
and without confidence in their chief. 



XY. 

BUELL AND BRAGG. 

AGAIN to return to the West, where we left the Union 
Army to recruit from the fatigues of their successes 
against Beauregard. After the fall of Corinth the Confed- 
erates dispersed their forces over a considerable area. As 
Halleck made no effort to follow up his advantages by a 
forward movement, this necessitated a similar disposition 
on his part. 

It is altogether probable that, starting from Corinth, a 
column of ten thousand or fifteen thousand men could have 
captured Yicksburg. But enterprise in the field was not one 
of Halleck's virtues, and the enemy was able to erect defences 
both there and at Port Hudson which checked our opera- 
tions for at least a year. 

When summer opened Halleck stood at 

June, 1862. . ■, n ^ 

the head of one hundred and seventy-five 
thousand men, of which one hundred and ten thousand 
were carried on his Morning Report as "for duty." In 
addition to this Mitchel was at Huntsville on the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad with seven thousand ; Morgan at 
Cumberland Gap with nine thousand ; and Cm-tis with 

ten thousand more was, after the battle of Pea Ridge, ap- 

82 




^sC< ■;:• 




THEATRE OF 

SOUTHWESTERljr 

CAMPAIGNS 

SCALE OF MILES 



f Months of the 
m-wich f^^^\^ Mississippi Ri\ 



< 



1862.] BUELL AND BRAGG, 83 

proaching the Mississippi river. Our forces were much 
elated by recent victories, which had a correspondingly 
depressing effect upon the enemy. With this force at his 
command, it seems as if Halleck might have marched at 
will to Mobile and neutralized the entire belt of country 
for a hundred miles east of the Mississippi. 

Beauregard was south of Corinth with one hundred and 
twelve thousand men, fifty-three thousand " for duty," and 
in addition eleven thousand in East Tennessee, with head- 
quarters in Knoxville, and ten thousand in Jackson and 
Vicksburg. The Arkansas forces had been ordered to 
Corinth against the protest of the governor of that state. 
I There were two roads open to Halleck by. which to 
[ pierce the heart of the Confederacy ; one down the great 
' river, one from Chattanooga to Atlanta and beyond. He 
I had the numerical ability to control both, and each being 
' a highway to the North, it behooved him to protect both. 
I The Memphis and Charleston Railroad was in his hands. 
, His army was strong enough to divide and yet hold the 
» keys to each of these strategic routes. The bulk of his 
force was still disposable for whichever route he might 
I choose to advance upon. 

j But Halleck was feeble in movement. Buell could well 
have been despatched towards Chattanooga to secure what 
\ Mitchel had already seized. This would have left Halleck 
j plenty of force with which to attack Beauregard. But 
Halleck's whole scheme is formulated in his own words : 
'^ I think the enemy will continue his retreat, which is all 
I desire." 

Not so the Confederates. While Halleck, with his 



84 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

forces disjointedly strung out, was losing precious time in 
repairs on the railroad and in contemplating his past tri- 
umphs, Bragg sent his thirty-five thousand men by rail via 

Mobile to Chattanooo^a. This foresio^ht pro- 
July 21-30. ^ . . 

longed the Western contest indefinitely, and 

enabled Bragg to control events until Grant, more than a 

year later, had freed the Mississippi and could devote 

his active energies to the interior. 

The cards are again shuffled, during which operation 

every one is without definite instructions ; there is no one 

head, and the Western armies are practically put on the 

defensive. Pope is transferred to Virfrinia, 

June 26-27. . . . 

and Rosecrans is given the Army of the Mis- 
sissippi ; Buell retains the Army of the Ohio ; Halleck's 
questionable strategy in the field is rewarded by the supreme 

control of the Union forces in the War De- 
July 16-17. 

partment — work for which he is better fitted. 

To Grant's lot falls the Army of the Mississippi in addition 
to the Army of the Tennessee, forty-two thousand effec- 
tives, with which to keep open his communications with 
Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur. 
While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line 
of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennes- 
see, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. 

Mitchel's capture of Huntsville and of some hundred 
miles of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which he 
had held, together with all territory north of the Ten- 
nessee River, had been full of possibilities. Had he but 
received the authority, he might readily have anticipated 
Bragg in taking possession of Chattanooga, and have 



1862.] BUELL AND BRAGG. 85 

saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this 
town is the key to that entire strategic field. 

Buell desired to establish his base of supplies at Nash- 
ville and to make an immediate advance upon Chattanooga 
from thence. Halleck insisted on his ad- 

June 15 to Aug. 1. 

vancing along the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad and putting it in thorough repair as he went. 
This he did ; but it was the delay so caused which enabled 
Bragg to seize the coveted prize, and A. S. Johnston had 
well filled the place with stores when he had found himself 
obliged to abandon Nashville months before. 

Buell had barely reached a position in which he could 
confront Bragg, when the Confederate partisans Forrest 
and Morgan began their equally brilliant and troublesome 
raids against his communications. These Buell was unable 

I to meet for entire lack of horse. But he took up a line 
calculated to protect Nashville as well as to threaten Bragg, 

I who lay in advance of the Tennessee. 

I Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his 

I right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He there- 

I fore concentrated the bulk of his force at 
Murfreesborough. Thomas, then command- 

j ing a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military intui- 
tions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, and who was 

! always the safest adviser either Buell, Rosecrans or Sherman 
ever had, was shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's cross- 
ing of the Tennessee river as a threat to invade Kentucky. 
Not so Buell, to his sorrow. 

By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around 
Buell's left through the Sequatchie Valley August 28. 



86 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

and marches straight toward Louisville, 
August 30. ^j^.j^ Kirby Smith turns Cumberland Gap, 
defeats Nelson at Richmond and makes for Cincinnati. 
This is all in pursuance of the plan of A. S. Johnston, 
which he had purposed to put into execution, when, as he 
confidently believed, he should have beaten our army at 
Shiloh. 

Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, Buell at 
once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he endeavors 
to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right. Bragg has 

the shorter line and the start. But he is 
Sept. 14-17. , , , , , , 

delayed a day or two by the capture of 

Munfordville, and by scattering his forces instead of 

pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part. 

He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by 

this delay. After some rapid marching and manoeuvring, 

Buell enters Louisville just ahead of his opponent. 

The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence 

in Buell. He is summarily relieved from 
September 29. ^ ^ rr^^ • i j 

command and Ihomas appomtecl to succeed 
him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from 
always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the. 
proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, Buell is 
reinstated. The Army of the Ohio marches out to meet 
Bragg, with Thomas second in command. 

Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and 
Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith 
near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon 
Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling, 
Buell comes upon Hardee with only sixteen thousand 



1862.] 



BUELL AND BRAGG. 



87 




THOMAS AND 
CHITTCNOEN WEK' 
MOfT ENOAttO 



men, at Perry- 
ville, where, had 
he at once at- 
tacked he could 
have punished 
Bragg severely 
for this division. 

\ But, owing to 
lack of water, 
one-half of Buell's 
army is distant 

, from the field, 

I and he in turn 
pays the penalty 

i of lack of con- Peppyville. Oetobep 8, 1862. 

j centration. Polk 

( joins Hardee and they both fall heavily upon McCook, 

\ who holds Buell's left, and bear him back. 
But they cannot break the Union centre ; 
and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving 
to our forces the field. Our right has not been en- 
gaged. The loss is : Buell, forty-two hundred ; Bragg 
thirty-four hundred ; a fifth of the men actually en- 
gaged. On being followed up, Bragg re- 

\ treats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves 
Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession. 
His retreat ends only at Chattanooga. 

"What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast 

] accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. 
Both fell short of their calculations, thous^h Brao^o^ carried 
off a goodly train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had 



October 8. 



October 13. 



88 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [180!^ 

really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's 
failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. But his 
campaign had really placed him in a position in Buell's 
front far superior to the one he had occupied before he 
marched for the Ohio, morally and materially. And it 
was beyond reason to anticipate his holding any consider- 
able part of these States in permanency. 

Halleck now insists that Buell shall undertake a cam- 
paign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But 
Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops 
80 far from the railroad, and again concentrates at Nash- 
ville. Here he is relieved and Gen. Rose- 
October 30. 

crans is appointed to the command. 

During this campaign every one lost confidence in Buell 
except his stanch lieutenant, Thomas, who, though he 
could have had the command, allowed his sense of justice 
as well as his very singidar distrust of the great powers he 
possessed to stand in his own light. Thomas desired nothing 
less than to have an independent charge. A rare union 
indeed of ability and modesty. 

Buell was a thorough soldier and a fine disciplinarian. 
The effectiveness of the diidsions he had led was due to 
his care and skill in organization in as full measure as that 
of the Army of the Potomac to McClellan. More than 
one soldier of our war acquired fame and achieved success 
on a basis less sound than his. But he had served in the 
bureau more than with troops, and the marshal's baton was 
bestowed upon him too early. Had he possessed the 
experience of moderate field command before he worked 
in so large a sphere, he might have compassed final success 
of much more enduring character. 



XVI. 

lUKA AND CORINTH. 

WHEN Bragg had confronted Buell in Tennessee with 
the purpose of operating towards the Ohio, as just 
narrated, it became necessary for him to adopt measures to 
prevent Rosecrans or Grant from detaching reinforcements 
to, or indeed from making a junction in force with, their as- 
sociate. He therefore sent orders to Price, whom he had 
left south of Corinth, to advance upon the Federals and di- 
vert their attention. Price, deeming himself too weak to 
cope single-handed with the Army of the Mississippi, re- 
quested Van Dorn to lend his assistance to the enterprise. 

Grant is meanwhile anticipating that the enemy will 
make an attack upon Corinth, where the bulk of our force 
is stationed, while we have heavy detachments at Memphis 
and Bolivar. But Rosecrans' cavalry discovers Price's van- 
guard in luka. Well aware that Yan Dorn 

September 15. 

IS at least tour marches distant. Grant de- 
termines to crush Price singly, and feels that he has nu- 
merical strength enough to divide his forces. He sends 
Rosecrans to make an attack upon Price along roads reach- 
ing luka from the south, while another column from the 

north shall intercept him and if possible drive him back 

89 



90 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1862. 



September 19. 






upon the Tennessee river. Grant accompanies the latter 

body under command of Ord. 

Bad roads and worse maps of the country- 
delay Eosecrans. And when he finally does 

attack, it is in so 
disjointed a way 
that only a por- 
tion of his force 
can engage the 
enemy. Rose- 
crans' task is to 
seize both roads 
running south 
from luka ; but 
he manages only 
to reach one. On 
The loss on either 




luka. September 19, 1862. 



October 1. 



the other Price escapes unharmed 

side is not far from eight hundred men. 

Grant has, all told, some forty-eight thou- 
sand men, seven thousand being under Sher- 
man at Memphis, twelve thousand under Ord at Bolivar, 
twenty-three thousand under Rosecrans at Corinth, and 
six thousand at head-quarters at Jackson. 

Price and VanDorn in due time join their forces, twenty- 
two thousand men, at Ripley, the latter as 
September 28. . i tt • • ' i 

senior takmg command. He is wise enough 

to see that a successful attack upon isolated Corinth will 
thrust Grant back, as Bragg has served Buell, and neutralize 
all his victories. Full of his purpose Van Dorn with his wonted 
energy moves upon Corinth and marshals his army on the 



1862.J 



lUKA AND CORINTH. 



91 



north-west of the town. His position sev- 
ers Rosecrans' force from Grant's. Van ^P ^^^ ei 
Dorn's plan is to feint upon Rosecrans' left, thereby drawing 
troops from his right, and then to throw Price upon the 
depleted wing and crush it. He attacks. At an early 
stage of the battle a gap is opened in Rosecrans' line. Into 
this breach Van Dorn is not slow to press. Our left and 
centre is borne back, but the right remaining 
intact, wheels and threatens Van Dorn's ex- 
posed flanks. Darkness brings the combat to a close. 

The forces of each are about equal. The night is spent 
in reforming the troops for the morrow. Van Dorn pur- 



October 3. 




Corinth. Oetober 3-4, 1862. 



poses to assault at dawn, but is belated by subordinates. 
When, however, he does attack, it is with characteristic 
vigor. Part of his troops actually enter the city, and for 



92 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

about an hour cannot be ejected. But Rosecrans holds his 
own ; Yan Dorn j&nds that he cannot worst him, and, fear- 
ing an attack upon his rear, determines on retreat. This 
he skilfully effects, under cover of renewed 

October 4. 

attack. 

Rosecrans makes no motion to follow. In falling back 
Van Dorn runs across Ord at the fords of the Hatchie river, 
and had Rosecrans been at his heels, Van Dorn might have 
been badly used up. But by ably manoeuvring his rear- 
guard. Van Dorn manages to elude Ord, crosses the 
Hatchie a trifle to the east and escapes. 

TJie Confederate loss and ours were not far from two 
thousand five hundred each. We took two thousand 
prisoners. 

Shortly after, Van Dorn was displaced by Pemberton, 
while Rosecrans was promoted to BuelFs 

October 30. 

command. In subordinate positions Van 
Dorn rendered excellent service to the Confederacy until 
the close of the war.^ It is not saying much to assert that 
had he remained in command of the Vicksburg forces, 
Grant's task would have proved a harder one than with 
Pemberton in his front. 

^ J eft,' <U^i '^ ''CUi'-'*^ '^ '^ si^'^ji^ f*^ ^}^\\^^ ".rl%\ 



s 



xvn. 

GRANT'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 

OON after Farragut had passed into New Orleans, he 
moved up the river to Baton Roupje and 

XT 1 T • .11. ^^ay S> 1862. 

Natchez. In connection with tms movement 
a land force had made its way to Yicksburg, under com- 
mand of General Williams, hoping to capture the place by 
2b coup de main; but its batteries, during 

May 18. 

the weeks just elapsed, had been completed, 

and General M. L. Smith made show of so good a defense 

that Williams deemed it unwise to attack. Farragut having 

run the batteries, then incomplete, both up and down river, 

returned to New Orleans. The next month the importance 

of the new fortress was the occasion of putting 

Van Dorn in command. 

Subsequently Admiral Porter was or- 
dered up the river by Farragut, and 
Williams began to dig the afterwards famous canal, which 
its projectors imagined would make Vicksburg an inland 
town by diverting the current of the Missis- 

. . A 1 . . T^ . 1 June 28. 

sippi. At this time F arragut again ran the 

batteries with his fleet up river, at a loss of some sixty men, 

satisfying himself that he could at any time perform this feat. 

93 



94 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

But he was by no means strong enough to successfully 
engage the forts without cooperation of a land force. 

The ram Arkansas had been building in the Yazoo river, 
above Vicksburg. Farragut had hoped for a chance to 
destroy the vessel ; but the ram eluded his watchfulness, 
and sought refuge under the Vicksburg guns, much to Far- 
ragut's disgust. He again ran down past the batteries, in- 
tending to destroy the ram, but vainly. Later he was 
ordered back to New Orleans ; Williams re- 

July 25. 

turned to Baton Rouge, and Admiral Davis 
moved up the river, leaving Vicksburg mistress of the 
situation. 

This invited Van Dorn to make a raid from Vicks- 
burg on Baton Rouge, which he entrusted to Brecken- 
ridge. A stubborn resistance succeeded in holding the 

city, though Williams was killed in the de- 
August 5. -n -r» 1 • 

fense. But Breckenridge actually accom- 
plished his purpose by securing an available point for 
another fortress below the mouth of the Red river, to wit. 
Port Hudson. Baton Rouge was, in consequence, shortly 
abandoned by us, as at the time comparatively of no value. 
While Rosecrans was planning a campaign against Chat- 
tanooga, Grant, in immediate command of the Thirteenth 
Army Corps, as it was now called, suggested the capture of 
Vicksburg to the general-in-chief. There was a force of 
not far from fifty thousand men in this vicinity. With 
Halleck's half-approval Grant made a forward move ; but was 

no sooner under way than he stopped and de- 
November 2. . . -^ -^ ^ 

cided to wait for some twenty thousand rein- 
forcements promised him. Hereupon Halleck placed all 



1862.] GRANT'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 95 

the forces in the Department under his orders, and told 
him "to fight the enemy where he pleased." 

r^ ^ ni- 1 1 Ml 1 November 11. 

(jrrants iirty-seven thousand men still lay 
substantially as they had, with Pemberton in their front. 

A threatened complication of serious nature arose in a 
half promise extorted from Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary 
of War by General McClernand, that the latter should have 
a separate command to operate down the Mississippi; 
and while Grant and Halleck were planning one thing. 
Secretary Stanton and McClernand were secretly confer- 
ring about another. These cross-purposes were, however, 

for the time beins:, arrested by Grant's mov- 

. '' Nov. 26-27. 

ing on Holly Springs, Sherman at the same 

time starting from Memphis, and Hovey crossing from 
Helena to threaten Grenada on Pemberton's flank and rear. 
Some skirmishing was had with the enemy's outposts, but 
without results. Pemberton had established his head-quar- 
ters at Jackson, Miss., with Van Dorn out as vanguard at 
Holly Springs. All told, he had some forty thousand men 
under his command. 

Grant's line of operations was long and weak ; he could 
get no locomotives nor cars so as to utilize the railroad, nor 
did support, moral or material, reach him from Halleck. 
He had desired to bring Pemberton to battle, but the latter 
retired behind the Tallahatchie. And, lest McClernand 
should actually receive the command of the Mississippi ven- 
ture, while he himself was left to fight on the overland route 
single handed. Grant devised a new plan. This contem- 
plated that Sherman should take the bulk of the forces at 
Memphis, at once descend the river in transports, and, in 



96 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1862. 



connection with Admiml Porter, assail the works at Ticks- 
burg, while he himself would push the enemy down the line 
of the Mobile and Ohio Kailroad, and if they retired to 
that fortress, endeavor to enter the city with them. 



yOBOUVAnV 

/ T 

jtRAND JN. I 




Memphis to Vieksbupg. 1862-63. 



This double attack was certainly not strategically sound. 
None of the attendant circumstances warranted such a divi- 
sion of forces. But, at that stage of the war, it was not 
deemed possible to subsist an army very far from its base, 



1862.] GRANT'S FAILURE AGAINST VICES BURG. 97 

nor at all upon the country. And McClernand was so very 
uncertain and disturbing a factor in Grant's calculations 
that the latter deemed any action preferable to delay. 

McClernand meanwhile had received the sole command 
of the river expedition. But, as it fell out, Sherman got 
under way before the news could reach him. About the 
same time Joe Johnston was put in command of all Con- 
federate forces between the AUeghanies and the Mississippi 
river. 

While Sherman and Porter are moving down the river, 
with thirty thousand men and sixty guns, beside the 
flotilla of eight gun-boats. Grant pushes forward to Oxford, 
while Pemberton retires to the line of the Yallabusha at 
the town of Grenada. Grant's line of operations is pro- 
tected at various points along the railroad by strong 
detachments. Van Dorn, now commanding a cavalry 
division, and Forrest, the noted Confederate raider, join 

forces to operate against Grant's communi- 

f . * December, 1862. 

cations, and during the last ten days of the 

year, while Forrest demonstrates against Jackson, Tenn., 

Van Dorn attacks, and with scarcely any opposition from 

its negligent commander, captures Holly Springs, with 

large stores of food, arms, and ammunition. Several 

important bridges in Grant's rear are at the same time 

destroyed. 

The whole scene is suddenly changed. Grant's advance 

is made impossible, for starvation stares him in the face. 

He is obliged to fall back to reestablish his base, while 

Pemberton in his turn retires to defend Yicksburg from 

Sherman and Porter. This raid has not only destroyed 



98 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Grant's supplies, but also his ability to accumulate more 
for the moment. A courier is at once despatched to 
Sherman to notify him of this disaster, but does not 
overtake him with the news. Grant is ordered by Halleck 
to follow Sherman down the river. This he proceeds to 
do by way of Memphis. 

It took all Grant's patience to bear up under this utter 
failure of his campaign, and especially to brook the 
appointment of McClernand. But his zeal and activity 
never flagged. Grant possessed the rare power of stand- 
ing firm under the hardest conditions of disappointment or 
defeat. 



XVIII. 

SHERMAN'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 

MEANWHILE Sherman, convoyed by Porter and 
his fleet on some sixty transports, had reached the 
mouth of the Yazoo river. Next day he ^ , „„ 

'' December 2o. 

moved up stream to eflect a hmding, expect- 
ing that Grant was near at hand or else was holding the 
enemy on the Yallabusha. Halleck had also promised 
Banks' cooperation from New Orleans ; but fortunately no 
immediate reliance was placed upon this promise. 

A line of bluffs runs for many hundred miles along the 
east bank of the Mississippi river. From Yicksburg 
north these bluiFs leave the river to join it again at Mem- 
phis. The land between the river and the bluffs is low, 
much cut up by bayous, and like to an impenetrable morass. 
Its waters all flow into the Yazoo. Some fifteen miles 
above Yicksburg, where the blufl" abuts on the Yazoo, 
Haines Blufl*, as it is there called, is some two hundred 
feet high, and all but inaccessible. The ground in front is 
of the same low character, and is diversified by the presence 
of several small lakes connected by Chickasaw Bayou. 

There were no maps of the ground in Sherman's posses- 
sion. It was terra incognita. And it was equally un- 

99 



100 BIRUS-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

known to him that strong works had been erected all along 
the bluffs, the few approaches to which were specially- 
defended. Sherman had hoped to get in rear of Vicksburg 
by this route ; to cut the railroad and to isolate Pemberton, 
whom he imagined at the moment to be confronting Grant. 
Our success depended entu-ely on a surprise. But Pember- 
ton was actually in Vicksburg and fully aware of Sherman's 
every move. We were already checkmated, but did not 
know it. 

Sherman has with him four good divisions, 

December 28. . . 

He makes a reconnoissance, to ascertain the 
best point of attack. It is thought that a lodgment can 
be effected on the bluff. 

Two well-pushed attacks are made. Some 

December 29. 

of the enemy's defences come near to being 
taken. But after an all-day struggle to get a suitable force 
across the open and up the perpendicular bluffs from which 
the resistance of the enemy is steadily maintained, and with 
absurd ease, our troops fall back with a loss of nearly two 
thousand men. The Confederate casualties are nominal. 
Sherman then makes an attempt further up and nearer the 
Yazoo, but as Porter can not cooperate with the flotilla he 
is unable to accomplish material results. 

This disheartening failure was not caused by want of 
courageous effort or intelligent action. Even had Sherman 
taken the bluffs, as he thinks might have been done, it is 
doubtful if he could have held them. 

Grant's subsequent success goes far to show that a cam- 
paign overland with all forces in one body would have come 
much nearer to compass the end than these two isolated 



1863.] SHERMAN'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 101 

attempts by land and water. A division of forces requires 
a background of good luck. It can not face bad fortune or 
accidents. 

McClernand now joined the army on the Yazoo and 
assumed command under his general orders 

° January 4, 1863. 

to that effect. 

An attack on Arkansas Post had already been planned 
by Sherman and Porter, and McClernand as commanding 
officer having assented, they now proceeded to put it into 
effect. Fort Hindman, as the Confederates called it, lay 
some distance up the Arkansas river, and was a constant 
threat to the rear of any force operating against Vicksburg. 
It was at this time garrisoned by some seven thousand men, 
under command of General Churchill. 

The troops embark and in a few days reach the scene of 
action. A landing is eflPected below, and next 

January 11. 

day the heavy guns of the fleet, after a few 
hours' bombardment, silence the artiUery in the fort. An 
assault is in contemplation when (as it is afterwards claimed 
by the enemy, under a mistake) white flags are raised along 
the parapet, and the fort is surrendered with nearly five 
thousand prisoners. Our loss was about one thousand. 

This very brilliant and cheap success was in the nature 
of a compensation for the grievous failure at Chickasaw 
Bayou. McClernand arrogated its accomplishment to him- 
self, and proceeded to project a visionary movement into 
the heart of Arkansas. But this expedition was nipped in 
the bud by Grant, who under authority from Halleck 
ordered the forces back to the Mississippi. McClernand 
sullenly obeyed. 



XIX. 

LEE'S FIRST INVASION. —ANTIETAM. 

LEAVING Grant to profit hj his failure, and to study 
up a new means of compassing the reduction of 
Vicksburg, we will see what is doing in Virginia. 

The natural sequence of Pope's reverse was an incursion 
by Lee across the Potomac. Active Bragg had just 
marched around Buell's left flank and made his way into 
Kentucky. The Army of Northern Virginia had utterly 
worsted both McClellan and Pope. Confederate prestige 
was high. In Southern eyes "My Maryland" was groan- 
ing under the tyrant's heel. And were there not corn, and 
horses, and shoes, as well as perhaps recruits, to be had in 
exchange for liberation ? 

No sooner then had the disjecta membra of the short- 
lived Army of Virginia been gathered within the defences 
of Washington, than McClellan, informally reinstated by 
unspoken verdict of army and people alike, found it neces- 
sary to move up the left bank of the Potomac to encounter 
the divisions which a few weeks since he had fought within 
the suburbs of their own capital. 

Rather than march on Baltimore, Lee had chosen a cam- 
paign in the mountainous region of Maryland. D. H. Hill 
102 



1862.] LEE'S FIRST INVASION. 103 

was the first to cross the Potomac, and within three days 
the whole Confederate Army was put over, and occupied 
the line of the Monocacy. 

The disenchantment of the Marylanders at the ragged- 
ness of the Southern chivalry was only equalled by the 
mortification of these gallant soldiers at their lukewarm 
reception, and Lee's campaign from the start wore the 
signs of failure. Harper's Ferry barred his communication 
up the Yalley with a garrison of eleven thousand men, and 
offered a tempting bait as well. With reckless contempt 
of his foe, Lee once again divided his forces, sending 
Jackson back across the river to capture tliis position. 

Harper's Ferry, with Lee in Maryland, was worse than 
useless to the Federals. It was a mere key to gates 
already broken down. Lee, of course, expected to see 
it evacuated. But to Halleck's soul this position was 
always dear. To lose it was to endanger the republic ; 
he ordered it held at any sacrifice. 

Meanwhile McClellan was movino- from Washins^ton 

into Maryland by his right, reorganizing the crestfallen 

but still resolute Army of the Potomac as he went. The 

troops had received the return of " Little Mac " as a 

harbinger of success, though it was a bitter task to follow 

the enemy into loyal territory. 

McClellan occupied Frederick, moving 

. September 12. 

With more than his usual caution on account 

of Halleck's absurd fears that he would uncover the 
capital. Here unexampled good luck put into his pos- 
session a copy of Lee's order of march to „ ,_■,., 

^ ^ September 13. 

his division commanders. To secure the 



104 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

fruit of this good chance he had but to extend his hand. 
An immediate march through the then undefended South 
Mountain passes would have enabled him to crush Long- 
street, separated from Jackson by the broad Potomac. 
But McClellan was incapable of moving rapidly. He 
loitered till the enemy occupied and he had to force 
these passes, at equal sacrifice of men and opportunity. 

Reno finds Hill in force in Turner's Gap. Reinforced 
by Hooker, a heavy fight enables them to gain a domi- 
nating foothold. Hill retires. On the 

September 14. i -i^ i t /• /^ i i 

same day Jranklm lorces Cobb out of 

Crampton's Gap. These two actions, known as the 

Battle of South Mountain, cost us eighteen hundred men. 

The enemy's loss was much larger, for we captured some 

twelve hundred prisoners. 

Meanwhile Jackson has cooped up eleven thousand 

Federals in the cid de sac at Harper's Ferry. The 

heights on both sides of the river are occupied. The 

bombardment begins. But within an hour Colonel Miles, 

the commander, who could have cut his way out, as did 

his cavalry, surrenders. His death, by almost the last 

shot fired, ill atones for this weakness. Jackson, with 

a part of his force, at once starts to rejoin 
September 16. ^ > n i^t i mi 

his chief in Maryland. The rest follows 
after completing the details of the capitulation. 

McClellan's inertia had thus permitted Lee to capture 
eleven thousand men and to reunite his separated corps. 
The Army of Northern Virginia now takes up at Sharps- 
burg a strong defensive position, covered by the Antietam. 

Lee had over fifty thousand muskets, every one of 



1862.] 



LEE'S FIRST INVASION. 



105 



which was as usual put to use. McClellan had eighty-seven 
thousand, but he not only failed to deceive Lee as to his 
tactical dispositions, but managed to use barely two-thirds 
his men, while his successive instead of massed attacks 
enabled Lee to fight what English roughs would call a 




Antietam. September 16 and 17, 1862. 

"one down t'other come on" sort of battle. Wherever 
engaged, the Confederates were equal to the Federals in 
number. 

The main attack is by the Federal right. Hooker crosses 
the Antietam, and opens the battle by a sharp assault on 



- 



106 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Lee's left. Next morning the attack is re- 
Sept. 16 and 17. , , . -. i ? i -r^ , 

newed, but is stopped by Jackson at Dunker 

Church. All day the tide ebbs and flows over this ground. 

Meade and Sumner and Mansfield fight their men to the 

best advantage, though in isolated columns. The lack of 

single purpose is manifest. Lee heavily reinforces this 

wing. 

But hard fighting across the Antietam is neutralized by 

Burnside's sluggish movement on the left flank. Ordered 

to cross at 7 A.M., he barely works out his task, against 

feeble opposition, by 3 P.M., when our ex- 
September 17. . *^ 

hausted right has ceased to struggle, and the 

balance of Jackson's corps comes upon the field from the 

Harper's Ferry triumph. Both combatants need rest, and 

Lee next day withdraws from a tactically drawn battle and 

a strategic defeat. 

Our loss in this battle of Antietam (Confederate " Sharps- 
burg ") was twelve thousand ^vq hundred ; Lee's over ten 
thousand. Except Shiloh, no such sanguinary struggle had 
stained the sod of the civilized New World. 

McClellan's pursuit was feebler than his critics deem it 
should have been. But he had under him many raw troops, 
and his best were the men who had been disheartened 
by the Richmond failure and Manassas ; who scarcely now\ 
felt the elation of victory, and were exhausted by labors 
such as critics oftener impeach than perform. 

Lee crossed into Yirorinia without losinsr a 

Sept. 18-19. * ^ 

man. 
The Confederates had, during the summer of 1862, as- 
sumed a bold offensive all along the line, at Corinth, into 



1862.] LEE'S FIRST INVASION: 107 

Kentucky and into Maryland. Each campaign terminated 
in disaster about the same time ; by Lee's 

September 17. 

withdrawal from Antietam : by Van Dorn's ^ , 

•^ October 4. 

defeat at Corinth ; by Bragg's check at Per- October 8 

ryville. After this date, a strong offensive, 

with any chance of success, was never undertaken by the 

enemy. 



n 



XX. 

AGAIN TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 

THE elation of the North was equalled by the bitter 
disappointment of the South at the failure of the 
Maryland campaign. McClellan moved to HarjDer's Ferry, 
but did not attempt to cross the army. As a shadow of 
the great struggle, Stuart made a sudden raid into Mary- 
land and Pennsylvania with a couple of reofi- 

Oct. 9-12. -^ 1 & 

ments of horse. He penetrated as far as 
Chambersburg, remounted his troopers and retired again 
across the river, making the entire circuit of the Army 
of the Potomac. Our cavalry was unable to follow or 
cope with him, though great efforts were made to head him 
off. For some weeks, McClellan paused to rest and reor- 
ganize. 

The Potomac having risen so as to be in the nature of a 

protection to Maryland, McClellan began to cross the army, 

intendino: to move down the eastern slope of 

October 26. ^ ^ 

the Blue Ridge until he struck the Manassas 
Gap Railroad, where he would be in direct communication 
with Washington, and successively to occupy all the de- 
bouches of the mountains. Lee retired up the valley on 

108 



1862.] AGAIN TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 109 

the western side of the range. Beyond a successful cav- 
alry combat by Pleasonton against Stuart 

November 5. 

in the valley, no blood w^s spilt. 

Six weeks after the close of the Maryland 

November 6. 

campaign the Army of the Potomac was con- 
centrated near Warrenton. McClellan was ready to move 
upon Culpeper. There was good ground for thinking the 
prospect brighter than ever before, when suddenly he was 
relieved, and Burnside appointed to command. 

McClellan " was an excellent strategist, and in many 
respects an excellent soldier. He did not use his own 
troops with sufficient promptness, thoroughness and vigor 
to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftenei 
successful than unsuccessful with them, and he so conducted 
aifairs, that they never suffered heavily without inflicting 

heavy loss upon their adversaries There are 

strong grounds for believing that he was the best com- 
mander the Army of the Potomac ever had. . . . While 
the Confederacy was young, and fresh, and rich, and its 
armies were numerous, McClellan fought a good, wary, 
damaging, respectable fight against it. . . . Not to men- 
tion such lamentable failures as Fredericksburg and Chan- 
cellorsville, it is easy to believe that with him in command, 
the Army of the Potomac would never have seen such 
dark days as those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor." 
(Palfrey.) 



XXI. 

THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. 

FROM McClellan's hyper-caution, a quality from which 
he seemed to be gradually weaning himself, to 
Burnside's utter recklessness, is a disheartening step. 
McClellan had followed up Lee rather charily, but his 
position and plans were good. 

Longstreet was but one day's march in our front. A 
sudden attack in force might have proven fatal to him, for 
Jackson was in the valley, beyond supporting distance. 

The Army of the Potomac numbered one hundred and 
twenty-two thousand men. McClellan had purposed to 
cross the Rappahannock, drive the enemy to Gordons ville, 
and then, by a sudden movement to the east, anticipate 
him in a march on Richmond by way of Bowling Green. 
Later events proved the soundness of McClellan's method. 

It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, 

and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates' ; it 

is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving 

in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do 

some new thing, for no reason dictated a change of the 

movement already in course of execution (which was, by 

the way, the first of McClellan's ever approved by Ilal- 
110 



1862.] THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. Ill 

leek) , the new commander of the Army of 
the Potomac determined upon a flank move- 
ment by his left on the north of the river towards Fred- 
ericksburg. 

To be sure, the lines of operation and supply by way of 
Acquia Creek were shorter, but this was the only advan- 
tage, and McClellan's plan embraced this factor when he 
should march eastward. Burnside was on the wrong side 
of the Rappahannock, and was widening the one great 
obstacle in his path for every mile of distance. Only by 
movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure 
means of crossing the river, could Bumside's manoeuvre 
possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Hal- 
leck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did 
not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. 

Arrived at Fredericksburo:, Burnside still 

*= November 16-18. 

might have crossed by the fords, for the water 
was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the 
city, he could afford to wait. But slower than even his pre- 
decessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north 
side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his move- 
ment, by forced marches concentrated his army on the 
opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences 
in his front. 

Burnside had reorganized the Army of the Potomac into 
three Grand Divisions, the Centre Grand Division under 
Hooker, and the Right and Left under Sumner and Frank- 
lin respectively. These were in their system of responsi- 
bility practically separate armies, and robbed the whole 
body of elastic force and mobility. 



112 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, 
Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been 
crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought 
together seventy-four thousand troops to man them. Two 
canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, 
sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attack- 
ing party for a long period under fire. To assault these 
works in front was simple madness. To turn them below 
necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, 
in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front, an 
operation always attended with the greatest risk, and con- 
sidered one of the most delicate in war. To turn them above 
was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's 
plan. Burnside chose the first. 

Preparations for crossing were begun. The 

December 10. pit t . 

better part of three days was consumed m 
throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Di- 
visions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accom- 
plished under fire. 

But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army 
of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy 
prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did 
not dispute the crossing in force. 

Burnside's one chance in an hundred lay in a concen- 
trated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could 
oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained 
attack or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered 
away this single chance by putting in FrankHn on the 
left and Sumner on the right, without concerted ac- 
tion. Nearly one hundred thousand men were in line. 



1862.] THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. 113 

Our artillery opens the affair and, as always, proves 
superior to the enemy's. From Franklin's ^^^^^^^^.^g. 
front Reynolds assaults with a well-massed 




Frederieksbupg. Deeembep 13, 1862. 



! column. Meade, who is in the lead, drives in A. P. 
Hill, but being unsupported, Doubleday and Gibbon having 



114 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

been delayed, is hurled back by Early, whose advance is 
in turn balked by Birney's division. 

In Sumner's front French is arrested at the stone wall. 
Hancock comes up and makes a manful struggle to pass it. 
Both attacks are easily repulsed. Hunt with his artillery 
on the north side essays to silence the guns on Marye's 
heights. It is too distant for his field ordnance. Hooker 
is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked 
not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and 
leads his men into the slaughter-pen. Humphreys again 
assaults the stone wall with all the gallantry and coolness 
which distinguish him. All is in vain. Even the Army 
of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated 
troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually 
withdrawn across the river. 

Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault 
next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him 
to desist. 

No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps, 
of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and thirteen 
thousand men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but 
two in five of ours. He had exulted in a fiery holiday. 
Well were his paeans sung ! He had been obliged to put 
in but a few divisions. 

Lee was taken to task for not advancing from his defences, 
and completing the destruction of the Army of the Potomac. 
But he believed that the attack would be renewed, for he 
did not know how hea\y our losses had been, and was un- 
willing to risk the advantage of position which had already 
gained him so much. The Southern public was quite as 



1862.] THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. 115 

unreasonably critical of military events as our own, and 
Lee's splendid achievements were scarcely ever appreciated 
at a fraction of their true value. In view of the difficulty 
to-day, with all the facts before us, of withholding from 
Greneral Lee our sincere homage as the great soldier of ou? 
Civil War, of the difficulty we meet in passing any criticism 
upon his conduct as a soldier, it seems strange that, during 
the war, when it was he, whose unfailing equipoise and 
sturdy courage prolonged the hfe of the Confederacy from 
month to month, many of his feUow-citizens should have 
been bitterly arrayed against him. And yet this was the 
case. A dispassionate judgment places Eobert E. Lee 
on the level of such captains as Turenne, Eugene, Marl- 
borough, Wellington, and Moltke. 



xxn. 

THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 

i 

'^ rriHERE can be no doubt about the proposition that 
-L greater results were habitually achieved by a 
certain number of thousands or tens of thousands of Lee's 
army than by an equal number of the Army of the Potomac. 
The reason for this is not to be found in any difference in 
patriotic zeal in the two armies. The first reason probably 
was that the different modes of life at the South and at the 
North made the Southern soldiers more fond of fighting 
than the Northern men. Not to mention the intense and 
more passionate character of the Southerner as compared 
with that of the Northerner, the comparatively lawless (not 
to speak invidiously) life at the South, where the popula- 
tion was scattered and the gun came ready to the hand, 
made the Southern man an apter soldier than the peaceful, 
prosperous, steady-going recruit from the North. The 
Southerners showed that they felt the gaudiu7n certaminis. 
With the Northerners it was different. They were ready 
to obey orders, they were ready to do the work to which 
they had set their hands, they were ready to die in their 
tracks if need be, but they did not go to battle as to a 
feast. They did not like fighting. Sheridan, Hancock, 



1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH 117 

Humphreys, Kearny, Custer, Barlow, and such as they, 
were exceptions ; but the rule was otherwise." (Palfrey.) 

Other reasons are alleged. The Confederate soldier was 
as a rule ill fed and clothed, worse shod and rarely had 
luxuries. And as a field won meant to him these sadly 
needed shoes and clothing and blankets and rations as weU 
as arms and ammunition, — not indeed to mention money 
and other valuables, — this motive may fairly be said to have 
weighed also as an incentive to the fight. The very rags and 
starvation of the Southerner made him the better fighter and 
the quicker marcher. "'I can whip any army that is fol- 
lowed by a flock of cattle,' said Jackson, and it was a preg- 
nant saying. " (Ibid.) The Federal was embarrassed by 
his riches, and the difficulty of transporting all he had. The 
Confederate was always in light marching order, and all too 
often captured his rations on the field. 

General Palfrey has struck the key-note of this inter- 
esting discussion. But there are still other reasons. The 
marked degrees of the Southern social scale as readily assigned 
to the enlisted man his musket as to the officer his side-arms. 
Wherever a regiment was raised, the men who had always 
been leaders at home were with rare exceptions chosen 
leaders for the field ; they were uniformly the best men for 
the places, and the habit of command and obedience was 
instinctive. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the 
early conscription laws kept under the Confederate colors 
the hardened men, making discipline more a matter of course 
than in our ranks where the individual soldiers were con- 
stantly changing. 

That he accomplished more is true. But that the 



118 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

Southerner was a better soldier cannot be claimed. Even 
Friedrich's regiments at Leuthen showed devotion no 
greater than our own battalions at Marye's Heights ; and 
desperate as was the Prussians' task as they marched in 
parade order upon the Austrians' left flank, had they not 
Vater Fritz to lead them, and the pregnant threats of 
Friedrich the King to keep them to their work? While 
every soldier in the ranks on that fatal thirteenth of 
December could see the hopeless nature of his struggle, 
and was far indeed from fighting for king and fatherland. 
In tliis most famous of Friedrich's victories he, the attack- 
ing party, lost six thousand two hundred men out of 
thirty thousand, all of whom were actually, and at the 
crisis simultaneously, engaged. At Fredericksburg, with- 
out incentive, the Army of the Potomac laid at the foot of 
the heights ten thousand nine hundred dead and wounded, 
out of not much more than sixty thousand men actually in 
the assault. Hancock lost two thousand and twenty-nine 
out of forty-eight hundred and thirty-four. 

Not that the presumption is attempted of comparing the 
two battles as such. Leuthen is the most splendid piece 
of grand-tactics of the last century, perhaps of modern 
times ; Fredericksburg was a tactical blunder of the purest 
water. But Leuthen is often cited to show the grand fidel- 
ity of the Prussian infantry ; in this respect the comparison 
is not odious. 

Nor is it hard to parallel Fredericksburg more than once 
during our war. What shall be said of Grant's " hammer- 
ing " campaign of 1864, in which the Army of the Poto- 
mac from May 5 to June 10 lost little short of sixty thou- 



1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 119 

sand men, killed and wounded, in front of Lee's intrenched 
lines, out of a total of one hundred and twenty thousand 
under arms ? Or of the thirteen thousand out of forty-three 
thousand at Stone's Eiver? Or of Chickamauga's sixteen 
thousand out of sixty-two thousand men on the field ? Or of 
Porter's loss of seven thousand out of twenty-nine thousand 
at Gaines' Mill ? Or of Sherman's loss of thirty thousand 
men out of one hundred thousand in his four months' cam- 
paign from Dalton to Atlanta? Shall further comparison 
be made? That the elation of the battle-field ens^endered 
of a sunny climate can be offset by the sturdier virtues of 
the patient North is the constant verdict of history. 

Moreover, in Virginia, it was leadership which accom- 
plished such results with so feeble resources. Look at 
other battle-fields, and, man for man, where commanders 
were of equal weight, what difference can be traced? The 
arithmetical value of the Southron as compared with the 
Yankee, which used to be so constantly rolled as a sweet 
morsel under the tongue by our ancient foemen, can to-day, 
I ween, be dismissed with a friendly shake of the hand as 
we shoulder our crutch for the rising generation, and show 
how fields were won. 

It is a noteworthy fact that a list of the fifty most severe 
battles during the Civil War shows ten drawn and twenty 
victories to each side. At the point of fighting contact, in 
these fifty battles, the forces were within two per cent, of 
being equal. 

In thirty-four battles the Union forces remained in pos- 
session of the field, and buried the enemy's dead ; the 
Confederates did the like in twenty-nine. In eleven assaults 



120 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. IU^2. 

by large forces, the Union troops won ; in eleven the Con- 
federates drove them back ; in eight the Federals repulsed 
such assaults. 

The stronofest reason for the acknowledo^ed truth that 
the Southerner accomplished more with less means than we 
did lies in the fact that he was fighting for the preservation 
of his own soil. It needs not history to teach us what this 
.incentive can accomplish. Every brave man carries it in 
the deepest recesses of his heart, and reads his willing duty 
in the eyes of the wife, the child, the mother, or the sweet- 
heart, to preserve whose sacred right to a peaceful home 
his life stands always a ready sacrifice. 

The North, thank God, was never called upon for the 
effort, the self-denial of the South. That it is capable of 
yielding it when so called needs not to be asserted. And 
there is sufficient to be proud of in American manhood not 
to draw lines of politics or climate in comparing either the 
intelligence or the hardihood of the men who marched 
and fought throuojh our Civil War beside or as^ainst each 
other. 

To attempt to give the American his proper place among 
the soldiers of other nations, ancient or modern, is an 
inquiry demanding a volume by itself. But the stanchness 
of the American in battle may be measured to a fair extent 
by a few statistics. Courage is only one of the necessary 
virtues of the soldier ; but it is an important one, and, if 
we take the average number of killed and wounded in the 
prominent battles of the past century and a half, we arrive 
at a conclusion reasonably secure. 

Frederick and Napoleon are the two captains of modern 



1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 121 

times who have fought their men au fond. Their losses 
are the heaviest ; but ours follow hard upon. 

The following percentages of men killed and wounded 
comprise the most noted battles since 1745. Only those 
whose full statistics are wanting are omitted : — 

Up to Waterloo, the French, in nine battles (Napoleon's), 

lost in killed and wounded of the number engaged . . 22.38 per cent. 

Since, in nine battles 8.86 " 

Up to Waterloo, the Prussians, in eight battles (mostly Fred- 
erick's), lost 18.42 *< n. I " 

At Koniggratz they lost 3.86 ««,-— t^Qci^'^^^ 

Up to Waterloo, the Austrians, in seven battles, lost . . 11.17 ** 

Since, in two battles 9>.f\Q " 

The Germans, since 1745, in eight battles .... 11.53 " 

The English, in four battles 10.36 " 

During our Civil War, the Union forces lost in fourteen pitched 
battles, in which numbers and casualties are well ascer- 
tained 14.48 " 

The Confederate forces, in twelve, ditto .... 18 ** 

Of very severe losses in small bodies, perhaps the most often 

quoted is that of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, viz. . 36.7 per cent. 

At Metz the Gardeschiitzen battalion lost .... 46.1 " 

At Mars La Tour, the Sixteenth Infantry (Westphalian) lost, 49.4 " 
During our Civil War, there were lost, in some one action by 

one Union regiment, out of the men taken into action . 82 '* 

By three Union regiments . . between 70 per cent, and 80 " 

By seventeen Union regiments, " 60 " *' 70 " 

Byfortj-one *« '' . <' 50 " " 60 <' 
These numbers are all taken from the muster rolls on file in the War Depart- 
ment, where each man is accounted for by name. 

The severest loss in the Civil War was by a Confederate regi- 
ment at Gettysburg, 720 out of 800 men .... 90 per cent. 

Another lost in one battle 82 " 

Three " " ... between 60 per cent, and 70 *< 
Nine " " ..." 50 " *' 60 " 

Twenty-nine lost in one battle over 50 " 

Longstreet's Division lost at Gaines' Mill and Glendale 

4,438 out of 8,831 men over 50 per cent. 

Sevei'al divisions lost in some one action . . . . " 40 " 

It thus appears that in ability to stand heavy pounding, 
since Napoleon's Waterloo campaign, the American has 
shown himself preeminent. Of course there are other 
factors in the problem. But these figures may surely be 
looked upon with pride — even if no absolute conclusion 
can be drawn from them. 



xxin. 

ROSECRANS AND BRAGG. — STONE'S RIVER. 

ROSECRANS was called to the command of tlie 
Department of the Cumberland in the place of 
Buell, as already stated. The forces operat- 

October 30, 1862. . i . t 

mg on this line were hereafter to be known 
as the Army of the Cumberland. The name of Army of the 
Ohio was to be borne by the troops in the East Tennessee 
YaUey. 

Much was expected of Rosecrans. His many friends 
claimed for him up to this date the only record of uniform 
success. His brilliant, if somewhat erratic, method wag 
thought to embody the soldierly instinct, not so apparent in 
more quiet natures. 

Rosecrans made many changes. He gave the command 
of his right wing to McCook ; of his left to Crittenden ; of 
his centre to sturdy Thomas. The position of the army 
about Nashville was not modified. 

Towards the middle of November, Bragg, somewhat 

reinforced, advanced to Murfreesborough and laid distant 

siege to Nashville. Beyond this movement, except for 

some minor operations, — another notable 

raid of J. H. Morgan among them, — there 

was no attempt to cross swords for two months. 

122 



1862.] 



ROSEGRANS AND BRAGG. 



123 



December 26. 



Braxton Bragg's rank as a soldier is hard to gauge. He 
was put and kept in place by the personal favor of President 
Davis. Not lacking audacity or military skill, he was 
uniformly beaten, and, like all unsuccessful generals, he 
received no credit for what he did accomplish. It is easy 
to forgive errors to the eventually successful ; hard to allow 
any credit for even good work. which comes to nothing. 

Rosecrans' objective was of course Chattanooga, as had 
been Buell's. But he must first clear the enemy from his 
front. In the last days of the year, in three 
columns, he advanced upon Bragg's posi- 
tion. Not intending active operations, Bragg had already 
put his army 
into winter- 
quarters over 
a considerable 
area ; but no 
sooner aware of 
Eosecrans' in- 
tentions, than 
he concentrated 
his troops 
across the lat- 
ter 's path. 

After some 
outpost skir- 
mishing, the 
armies con- 
fronted each Stone's River. December 31, 1862. 

other north of Murfreesborough, intent upon a prompt 




124 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862. 

struggle for mastery. The Army of the Cumberland was 
in a position facing substantially south-east. Stone's River, 
the turnpike, and the railroad, all near together, ran north- 
westerly from the town at right angles to the position of 
Rosecrans and near his left flank. The river was fordable 
in places. The country was alternate woods and clearing. 

Rosecrans' plan of battle was to throw Crittenden across 
Stone's River upon Bragg's right in force, while McCook 
should hold our right where it lay. Upon his strict per- 
formance of this duty depended success, and McCook 
protested his ability to hold his lines at least three hours 
against any odds. Curiously enough, Bragg contemplated 
precisely the same field tactics, to wit : to crush our right. 
Under these conditions, other things being equal, whoever 
moved first upon his enemy with sufficient vigor would win 
the day. Rosecrans ordered the men to breakfast and the 
movement to begin at 7 A.M. Bragg ordered the attack 
to begin at daylight. 

There was some carelessness in the disjDOsition of the 

troops on McCook's wing, which Rosecrans should have 

personally known and rectified. He placed too much 

reliance on this officer's assertion that he 

December 31. 

could hold his own. 
Bragg's left, under Hardee, overlapped our right. His 
onset was made with true Southern 6lan, and immediately 
thrust back McCook, whose resistance ill bore out his 
boast. Scarcely had Rosecrans crossed Stone's River and 
launched Crittenden's columns upon Breckenridge than he 
was forced to recall them to the assistance of his abeady 
routed right wing. There was no let up to the Confederate 



18G3.] ROSECRANS AND BRAGG. 125 

attack. Hardee was in his element. Every success was 
quickly followed up, and McCook was driven in confusion 
upon the centre. The situation was grave. 

But Thomas was of other stuff. He was not to be so 
easily disposed of. Forming his own divisions along the 
turnpike at right angles to our first line, he fought with his 
never flao:2:ino^ coolness and determination. Rosecrans' 
feverish activity served to reanimate the troops. Sheridan's 
division reflected the mettle of its commander. Young, 
and as yet unused to large commands, he seconded Thomas 
with the instinct of the soldier glowing in every fibre. Our 
lines struggled through the rest of the day against almost 
certain defeat. The success of the Confederates elated 
them, but in no sort demoralized the Federals. The fight- 
ing on either side was desperate. 

Night fell. All we could claim was that we had not 
been driven from the field. A council of war was held. 
Neither Rosecrans nor Thomas would consider the question 
of retreat. A fresh conflict was settled for the morrow, 
the first day of the new year. 

But Bragg's success had bred more disorganization than 
our defeat. He was in no condition to attack. His men 
and oflScers had exhausted themselves in the splendid efforts 
which had so nearly destroyed the Army of the Cumberland. 
New Year's passed without a demonstration on either side. 
Next day, Bragg essayed an attack on Rosecrans' left, but 
was thrown back. Unable to force defeat 

^^ ^ i- t • i -r^ i, Januaij 2, 1863. 

upon the stubborn battalions which Buell 

had drilled, he withdrew into Miirfreesborough, with a loss 

of ten out of thirty-eight thousand men against thirteen out 



126 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

of forty-three thousand on our side. Bragg could show 
as trophies some twenty-eight guns. 

Both parties laid claim to victory. But Bragg retreated 
from Murfreesborough as a consequence of this battle, and it 
was occupied by our troops. 

Bragg was apt to throw blame upon his subordinates for 
his own shortcomings. On this occasion he gave as the 
cause of his failure that Breckenridge did not promptly 
obey orders in reinforcing Hardee when sore pressed. 
But as the usual test of a general is success, or at least 
results, small attention can be given to the easily invented 
explanations of failure. Under equal conditions none but 
the victor may wear the laurel. Against overwhelming 
odds alone can defeat add honor to the soldier's name. 



XXIV. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

THE Army of the Potomac was never so demoralized 
as after the horror of December 13th, at Fredericks- 
burg. Succeeding this battle a fine spell' of weather 
invited a renewal of aggressive movements. But Burn- 
side allowed the favorable time to pass. Just as the 
elements ceased to be propitious he began a manoeuvre 
— it was on McClellan's plan — to turn Lee's left. But 
Virginia roads and rivers are treacherous. One day's 
down-pour of rain sufficed to destroy the 

^ ^ January 20 to 24 

possibility of success, and the farcical ending 
of the so-called Mud March gave the enthusiasm of the 
army its coup de grace, A new commander became 
essential, and Hooker was promoted from his Grand 
Division, — Franklin and Sumner being overslaughed. 

At this time, so lax had been its discipline, some 
eiffhty-five thousand officers and men ap- 

-, 1 ,, ^ , * January 26, 1863. 

peared on the rolls of the Army of the 

Potomac as absent without leave. But "Fighting Joe" 

grasped the reins with firmness and in organization gave 

proof of great skill. A rare favorite among the men, 

and with solid record, it was only those who judged 

127 



128 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

with exceptional insight and long knowledge of the man 
who mistrusted the result. And even their apprehensions 
were in part allayed by Hooker's steadiness. 

By the beginning of April the recuperative power of 
the stanch old army had again made it equal to any 
effort. It lay in its cantonments about Falmouth, while 
Lee watched it from his ever strengthening heights 
back of Fredericksburg, with confidence bred of the 
knowledge that under him served sixty thousand of the 
hardiest troops which ever laughed at hunger, cold, or 
danger. 

Hooker initiated the Chancellorsville campaign by _ a 
cavalry raid on Lee's communications intended to move 
about his left and far to his rear ; but sheer blundering 
robbed this diversion of any good results. He followed 
up this raid by a feint under Sedgwick below Fredericks- 
burg, while he himself so cleverly stole a march on Lee by 
the upper Rappahannock, that within four 

April 30. 

days he had massed forty thousand men on 
the enemy's left flank at Chancellorsville, before the latter 
had begun to divine his purpose. 

But here Hooker paused. Indecision seized his mind. 
He frittered away a precious day, and when he finally 
advanced on Lee, the latter had recovered himself and was 
prepared to meet him. After barely feeling his adver- 
sary, " Fighting Joe " retired into the Wilderness to invite 
attack, while Lee, with half his force but thrice his nerve, 
sharply followed him up. The terrain to which the Army 
of the Potomac had been thus withdrawn was well named. 
It was one vast entanglement of second growth timber 



1863.] 



CHANCELL ORS VILLE. 



129 



and chapparal, to the last degree unfitted for the ma- 
noeuvres of an army. 

With his wonted rashness, but relying on his adver- 
sary's vacillation, Lee divided his army and sent Jackson 
around Hooker's right to take him in reverse and cut him 
off from United States Ford, while his own constant feints 
on the centre should cover the move. Meanwhile Hooker 
weakened liis right by blind demonstrations in his front, 




Chaneellopsville. May 2, 1863. 

and enabled Jackson to complete his manoeuvre and to 
crush at a blow the Eleventh corps, which held that flank, 
and to throw the army into utter confusion. 
In this moment of his greatest triumph Jack- 
son fell at the hand of his own men. 

On the morrow, by dint of massed blows, with " Jack- 
son " for a watchword, upon Hooker's lines, where but one 
man in three was put under fire, Lee fairly drove our army 



May 2. 



130 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1863. 



into a corner, from whence its dazed commander, with 
eighty thousand men, cried aloud for succor to Sedgwick's 
one corps fifteen miles away, still fronting the defenses at 




Chaneellorsville. May 3, 4, 6, 1863. 



Mays. 



Fredericksburg. Under quite impossible orders this gal- 
lant soldier captured Marye's Heights, where 
Burnside had lost thirteen thousand men, 
and advanced towards his chief. But Lee, trusting to 
Hooker's panic to keep him bottled up, turned upon Sedg- 
May4. wick, drove him across the river after an all 
^ay^- day's fight, and again confronted Hooker, 
who, dizzy and nerveless, sought safety in retreat to his 
old camps. 

This ten days' passage at arms was glorious to the Con- 
federate soldier's valor and to his leader's skill, while we 
lost all save honor. With an effective only half as great, 
Lee had actually outnumbered Hooker whenever he 



1863 . ] CHANG ELL ORS ViLLE. 131 

had struck him. While a fraction of our forces were beinsr 
decimated, the rest were held by Hooker in the leash at 
places where they were uselessly fretting to join their 
brothers in the fray. 

It is true that Hooker was accidentally disabled May 3 ; 
but rather than turn over the command to his second, 
Couch, he chose to retain the responsibility. 

Of this splendid campaign every American may make his 
boast. Every Northerner must keenly deplore it. Our 
losses were seventeen thousand out of one hundred and 
^VQ thousand engaged, and the enemy's thirteen thousand 
out of sixty-one thousand. 

Jackson's reputation as a soldier is national. It is 
almost supererogatory to add anything to what has been 
narrated about this remarkable man. Untried in large 
command, his powers as a captain can only be judged from 
his successes in the Valley. But as a lieutenant he was far 
beyond any officer who fought on either side during our 
Civil War. 

Hooker and Hooker's partisans have endeavored to shift 
the responsibility of this defeat on Howard, for allowing 
his corps to be surprised on the right ; and on Sedgwick, 
for not fighting an impossible battle and making an impos- 
sible march in the middle of the night. But neither can be 
so saddled. Hooker himself must bear the load, however 
heavy, and however well he has otherwise deserved our 
admiration. And this may be said with sincere apprecia- 
tion of Hooker's services as a corps commander, and of his 
splendid gallantry on many a hard-fought field. 



XXY. 

LEE'S SECOND INVASION. 

'IVT'OW supervenes another rest in the thrice-reocciipied 
X.M Falmouth camps, while Lee plans with questionable 
political or strategic foresight a second raid into the North- 
ern States. Still grasping with his right the old defenses 
at Fredericksburg, he covertly advances his left, under 
Ewell, to Culpeper, and thence into the Shenandoah 
Valley. 

Hooker became aware of an impending, movement, and 

threw his entire force of cavalry across the Rappahannock on 

a forced reconnoissance. At Beverly Ford 

a smart combat with Stuart, the loss on 

our side being some eight hundred men, on theirs half as 

many, revealed Lee's intentions. 

Ewell, followed warily by the centre, pushed rapidly on 
down the Valley. 

At one moment the line of the Army of 
Northern Virginia stretched from Fredericks- 
bur o; to Winchester, — a distance of one hundred miles. 
This was a very dangerous extension, and Hooker sug- 
gested to his timid chief in Washington the obvious pro- 
priety of recalling Lee from his now evident objective by 
132 



1863.] LEE'S SECOND INVASION. 133 

crushing his right wing, thus seriously compromised at 
Fredericksburg. But he was forbidden this safest of opera- 
tions, for Mr. Lincoln's idea of fighting a divided army 
was that of " an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to 
be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to 
gore one way or to kick the other," while Halleck's one 
notion of defending Washington was by the presence of 
the entire army between it and the enemy. 

Thus Hooker was chained to the hackneyed strategy 
of moving by his right towards the Potomac, while Ewell 
trapped Milroy at Winchester and captured some four 
thousand prisoners and much material. 

June 13-15. 

From here Ewell marched boldly into Penn- 
sylvania, where his cavalry levied heavy contributions in 
stock and grain on the terrified farmers. 

So soon as Lee saw Hooker fairly started in pursuit of 
Ewell, he let go of Fredericksburg, and urged Longstreet 
and Hill to their utmost speed to rejoin him. Halleck had 
got the Union forces parcelled out in wretched driblets all 
over the map from West Virginia to the Peninsula, and 
could still not rise beyond his one idea of preserving 
Harper's Ferry. Within his restrictions Hooker's march 
had been conducted with logistic skill and discretion. He 
was simply hand-tied, while the enemy was free to ravage 
Pennsylvania. However fretted by E well's presence in the 
loyal States, Hooker could not cross the Potomac until he 
knew that none of Lee's three corps was left in Virginia. 

The Army of the Potomac was put over a day after 
the Confederates and was concentrated at 

. June 25-27. 

Frederick, from which point Hooker could 



134 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

debouch on Lee's rear through South Mountain, or else 
move upon him on the line of the Susquehannah. For 
intelligent concentration Halleck had substituted pitiful 
fault-finding, all of wliich had resulted in the enemy's 
reaching the vicinity of Harrisburg without opposition 
worthy the name. And unable to control events within 
his ow^n reach, Hooker requested on the eve of engagement 
to be relieved. This was an act scarcely to be condoned, 
but for its happy outcome. 

Few words sum up Hooker's military standing. As a 
corps cQmmander, or with orders to obey, unless jealousy 
warped his powers, he was unsurpassed in bravery, devo- 
tion and skill. For the burden of supreme command he 
had neither mental calibre nor equipoise. Self-sufficiency 
stood in lieu of self-reliance. 

Into Hooker's place quietly stepped business-like Meade, 
and unhampered by Halleck, whose favorite 

June 28. r j ^ 

he was, continued to follow up the invaders. 
Ewell was at York and Carlisle and might cross the Sus- 
quehannah and capture the capital of the State. Meade, 
therefore, moved northward from Frederick, intent upon 
loosening Lee's grip on that river. This he effected, and 
Longstreet and HjU were ordered, not towards Harris- 
burg, but through the South Mountain passes. For Lee, 
so soon as he knew of Meade's direction, became fearful for 
his communications. And he was moreover troubled by 
the naked defense of Richmond, which prize could have 
been secured by a vigorous attack by General Dix from 
Fort Monroe with more ease than at any time during the 
war, had the attempt been made. Lee, therefore, deter- 



1863.] LEE'S SECOND INVASIOm 135 

mined to draw back and make a diversion east of the South 
Mountain range to engage Meade's attention. 

Lee's plan of invasion had been thwarted ; but his army 
must be defeated. 

Having divined the purpose of his adversary, Meade 
selected the general line of Pipe Creek for his defense, and 
threw his left wing, preceded by cavalry, forward to 
Gettysburg as a mask. Lee also aimed to secure this 
point, for it controlled the roads towards the Potomac. 
The encounter was near at hand. 



XXVI. 



GETTYSBURG. 



THE First and Eleventh corps met the van of Lee's 
Army under A. P. Hill, on the north of the now 
historic town. A severe engagement ensued, 
in which doughty Reynolds lost his life, and 
the Federals, after Ewell came upon the field, were driven 



July 1. 




Gettysburg. July 1, 1863. 

back through the town, with heavy loss, but unpursued, 

Hill and Ewell waited for Longstreet. 
136 



1863.] . GETTYSBURG. 137 

This check to the enemy's advance led to results worth 
all the sacrifice. 

Few conflicts of modern times have become so familiar, 
in art and story, as the battle of Gettysburg. Only its 
chief features need be recalled. South of the quiet little 
town, covering the road to Baltimore, lies a chain of liil- 
locks and bluffs shaped like a fish-hook. At the barb rises 
Gulp's Hill, along the back what is known as Cemetery 
Hill, and the shank, running north and south, is formed 
by a hilly slope terminating in a rocky, wooded peak, called 
Round Top, having Little Round Top as a spur. For 
Hancock and Howard alike has been claimed the credit 
of selecting this ever memorable position. Perchance 
Reynolds' keen eye gauged its value as he hurried through 
the town to stem the approaching tide. On this eligible 
ground the retreating Unionists were rallied, and speedily 
reinforced, while Meade, at Hancock's suggestion, brought 
the army forward from Pipe Greek to secure it. 

Meanwhile Lee cautiously advanced his own troops, and 
forgetting that he had promised his corps commanders that 
he would not in this campaign assume a tactical offensive, 
resolved to give battle. Longstreet's preference was to 
seize the Emmetsburg road beyond the Union left, and 
manoeuvre Meade out of his position by compromising his 
communications with Washington. But there lurked in 
the healthy body of the Army of Northern Yirginia a 
poisonous contempt of its adversary. This was the natural 
outcome of Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellors- 
ville. Lee was morally unable to decline battle. He 
could not imperil the high-strung confidence of his men. 



138 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 



July 2. 



As tEe second day dawned he must, however, 
have watched with throbbing anxiety the 
Federal line rapidly throwing up defences on just such a 




Gettysburg. July 2, 3, 4, 1863. 



formidable crest as himself had held at Marye's Heights. 
For Lee gauged better than his men the fighting qualities 
of his foe. 



1863.] GETTYSBURa. 139 

His general line lay along Seminary Ridge, parallel to 
Cemetery Hill, and about a mile distant, with his left 
thrown round and through the town to a point opposite 
Gulp's, in order Longstreet, Hill, Ewell. He was thus 
formed in concave order of battle, the Army of the 
Potomac having been thrown by the lay of the land into 
substantially the convex order. 

By noon Lee had perfected his plans, and Longstreet 
opened an attack on a weak salient thrown out by Sickles 
from the general line of our left towards the Emmetsburg 
road. The possession of Round Top would take the 
Federal line in reverse, and Sickles' position, an outward 
angle, could be enfiladed in both directions, and if lost 
would seriously compromise this point. Longstreet was 
not slow to clutch at the advantage thus offered. But the 
foresight of Warren, after a desperate struggle, secured 
Round Top ; and though Longstreet wrested from Sickles 
his salient, he secured only an apparent benefit not com- 
mensurate with his loss. 

On the Union extreme right, Ewell had meanwhile 
gained a foothold on Gulp's Hill, and, as night fell, Lee 
was justified in feeling that the morrow would enable him 
to carry the entire ridge. For he believed that he had 
effected a breach in both flanks of the Army of the 
Potomac. Indeed at the close of the second day the gravity 
of the situation induced Meade to call a council of his corps 
commanders. It was determined to abide the result at 
that spot. Officers and men were in good spirits and 
equal to any work. 

Lee was tactically in error as to Longstreet's supposed 



140 BIRUS-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

success on the left. It had in reality rectified Sickles' 
position. Our real line was undisturbed. And Meade at 
daylight attacked Ewell in force, and after a 
hard tussle wrenched from him the ground 
commanding Gulp's. Thus Lee had failed to effect a per- 
manent lodgment on our either flank, and we had thrown 
up strong field works to defend them. There was no 
resource for him but to break our centre. 

He accordingly massed nearly one hundred and fifty 
guns along Seminary Ridge, and at 1 P.M. opened 
fire. Owing to the limited space for the batteries, barely 
eighty guns from our side could answer this spirited chal- 
lenge. For two hours lasted the fiery duel, when Lee 
launched Pickett, " the Ney of the rebel army," with a 
column of thirteen thousand men, to drive a wedge into 
the centre of the Union line. A column charged with so 
desperate a duty — the forlornest of forlorn hopes — should 
contain none but picked troops. Pettigrew's division in 
the assaulting column was unable to hold its own. And 
though Pickett's Virginians actually ruptured Hancock's 
line and a few of the men penetrated some fifty yards 
beyond, he met an array in front and flank which rolled 
him back with fearful loss. Lee's last chance of success 
was wrecked. 

The instinct of a great commander might have seized 
this moment for an advance in force upon the broken 
enemy. But Meade cautiously held what he had already 
won, rather than gain more at greater risk. 

Beaten but not dismayed, Lee spent all 
the morrow and until after dayhght next day 



1863.] GETTYSBURG. 141 

preparing for retreat, and yet in a mood to invite attack. 
And he would have met it stoutly. But Meade was 
content. He would adventure nothing. He had won the 
credit of defeating his enemy; he lost the chance of 
destroying him. He may be justified in this ; but not in 
failing to follow up Lee's deliberate retreat with greater 
vi2:or. It must however be admitted that in almost nl] 
campaigns, a similar criticism maybe passed, — after the 
event. There is always a term to the endurance and ac- 
tivity of armies and their commanders. 

In this most stubborn battle of modern days we lost 
twenty-three thousand out of ninety-three thousand en- 
gaged ; the Confederates twenty-two thousand five hundred 
out of eighty thousand men, beside fifty-four hundred 
prisoners. The loss in killed and wounded, twenty-two 
and a half per cent., is unexampled in so large a force. 

Lee retreated by way of Williamsport, undisturbed save 
at a distance, and after some days was followed across the 
Potomac by Meade. 



xxvn. 

GRANT AGAIN MOVES ON VICKSBUEG. 

WHILE the old year closed with the tragedy of 
Fredericksburg and the drawn battle of Mur- 
freesborousfh, the new year opened with 

1862 and 1863. ^ , , ^ ' ^^. ^ , 

(jrrants second advance on Vicksburg, and 
with General Banks creating a base for operations at 
New Orleans. 

Grant was now in sole command of the forces operating 
down the Mississippi. His army consisted of the Thirteenth 
corps under McClernand, the Fifteenth under Sherman, 
the Sixteenth under Hurlbut, and the Seventeenth under 
McPherson, a body comprising the veterans of the West. 
We have seen how his overland march on Yicksburg was 
cut short by severed communications, and neutralized Sher- 
man's efforts at Chickasaw Bayou. This only served how- 
ever to whet his determination to capture the place, which, 
and Port Hudson below, were the only serious obstacles 
to the free navigation of the great river. But they were 
serious indeed. 

Hurlbut was detached to watch the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Railroad while Sherman and McClernand moved to 

Young's Point, and McPherson was ordered soon to follow. 
142 



1863.] GRANT AGAIN MOVES ON VICKSBURG. 143 

From here Grant would have preferred to work around the 
city by the north, but the Yazoo lowlands were quite under 
water, and all reconnoissances pointed to grave difficulties 
in the way of such an operation. 

It will be remembered that Vicksburg is situated at the 
bight of a great loop made by the Mississippi. Across the 
loop, at its narrowest point, does not much exceed a mile. 
Before reaching the ground Grant had given orders to con- 
struct another canal across this loop, as 
Williams had done a year before, but when, 
towards early spring, he arrived and (McClernand protest- 
ing) assumed command, he discovered the uselessness of 
such an attempt. Work on the canal, however, was kept 
up by the troops for six weeks, when a heavy freshet washed 

away the embankments and utterly destroyed 

T . . 1 1 1 1 . March 7. 

it. It IS improbable that as a water-way it 
could ever have been utilized, for it was not in such a loca- 
tion as to allow the current of the river to flow freely 
into it. 

During this period the monotony of the canal work was 
enlivened by various naval exploits on the river. Admiral 
Porter, who commanded the fleet cooperating with Grant, 
sent several of his vessels down past the Vicksburg batteries. 
Among these was prominent the feat of Colonel EUet, 
already noted for much excellent work with the flotilla. In 
the Queen of the West he ran below the town, attacked 
and all but destroyed the rebel ram. City of Vicksburg. 
Being unable to return he proceeded down the river, and 
after numerous adventures, joined the forces under Banks. 

Grant's task was one full of contingencies. Strangely 



144 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

enough, he seems to have had no settled plan at this time. 
But he set on foot various projects for weakening the ap- 
proaches to Vicksburg, or for opening a water-course around 
so as to isolate it. He dug a canal from the Mississippi to 
Providence Lake, hoping to make a practicable channel 
through the Tensas, Black, Red and Atchafalaya rivers to 
a point below Port Hudson. He opened another channel 
from the river to Moon Lake, purposing to run light- 
draught boats down the Tallahatchie and Yazoo. For not 
only was there a shipyard at Yazoo city, where ssbme ves- 
sels were building, but it was a considerable depot of 
stores. 

The latter route, if practicable, not only afforded an 
opportunity of destroying this depot, but would also enable 
Grant to take Haines' Bluff in reverse, and capture the hills 
which are the key to Yicksburg. A demonstration by land 
forces as well as the navy was made in connection with this 

scheme. But all these attempts, which con- 
March and April. ^ -, n • ^ ^ 
sumed over two months, resulted fruitlessly. 

The enemy was able to check each movement in its turn. 



XXVIII. 

GRANT TURNS PEMBERTON'S LEFT. 

I ,. 

PEMB|"RT0N had at Yicksburg some twenty-two thou- 
sand^ men, stationed from Haines' Bluff above, to 
i Grand Gulf below ; at Grenada, eleven thousand ; at Jack- 
' eon. Miss., five thousand. Johnston, though in supreme 
command of the forces west of the AUeghanies, was person- 
( ally at Chattanooga, deeming that field of most importance 
I to the fortunes of the Confederacy ; and Van Dorn, with 
his cavalry, had likewise joined Bragg. 

Having fruitlessly attempted all methods of approach to 
Vicksburg from the north and west. Grant now deter- 
i mined to place his army below the fortress and to turn 
Pemberton's left. His position was a trying one. The fickle 
j public was all but ready to tire of him also, as it had on 
I less pretext of so many of his brother soldiers. Since Don- 
elson, he had fought only the battle of Shiloh, — a most 
I questionable triumph. luka and Corinth had been quite 
i forgotten, or such credit as a minor victory yields had been 
ascribed to Rosecrans. For a year Grant had been floun- 
dering about with no substantial success to show. Some- 
thing was demanded of him. 

Grant must look the matter squarely in the face. Assault 

145 



146 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1863. 



promised ill-success from any point, while involving the 
certainty of heavy losses. To go back and try the really 










most feasible route, along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 
seemed like failure acknowledged, and would therefore be 



1863.] GRANT TURNS PEMBERTON'S LEFT. 147 

- politically ruinous, though strategically sound. To turn 
Pemberton's left was a desperate undertaking. Its only 
merit lay in that it showed no sign of turning back, for, 
while to do the unexpected is a sound maxim of war, this 
plan in no sense partook of the nature of a surprise. Sup- 
plies must come by a most circuitous route, liable to fatal 
interruption, and the fleet must run the Vicksburg batteries. 
Choice was difficult. But with his usual disregard of obsta- 
I cles Grant adopted the latter plan. He could face a difficult 
problem rather than a simple one. His courage grew with 
' opposition. He could assume any risk. In this case it proved 
I a virtue ; but not so a year later, in Virginia. This type 
j of courage often lacks the tempering element of caution. 
I Part of Sherman's corps was sent up the river to make 
I a diversion which mio^ht take Haines' Bluff in reverse. 
•, This was ably done, as was all work this 

' •; March 14-27. 

ffeneral had in hand. McClernand was 

^ March 29. 

ordered to New Carthage, below Yicksburg. 
Communication with Milliken's Bend, from which place 
Grant drew his supplies, was kept up by flat-boats along 
the innumerable bayous, and a haul overland of some 
twenty-five miles. The transports and gun-boats needed 
for operations below were safely run past the batteries. 

Towards the end of the month, after infinite trouble with 
the roads. Grant joined McClernand at New Carthage and 
from there marched to a point opposite Grand 
Gulf, twenty miles south of Vicksburg, at 
the mouth of the Big Black. Grand Gulf had been fortified, 
though not with the strength of Haines' Bluff, for Pember- 
ton was vastly more concerned for his right than his left 



148 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

flank, and, having no cavalry, v^^as much in the dark as to 
the plans of his opponent. 

But the passage of the fleet revealed Grant's purpose, 
and reinforcements v\^hich had been ordered to Bragg, on 
the supposition that Grant would not soon attack, v^ere at 
once recalled. 

As a means of diverting attention from his movements, 
and to disturb the enemy's line of supplies from the east, 
Grierson had been despatched on a raid from Lagrange south- 
ward, with a cavalry brigade of one thousand seven hundred 
men. This enterprising oflftcer, starting in light order, made 
his way along roads some twenty miles east 
of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, detailing 
parties right and left to destroy tracks and telegraph, stores 
and munitions of war, and by his clever devices kept the 
enemy utterly in the dark as to his du-ection and purposes. 

He finally turned up at Baton Rouge, having 
May 2. 

marched six hundred miles in sixteen days, 

and having created vast confusion, of no little assistance 

to Grant in safely crossing the Mississippi. 

The presence of the Federals opposite Grand Gulf, as well 
as on his right, made a problem which Petnberton was not 
soldier enough to solve. Though he seems to have known 
all about Grant's manoeuvre, he was incapable of action 
that met the conditions confronting him. 

The fortifications of Grand Gulf were incomplete, but 
Porter could not destroy the works from his gun-boats. 
Unable to get over, owing to their fire. Grant dropped 
down a few miles further to Bruinsburg, where by crossing 
he could take Grand Gulf in reverse. 



1863.] GRANT TURNS PEMBER TON'S LEFT. 149 



First McClernand with eis^hteen thousand 



o 



April 30. 



men is ferried over and marches towards 

Port Gibson. Pemberton promptly puts in an appearance 

and arrests his advance four miles this side 

May 1. 
of the place. Without waiting for Mc- 

Pherson, who is coming up, McClernand attacks. We 

have already twenty-four thousand men on the field, the 

Confederates but eight thousand five hundred. But they 

make none the less a stubborn defense. The ground is 

very broken and difficult for the troops. Despite his 

numbers, McClernand makes small headway for hours, 

when McPherson arrives and the Confederate right is 

turned. Thus thrust back, the enemy retires beyond and 

burns the bridges over Bayou Pierre. The loss on each 

side is not far from eight hundred. 

Next day our forces enter Port Gibson, 

. . . May 2. 

and repair and rebuild the bridges burned 

by Pemberton. The enemy is now obliged to evacuate 

Grand Gulf, which Porter speedily occupies. 

Sherman had been left behind as rear guard. While Mc- 
Clernand and McPherson were marching on Port Gibson, 

he had been making a still more noisy dem- 

May 1. 

onstration at Haines' Bluff. Pemberton was 

thus kept from sending reinforcements from the city. 

Matters were now much facilitated by all-water com- 
munication with the base of supplies. This had been 
laboriously opened by the engineers from Milliken's Bend 
to New Carthage and thence to Grand Gulf. 

Grant had at the beginning of his campaign been led to 
believe that Banks would before now be in position to 



150 BIBD-S-EYE VIEW OP OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

cooperate with him from below. But Banks was delayed 
by operations at Port Hudson; and Grant, seeing that to 
wa.t would only allow the enemy to accmnulate as much in 
reinforcements as Banks' presence would afford to himself 
concluded to push matters to an issue. 



XXIX. 

GRANT DRIVES PEMBERTON INTO VICKSBURG. 

P EMBERTON had now got out seventeen thousand 
men to thwart Grant's further progress. But he 
found himself compelled to place the Big Black between 
his army and the Federals. Meanwhile McPherson and 
McClernand went into bivouac to wait for Sherman. 

Grant was once more on dry ground, and had 
actually turned Pemberton's left. But this was only a 
beo^innino:. He must strike hard and fast to secure the 
fruits of his bold manoeuvre. Numbers were practically 
equal, but the local advantages were all on the Confederate 
side. They were within their own territory, near their 
supplies, on the defensive. Grant was obliged to get his 
supplies over seventy miles of treacherous country. But 
on the other hand Grant had a navy at his back, and above 
all good lieutenants, while Pemberton's military ability 
never proved equal to heavy strain. 

Grant now advanced from Hawkinson's 

May 7. 

Ferry along the Big Black, keeping to the 
east of the river and cutting loose from his base at Grand 
Gulf. He supplied the troops with five days' rations, trust- 
ing to reestablish himself within no great time on a new 

151 



152 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863, 

base by defeating the enemy. Until then he must sustain 
himself largely on the country, which could furnish him 
beeves and some corn. 

The enemy was posted at Jackson as well as Yicksburg, 
and Grant calculated to thrust himself between the two 
bodies of the enemy at these places. McPherson com- 
manded the right wing, Sherman, who had come up, the 
centre, McClernand the left. The advance was more or 
less irregular according to the opposition encountered and 
the roads pursued. McPherson pushed for 

May 12. ^ 

Raymond, and after a smart combat, in which 
we lost four hundred men, took possession of the place. 

Grant now made up his mind to secure the town of 
Jackson before the enemy could erect defences about it. 
This would give him a point from which to threaten the 
rear of Vicksburg and to protect his own. 

It was learned about this time that Joe Johnston was on 
his way with reinforcements to assume personal command. 
He could not be allowed possession of Jackson. Grant 
promptly moved Sherman and McPherson on that point 
while Pemberton was concentrated at Edwards' Depot, 
expecting him to attack there. 

Jackson was readily captured with a loss of three hun- 
dred men, and John'ston, thus forestalled. 

May 14. 

was obliged on his arrival to move round bj 
the north to seek to join forces with Pemberton. 

Johnston, who was really in supreme command, had per- 
emptorily ordered Pemberton to come out of Yicksburg 
and attack Grant's flank at Clinton. But Pemberton did 
not seem to feel that Johnston held over him exactly the 



. 1 



1863.] PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VICKSBURG. 153 

authority of a commanding-officer, and considered it the 
best policy to hold on to Yicksburg, not seeing, as John- 
ston did, that to beat Grant was the only means to retain 
possession of it. But a few days later, and too late, he 
made up his mind to attack as suggested. Strangely 
enough he conceived the plan of moving away from John- 
ston, to demonstrate against Grant's rear. Here then we 
have the spectacle of two armies, of equal resources, one 
solid and compact, the other split into several detachments, 
in Vicksburg, under Johnston, and under Pemberton. No 
military problem has ever been more often solved. With- 
out serious blunder or mishap the concentrated army must 
win. 

Pemberton, soon made aware of his mistake, endeavored 
to retrace his steps. But Grant was already upon him. 

The enemy takes up position at Champi- 
on's Hill (Confederate "Baker's Creek"), ^^""^ ^^* 
between Vicksburg and Jackson. Grant moves upon him 
along the three roads from Raymond and Bolton. The 
divisions of Hovey, Logan, and Crocker assault his left 
posted on the hill. Pemberton brings forces from his right 
to sustain this key position, but forgets that a vigorous 
movement along the two Eaymond roads could brush away 
this depleted wing and seize the fords over Baker's Creek 
in his rear. The battle wavers over the hill-slopes all day, 
with alternate success. Meanwhile McClernand, on our 
left, in lieu of pushing through Loring's division and thus 
helping Grant surround the enemy, wastes the day in mere 
skirmishing, with a loss of barely one hundred and fifty men. 
Towards night Pemberton is driven from the hill. 



154 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

Had the victory on the right been less complete, he might 
not have retired, and could still perhaps have been cooped 
up. But to be driven back upon the fords before McCler- 
nand has seized them is his one element of safety. 

Our loss was two thousand four hundred. The Con- 
federates lost an equal number in prisoners alone, fourteen 
hundred killed and wounded, and twenty-four guns. 

Pemberton escaped in confusion beyond the Big Black, 
where, at all the principal passages, he had already con- 
structed bridge-heads. Grant in pursuit arrived at some 
of the crossings as soon as Pemberton, but the latter 
secured the railroad bridge. 

Loring's division had been entirely cut off from Pember- 
ton at Champion's Hill, and after some days joined John- 
ston by a circuitous march. Pemberton had charged Loring 
with the duty of defending the railroad bridge-head in case 
of need, and in the perplexities of retreat, Loring being 
absent, there was some confusion in supplying his place. 

Sherman moved up to Bridsreport to turn 
May 17. , ^ * ^ 

the enemy's new left, and effected a crossing 

there. Everything was at sixes and sevens in the Confed- 
erate army. Pemberton's defences at the railroad bridge 
were maladroitly placed nearly a mile in advance of the 
crossing, without supports, and with an open plain behind 
the works. For troops to pass this plain under fire would 
prove certain destruction. The soldiers were well aware of 

the fact and made but a sorry resistance, 
May 17. . . . 

finally dwindling away with an unnecessarily 

heavy loss, our own being but three hundred. They 

burned the railroad bridge behind them. 



1863.] PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VIGKSBURG. 155 

Twenty-four hours were consumed in rebuilding the 
bridges. During this time, Pemberton had fallen back 
within his Vicksburg defences. Here he reassembled barely 
twenty thousand men of the force he had led out. 

Thus in two weeks, Grant had driven his antagonist into 
Vicksburg, with a loss of over five thousand men, not 
counting Loring's division ; had prevented the enemy from 
reuniting his forces, and held the key of the situation. 
And this on five days' rations. A splendid record ! 

Pemberton found that he must abandon the bluffs north 
of the city. These Sherman occupied, thus 

T 1 ^r .IT May 19. 

reachmg once more the Yazoo river, but this 
time on the bluffs, and not at the foot of them. Pember- 
ton had notified Johnston that he could not continue to 
hold these bluffs. Johnston replied that in that event he 
had much better leave Vicksburg to its fate, — for Walnut 
Hills was the key to the city, — and join forces with him. 
But Pemberton was already cooped up. Vicksburg had 
been invested. 

On the same day Sherman gained the ridge beyond Fort 
Hill, and rested his right on the Mississippi. On his left 
stretched McPherson's line. Beyond him McClernand. 
The city was now besieged from the east, after the Feder- 
als had made its complete circuit by the west and south. 

Altogether it has been a strange military manoeuvre, 
which success will justify ; failure utterly condemn. But 
it has exhibited on Grant's part exceptional self-reliance 
and knowledge of his opponent. 



XXX. 

SIEGE OF VICKSBURa. 

THE logistic situation was now simplified hy a change 
of Grant's base to the Yazoo. And, about these 
days, Porter found that time was ripe for an expedition 
up to Yazoo City, where he finally got at and destroyed 
the stores and the vessels buildino^ and beino^ armed for 
river warfare, as well as the means of replacing them. 

No sooner had the city been invested than, relying upon 
the demorahzation of the Confederate troops. Grant deter- 
mined upon an immediate assault. Preparations were yet 
far from complete, and to Sherman's share 

May 19. ^ . 

alone fell any severe fighting. McClernand 
and Mcpherson had not yet moved near enough to cooper- 
ate efficiently with him. And though these generals were 
enabled to seize an advanced position, the works proved 
everywhere too strong to be carried. 

The troops in Yicksburg were hardened veterans, who 
had acquired the peculiar instinct of the soldier. In the 
recent conflicts in the field they had felt the want of that 
strong leadership without which the lives of the men are 
always at stake, and had behaved accordingly. But arrived 

behind good defences, where each man's intelligence and 
156 



1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 157 

experience under fire came into play, they fought with their 
accustomed nerve, and no impression could be made upon 
them. Our loss was nearly a thousand men. 

Grant's success, like not a few of Napoleon's, had 
been aided by his opponent's incapacity. Had Lee and 
Jackson been in his front, his triumph would have been 
earned at the expense of much harder blow^s, if at all. 
Later on in Virginia, with only half Grant's effective 
strength, Lee was able to hold him at bay for a full year, 
despite courage which laid in front of Lee's field-works as 
many dead and wounded Federals as the entire Army of 
Northern Vu'ginia had under the colors. 

The assault has failed, but Grant is not made of stuff 
to recognize defeat. A second assault is ordered. He 
feels confident that the works can be carried. The troops 
are eager for it, and are unwilling to settle down to the 
spade, until they have again tried the bayonet. Johnston 
may do something which will oblige Grant to raise the 
siege. The investment is not yet quite complete on the 
south. Every reason seems to demand prompt action, 
and Grant's tendency is always towards hard blows. 

Two or three brigades form the storming party from each 
corps front, backed up by substantially the entire force. 
The first rush fails, though individual soldiers reach the 
parapet and plant their colors upon it. The 

May 22. 

men are withdrawn. At this moment Grant 
receives a misleading message from McClernand to the 
effect that he has made a lodgment in the w^orks in his 
front, and asking Sherman's and McPherson's help by a 
renewed effort. McClernand has really only got posses- 



158 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

sion of an outwork, which he can not retain. But Grant, 
supposing him to know what he asserts, orders the men in 
again with the hope of sustaining him. This second 
assault adds to the loss of life to no effect. Our casualties 
have been over three thousand ; the enemy's barely five 
hundred. But the failure has caused no loss of morale. 

Grant found himself driven to regular siege operations. 
The topography of Vicksburg is singularly cut up. The 
country is full of ravines. The Confederate line lay along 
ridges surrounding the town. The fortifications were skil- 
fully constructed and well armed and manned. Everything 
indicated that starvation alone would reduce the town. 
Our engineers got speedily to work and some twelve miles 
of trenches and nearly an hundred batteries were in due 
time constructed. 

Within the city Pemberton was soon obliged to econo- 
mize victuals, and then cut down to half and quarter rations. 
The firing from our lines and the fleet was continuous. 
Many thousand shot and shell were daily thrown into the 
city. In Vicksburg ammunition had necessarily to be 
more sparingly used. 

Johnston now took the field, and Grant, 

May 26. 

obliged to hold the lines of the Big Black 
and the Yazoo for the safety of his rear and flank, detailed 
Blair with six brigades to operate against him. 

Reinforcements began to arrive from Memphis, and from 
Burnside and Schofield, and swelled our force to seventy 
thousand men and two hundred and fifty guns. This 
enabled Grant to complete the investment at all points. 

With every day Johnston's chance of successful diversion 



1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 159 

was disappearing. He had thirty-one thousand men " for 
duty," but he made no active attempt to aid Pemberton, 
despite constant pressure from Richmond, and appeals from 
his comrades within the walls of Vicksburg. 

A momentary scare was created at this time by an 
expedition from Arkansas as^ainst our base 

June 6 to 8. 

of supplies at Millikens Bend. But no 
result of value was accomplished by the enemy. 

McClernand had never been satisfied with his loss of 
command on the Mississippi, and at times gave cause for 
serious complaint by his erratic conduct. At last, on the 
occurrence of an act of actual insubordination, Grant sum- 
marily relieved him, and appointed Ord to his place. 

One of the forts on the north-east front had been mined, 
and, hoping for a practicable breach, was 

June 25. 

blown up. But the enemy's countermine 
weakened the explosion and their loss was not severe. 
Our subsequent assault was met with the usual stubborn 
courage and shared the same failure as the others. 

Mining operations were vigorously carried on. Counter- 
mining by the enemy was almost uniformly unsuccessful. 
Starvation was fast approaching. The end must speedily come 
unless Johnston could accomplish something substantial. 

Towards the end of June, Johnston did get ready to 
attack. He was lying in the vicinity of Canton and 
Jackson. Grant sent Sherman with twenty-four thousand 
men to watch his movements, with instructions to attack him 
at once if the next assault on Vicksburg, which he set for 
July 6 , should eventuate in success . But Johnston attempted 
nothing which proved helpful towards raising the siege. 



160 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

The garrison by the end of June was much reduced by lack 
of victuals. 

In May, Johnston urged evacuation so as to save the 
army ; in June he promised aid and suggested a sortie. But 
the men were in no condition to cut their way through well- 
fed troops. They had in fact circulated a petition for surren- 
der. Mutiny was feared. All Pemberton's officers advised 
capitulation, and Johnston finally notified Pemberton that 
he saw no chance to afford him relief. There 

July 4. 

being no alternative, Pemberton, after some 
interchange of letters with Grant, surrendered with thirty- 
seven thousand men as prisoners of war. 

His total loss during this campaign was thus above fifty 
thousand. Ours, in the movement from Port Gibson on, 
some eight thousand men. 

Sherman's force was at once increased to forty-nine 

thousand men. He crossed the Big Black and marched on 

Johnston, who retired into Jackson. Here 

July 9. 

Sherman sat down before him and destroyed 
the railroads north and south of the town. 

Owing to Grant having laid waste the entire country 
around Vicksburg for fifty miles, as a means of self-protec- 
tion, Johnston was unable long to maintain himself. No 
provision had been made for a siege. Johnston indulged 
hopes that Sherman would assault ; but finding him disin- 
clined to do so, he quietly slipped away 
towards the east, and Grant withdrew Sher- 
man from pursuit. The loss of each in this subsidiary cam- 
paign had been about one thousand men. 

Johnston's conduct durino: these hostilities was not 



1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 161 

marked with vigor. He arrived at Jackson, as he tele- 
graphed the Eichmond authorities, " too late " to retrieve 
the campaign ; but it was quite within his power to join his 
forces toPemberton's, or failing this, to make a stout effort 
to raise the siege. 

Johnston, with all his ability, was never distinguished as a 
fighter. His tendency was dilatory rather than active, the 
very reverse of Grant's. He was never quite ready to at- 
tack. Compare this inactivity with any of the campaigns 
of the Army of Northern Virginia. At Chancellors ville 
Lee had but about two men to five of Hooker's. For all 
that, his very audacity gained him one of the most brilHant 
successes of the war. Here Johnston had all but the same 
j force as Grant ; yet he made no active attempt whatever 
to solve the problem. To be sure, Pemberton's obstinate 
hold on Vicksburg did not coincide with Johnston's views ; 
but it was consistent with the Confederate programme. And 
Pemberton's feelinor that Johnston had no more than a rio^ht 
I to advise as to liis movements, and not to give him orders, 
I resulted in a disastrous lack of cooperation. None the less 
I Johnston owed more assistance to the troops within the 
walls than he rendered ; and he had it in his power very 
j seriously to hamper Grant's operations. 

Grant had won the great success of the war. And he 
received his well-earned reward in the plaudits of the 
people. 

Thus ends the drama of Vicksburg, fit companion for the 
glorious victory at Gettysburg ! Both triumphs occurred 
on our national hoUday. 



XXXT. 

BANKS AND PORT HUDSON. 

YERY early in the war it was determined to open 
some of the ports on the Gulf to serve as bases for 
operations extending into the interior. New Orleans was 
the most important of these, and its possession was of 
great use in wresting the control of the Mississippi river 
from the enemy. It was expected that Mobile would 
shortly after fall iuto our possession, and sundry efforts 
were made to capture it. But until near the close of the 
war we did not enter the city. 

Mobile was the point of next military importance to 
New Orleans. From here an advance on the line of the 
Mobile and Ohio Railroad could have been made by a 
strong force towards the armies operating from the Ten- 
nessee river. The capture or destruction of the railroad 
centre at Meridian from this base would have seriously af- 
fected the ability of the enemy to detain our forces at 
Vicksburg ; or indeed an advance in force towards Mont- 
gomery would more than once have weakened the conduct 
of the Confederate campaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky. 
And as after we had broken the Memphis and Charleston 

Railroad there was no all-rail route east and west except 
162 



1863.] BANKS AND PORT HUDSON 163 

via Mobile, the importance of a lodgment here is 
apparent. 

But up to this date, none of the operations on the Gulf- 
coast, excepting notably those of the navy under Farragut, 
had been conducted with such vigor as to accomplish re- 
sults. The utmost that was done was to obtain a foot- 
hold at sundry points, which was made useful only to 
prevent supplies from entering the enemy's territory from 
abroad, and the shipment of cotton in return. All this 
was of course helpful to the Union cause, but it was 
negative helpfulness only. 

Towards the close of 1862 Banks had sailed from jN"ew 
York with an army of twenty thousand men, and had 
relieved Butler at New Orleans. Some results were ex- 
pected from his activity. He had at once 
^ , •: Dec. 14-17. 

despatched Grover with ten thousand men 

to Baton Rouge. Banks had, including the troops already 
at this station, a total effective of thirty thousand ; the 
whole force being consolidated into the Nineteenth army 
corps. But after he had made details from his troops for 
necessary garrisons, only fifteen thousand remained with 
which to operate against Port Hudson, which was his 
immediate objective. This force being deemed insufficient 
for direct attack. Banks formed a plan to cut off supplies 
from the place by tapping the Red river, down which the 
bulk of them was received. 

The Confederates held Brashear City, and various 
points alono^ the Atchafalaya river, to Alex- 

_ . . . Jan.-Feb., 1863. 

andria. Two expeditions were sent out, 

one under Weitzel to move up Bayou Teche and one 



164 BIRD'S-ETE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.^ 

under Emory up the Atchafalaya. Both came to 
naught. 

Banks himself then moved to Baton 
Bouge, and Grover, with twelve thousand 
men, started for Port Hudson. He was to create a 
diversion while Farragut could run the Port Hudson bat- 
teries, so as to be able to patrol the river above and inter- 
cept supplies. Farragut made the attempt 

March 14. a • r\ ' 

With seven ships. Owing to various mis- 
haps only two contrived to pass above, while the rest, 
barring the Mississippi, which was blown up, were dis- 
abled and fell below. Still with these two, Farragut was 
able to blockade the Red river. 

Banks projected a new expedition along the Atchafalaya. 
This time he was more successful. The army moved by 
the railroad west to Brashear City. Three 
days later Fort Bisland was taken. In an- 
other week we occupied Opelousas, and later, with Ad- 
miral Porter's cooperation, captured Alex- 

May 7. 

andria, at a loss all told of not exceeding 
six hundred men. 

Halleck found fault with Banks for pushing his Red 
River schemes in lieu of cooperating with Grant in the 
reduction of Vicksburg. But Banks was in the right. 
General Taylor was not far from New Orleans in some 
force, and had not Banks taken measures to keep him at a 
distance as well as to garrison tliis city with sufficient 
troops, it might easily have fallen into the hands of the 
enemy. This, even temporarily, for of course it could 
have been recaptured, would have been a sad blow to 



1863.] BANKS AND PORT HUDSON. 165 

Federal prestige. As it was, no sooner had Banks left 
the vicinity of New Orleans than Taylor appeared upon 
the ground and blockaded the river below Port Hudson 
for quite a period. Not until the fall of that place was 
Banks enabled to get rid of him. 

The correspondence between Banks and Grant during 
this campaign was conducted by couriers up and down the 
river. It proved very misleading, for the intervals be- 
tween despatches were considerable. Each at one time 
had reasonable ground to expect that the other would sup- 
' plement his efforts in his own special task ; and each con- 
I tinned to count upon the other after the changed conditions 
j had made cooperation impossible. 

Banks finally concentrated at Port Hud- ,, ^„ 

I -^ May 23. 

I son, bringing from the Red River country 
I the divisions of Grover, Emory, and Weitzel, and passing 
( around the city by the north, while Augur and T. W. 
Sherman moved up from Baton Rouge. The works 
I were strong and ably defended. Gardner had recently 
been in command of some seventeen thousand men, but 
Pemberton, in whose department he was, had withdrawn 
reinforcements and left him only four thousand effectives. 
Indeed, at the moment Banks completed his investment, 
Johnston had ordered Gardner to evacuate the place, in- 
tending that he should reinforce his own command at 
Jackson. 

No sooner on the ground than Banks 

May 27. 

orders an assault all along the Ime. But, 

despite good conduct, failure results. The loss is two 

thousand men. 



166 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

A second assault has no better fortune. 

But the issue in gaining an advanced line 

may have been worth the further loss of eighteen hundred 

men. The investment is continued, and the monotony of 

regular siege operations is the order of the day. 

In this condition matters remain for a month. News of 

the surrender of Vicksburg comes to hand, and Gardner 

capitulates, on similar terms, with a laro^e 

July 8. ^ ^ * 

number of prisoners. 

The loss by sickness had been enormous, exceeding 
vastly the casualties of the siege. The army left to 
General Banks after the surrender mustered barely one 
third " for duty " which had appeared on the rolls two 
months before. 

Just prior to the surrender of Port Hudson, Confeder- 
ate General Holmes, with nine thousand troops, arrived 
before Helena, Ark., held by Prentiss with half the num- 
ber. Holmes trusted to capture the s^ar- 

July4. . ^ ^ 

rison and to erect a new citadel there. 
But his project came to naught, with a loss of nearly two 
thousand men. 

Very shortly after this event the steamer 

July, 

Imperial from St. Louis arrived at New 
Orleans, with a load of freight. The Great River could be 
said to be fairly emancipated from its bonds. 

During the remainder of the war only partisan hostilities 
were waged upon the Mississippi. 



xxxn. 

SPARRING FOR A HOLD. — MINE RUN. 

LEE retired from his defeat at Gettysburg, by way of 
the Shenandoah Valley. Meade crossed the Poto- 
mac and marched along the route followed 
by McClellan in 1862, east of the Blue '^''^^ ^^"^^• 
Ridge. The pursuit was begun late, but once afoot it was 
expeditious enough to have enabled Meade to strike Lee's 
flank by debouching through Manassas Gap. This he at- 
tempted to do, but, owing to the delay of French's corps, 
the opportunity was lost. Lee retired to Culpeper. 
Meade advanced to the line of the Rappahannock. 

Not anticipating any immediate demonstration by Meade, 
Lee sent Longstreet to help out Bragg, who apparently was 
overmatched by Rosecrans in Tennessee. Meade, however, 
was preparing for an active campaign, and shortly put the 
army across the Rappahannock. But the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, in w^hich Bragg turned the tables on Rosecrans, 
alarmed the War Department, and Hooker with the Elev- 
enth and Twelfth corps was taken from the Army of the 
Potomac and hurried out to Chattanooga. Meade w^as 
thus reduced to the strict defensive. 

Overestimating Meade's depletion, Lee resolved to try 

167 



168 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

on the Army of the Potomac a manoeuvre shnilar to the one 

practised on Pope the year before, and to seize the Orange 

and Alexandria Railroad in its rear. He 

October 9. , 

accordmgly put across the river by the up- 
per fords. So soon as Meade fully learned 

October 11. "^ . . , "^ 

this fact, he in turn withdrew across the 
Rappahannock. 

In lieu of retreat, by a bold stroke Meade might have 
fallen upon Lee's rear, and thus have caught him in the 
execution of his manoeuvre, — a moment always critical, 
because the troops are not so well in hand. But Meade 
was a sound rather than a bold soldier ; he deemed it 
best to retire. Upon which, and not until then, Lee 
forged rapidly ahead, feeling safe for his own communi- 
cations. He had won a point. 

Meade assumed that Lee had abandoned his purpose and 
was still at Culpeper. Anxious to bring him to a general 
engagement if he could force it upon favorable ground, the 
Army of the Potomac was again put across the Rappahan- 
nock. But no sooner over than the appearance of Stuart 
on his right laid bare the facts, and he promptly retraced 
his steps. 

Now follows a race for the possession of the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad. Lee aims for Bristoe Station. He 
has the longer road, but also the clearer purpose. Meade, 
not understanding his intention, must divine if he would 
anticipate it. 

Warren acts as rear guard. Meade reaches and passes 
Bristoe en route to Centreville. Warren arrives there 
only to find himself alone in presence of Lee's entire force. 



1863.] SPARRING FOR A HOLD. 169 

As the boldest is often the best means of extricating one's 
self from peril, he smartly attacks Hill, who is in his im- 
mediate front. A brilliant combat results 

October 14. 
in Warren's favor. Under cover of this 

demonstration he retires in safety to join the army. 

Meade is now too strongly posted at Centreville for Lee 
to push him further. The Confederate chieftain's efforts 
have been foiled. But throwing out a curtain of troops 
along Bull Run he destroys the railroad south from that 
point and leisurely retii-es. Meade follows, 

• . -r» 1 • 1 -r. October 18. 

repairing as he goes. Keachmg the Rap- 
pahannock, he crosses, after being obliged to force the pas- 
sage. Lee at once puts the Rapidan between 

November 7. 

himself and the Army of the Potomac. 

This unsatisfactory manoeuvring served to demonstrate 
that if Meade was not always ready to take advantage of 
Lee's openings, neither could Lee make him lose his head, 
as he had done Pope. 

The country still demanded action. Meade appreciated 
the fact and sought opportunity again to try conclusions 
with Lee. The latter had put his troops into cantonments 
for the winter over a considerable area of country. A 
number of the lower fords of the Rapidan were left 
open, but Lee had defended his right flank by a line of 
intrenchments facing Mine Run, at right angles to that 
river. 

Meade deems it possible to turn this position, and 
seriously cripple Lee in detail by a sudden blow before he 
can call in his scattered forces. Time and distance are 
carefully computed. The Army of the Potomac is to cut 



170 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1863, 




Mine Run. November 26-30, 1863. 



loose from its base with ten days' rations for a flying 
campaign. The several corps are simultaneously to cross 

at the various 
fords. The 
strict execution 
of marching 
orders seems to 
promise suc- 
cess. But suc- 
cess can be 
compassed by 
nothing short 
of minute ac- 
curacy. 

It is never 

well to risk too much upon mathematical compliance 
with the order of march. In an ancient country, 
where turnpikes and bridges provide easy marching, 
such calculations may be made. On such terrain as 
was covered by our campaigns, abundant leeway was 
always essential. Here, however, the estimates appear 
liberal, and the movement is simple. 

But again French is at fault. He is 

November 26. 

three hours late. And the pontoon train 
has been prepared without accurately estimating the depth 
of the stream. From the start ill-luck attends a well- 
conceived plan. 

Lee catches the alarm, and hastily concentrates. Meade 

N b ■ 28 ^^^^ '^'^^'^ position two days later than he 

calculated to do. The army is not ready 



1863.] SPARRING FOR A HOLD. 171 

for attack tHl the fourth day. Lee has made his position 
impregnable. 

Recognizing failure, Meade ruefully withdraws. Each 
army resumes its old location, and the troops go into 
winter quarters. 



xxxni. 

ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG. 

TjlOR full six months the Army of the Cumberland 

J- lay quietly in and near Murfreesborough, still 

facing Bragg. None but minor operations 

anuaiy o ^gj,g undertaken. An occasional raid was 

July, 1863. 

made by the cavalry of either combatant. 
The Union horse, under Stanley, had begun to give a 
better account of itself than heretofore. 

Among other such operations was one by Forrest and 

Wheeler acrainst Fort Donelson in which 
Feb. 3. . . 

these brilliant troopers came nigh to snatch- 
ing a marked success, but as the event turned, suffered 
defeat. And the most remarkable cavalry raid of the 
war was undertaken during the early summer of this year 
by J. H. Morgan, tlie Confederate partisan. With some 
three to four thousand mounted men tliis officer ranged at 
large through the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, 

for about a month, destroying and capturing 
Jul 26 property wholesale. He was finally corralled 

and taken prisoner with his whole force. 

The consternation of the districts through which he rode 

was beyond anything which occurred in the North, except 

during the Gettysburg campaign, 
172 



IS63.] ROSEORANS MOVES UPON BRAGG. 173 

The Army of the Cumberland was in good condition to 
take the field. Halleck had been urging Rosecrans to open 
the campaign. The latter in turn advised that "two great 
and decisive battles should not be risked at the same time," 
meaning by Grant's army on the Mississippi and by his 
own. This was scarcely a fair interpretation of a maxim 
often applicable to the operations of a single body of 
troops. 

Grant was particularly anxious to have Rosecrans attack 
Bragg so as to prevent his detaching reinforcements to 
Yicksburg. Rosecrans, however, insisted that the sounder 
policy was merely to threaten Bragg. He was positive 
that this course would retain him in force in his own front. 
Bragg pursued the same policy. Each appeared to dread 
the struggle which sooner or later must come. 

Towards midsummer Rosecrans was finally 
constramed to move upon the enemy. He 
t had seventy thousand men ; Bragg lay at Shelbyville with 
some forty-seven thousand. Rosecrans feinted with his 
right against Bragg's position, in front of which some con- 
siderable skirmishing was done, to enable Thomas, whose 
j route lay through Hoover's Gap, to move upon Manchester 
I and thus turn Bragg's right. On Thomas' arrival at Man- 
chester, after tedious marching over heavy roads, Bragg, 
1 who had been watching his front and had forgotten his 
I flanks, was obliged hurriedly to retire from his well-fortified 

! works at Shelbyville. Hereupon Thomas 
, ' -, T. , . 1 . June 28. 

ao^am marched around Brao^o; s rio-ht, cuttinor 

( his communications at Decherd, and the Con- 

; June 30. 

federate found that it would be prudent to 



174 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

evacuate TuUahoma, which had been his depot of sup- 
plies, and move his head-quarters to Chat- 
July 7. 

tanooga. 

The casuakies in this short campaign, in which Itose- 
crans fairly manoeuvred Bragg out of positions which might 
have cost great loss by direct assault, were not much over 
five hundred men. The operation had been skilfully 
conducted and reflects credit upon the commanding general, |i 
as well as upon Thomas, whose pertinent advice and stanch 
methods always figured as an important factor in the 
success of the Army of the Cumberland. 

During the summer Burnside, with the forces w^hich were 
now called the Army of the Ohio, had advanced from Ken- 
tucky across the mountains into the Valley 

August. 

of East Tennessee. Buckner was in com- 
mand of this Yalley, but retn-ed towards Bragg on the 
approach of Burnside, who thereupon oc- 

September 2. "^ "^ . ^ . ... 

cupied Knoxville. He was now in position 
to afford protection to the left of the forces operating 
against Chattanooga, and his position cut Lee off from his 
easiest route to the Western armies. 

Rosecrans had before him the task of flanking B*ragg out 
of Chattanooga. A glance at the map will show the im- 
possibility of taking the city from the front short of a pro- 
tracted siege. An attempt to turn Bragg's right would 
necessitate a long and tedious march away from our railroad 
communications, and through a country beset with diflS- 
culties. He would have to move some seventy-five miles 
up the Tennessee river before he could cross. This was, 
however, the way Bragg expected the attack, on account of 



1863.] 



ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG. 



175 



Burnside's presence at Knoxville. And it Avas on cogent 
grounds that he assumed that Rosecrans would attempt to join 
those forces to his own before attacking him in his stronghold. 
But Rosecrans was planning a different manoeuvre. He 
guessed that Bragg would count on his moving by his left, 
and knew that 
to do what 
your enemy 
does not ex- 
pect is to half 
accomplish 
your purpose. 
He proposed 
to himself to 
cross the Ten- 
nessee west of 
Chattanooga, 
pass the moun- 
tain ranges 
below the city, 
and take 
Brao^or in re- 
verse from an unexpected quarter. 

This was no easy problem. He had before him a wide 
river and several parallel ranges of rugged mountains 
traversed only by the roughest of roads. He was provided 
with poor transportation. Yet he must calculate on forag- 
ing his beasts, and feeding his men for at least three weeks, 
and must provide ammunition for several encounters, if not 
one or more pitched battles. 




Rosecrans' Manoeuvre. Augr. 20-Sep. 1 7, '63, 



176 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863, 

Still this seemed to him, all things considered, the prefer- 
able route. He accordingly sent Crittenden 
with the left wing up the Sequatchie Valley 
to make a demonstration on Bragg's right, to confirm the 
latter in his theory that this was the real point of attack, 
while himself with Thomas and McCook made ready to march 
towards the most available crossing-places of the Tennessee 
near Bridgeport. He was about to place himself in the 
enemy's country, with insecure means of retreat in case of 
disaster, insufficient supplies, and a treacherous knowledge 
of the terrain; while the conditions prescribed a march in 
several columns. A bold but hardly a prudent scheme. 

Bragg had just been reinforced from Mississippi, and * 

expected Longstreet from Virginia. He was quite intent ' 

on watching Crittenden's movement toward his ris^ht. 

Rosecrans was unopposed in crossing the 
September 4. • > rn. 

Tennessee, and in putting Thomas and Mc- 
Cook over the Raccoon range into Lookout Valley. There 
being but three practicable wagon roads, he ordered Thomas 
by way of Trenton over Lookout Mountain and Missionary 
Ridge into McLemore's Cove, while McCook moved byway 
of Valley Head into the open country beyond Lookout 
Mountain, and south of Chattanooga. 

This eccentric route separated McCook by nearly three 
days' march from Thomas. Crittenden, meanwhile, had 
returned and had followed Thomas across the river. 

On reaching Alpine, McCook threw out a reconnoitring 

party, but without encountering the enemy 
September 10. . i ^ r r^ i 

in force. To reach McCook, Thomas must 
pass through one of the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. In 



1863.] ROSECRANS MOVES UPOy BRAGG. Ill 

attempting Dug Gap his van was attacked, and he drew 
back, as he must force the defile in order to advance, — 
always a delicate operation, — and was in 

September 11. 

the dark as to ^IcCook's whereabouts. 

So soon as Thomas and McCook had reached Lookout 
Valley, Bragg had seen the necessity of evacuating Chatta- 
nooga. Hereupon Crittenden moved up the river, took 
possession of the town, and advanced twelve miles south to 
Gordon's Mills. But the situation was scarcely bettered. 
Kosecrans' army was still divided into three parts, each 
separated from the others by a serious distance in the 
presence of the enemy. 

From Chattanooga Bragg had moved to LaFayette from 

j whence he at once sent out detachments to hold the 

'Pigeon Mountain Gaps. It was one of these which 

(Thomas' head of column had encountered. 

Kosecrans' position was perilous in the extreme ; Bragg 
was afterwards severely blamed by many for not taking 
summary advantage of it. But the game of war is not 
based on mathematical exactness. What appears feasible 

I on paper is often far from practicable in the field. Nor 
are all good soldiers great strategists. The heavy work of 
the world has to be done by the average abilities. And 
even brilliant genius does not always compass the most 

'useful ends. Li medio tutissimus, 

I The lack of maps and his unfamiliarity with the country 
1 1 was Rosecrans' only excuse for having placed himself in 

j such jeopardy. He had got his right wing 

September 14. 

I separated from his centre by three marches, 
and these through a long and dangerous defile. His left 



178 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

was equally distant from the centre. Thomas could not 
go to either wing without endangering the other. He 
must wait for each of them to rally upon him. If Bragg 
could but overwhelm Thomas singly, he could at once 
turn upon Crittenden with good assurance of crushing him, 
and still have ample time to retrace his steps and to cut 
McCook off from retreat across the river. \ 

To have done this would have stamped Bragg as the 
equal of Lee. And while McCook or Crittenden would 
have stood a sorry chance against Bragg single-handed, it 
is much easier to talk of crushing Thomas than it ever 
proved to do it. If Bragg had undertaken this operation, 
so obvious to his critics, he might have fallen far short of 
its performance. Though indeed it was the thing to attempt, 
for any action would have compromised Rosecrans still fur- 
ther. But Bragg did not act, and Rosecrans escaped from 
his peril. 

By a long and arduous march, McCook joined Thomas, 

and Crittenden soon after came within hail. 

Bragg must now fight the Army of the 

Cumberland as[[one body. 

The position of Rosecrans lies facing Chick- 
September 18. /^ 1 P . . T 

amauga Creek from a point in advance of 
Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge, through which passes 
the road to Chattanooga, southerly past Gordon's Mill tow- 
ards Dug Gap. He has finally manoeuvred himself in front 
of the captured city. But he must fight for its preserva- 
tion. And Bragg proposes to make him fight au fond. 



XXXIV. 

CHICKAMAUGA. 

LONGSTREET is now approaching the field. Bragg 
marshals his forces on the east bank of Chickamauga 
Creek. His purpose is to cross on the morrow, crush our 
left, seize the Rossville road, and thus cut us off from both 
retreat and Chattanooga. But Thomas has anticipated this 
probability and firmly covers Rossville. Kosecrans awaits 
attack. 

Bragg crosses Chickamauga Creek a day 

September 19. 

later than intended, and falls upon Thomas, 
whom circumstances have placed in control of the left of 
the army. The fighting is stubborn, and during the day 
Thomas is somewhat thrust back ; but by nightfall he re- 
gains his old position. Bragg's tactics have now become 
quite intelligible to him, and he re-forms during the night 
in such wise as to protect more securely the Rossville road, 
the enemy's evident goal. 

Next day Polk commands on the enemy's right. Long- 
street on the left. In the forenoon Polk 

rrM September 20. 

forces the fighting. Thomas exhibits a stay- 
ing quality of the highest order, and though repeatedly thrust 

back, shows no symptom of weakening. Towards midday 

179 



180 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1863. 



a serious breach is made in our line on the right of the 
centre, by the removal of Wood's division, through mis- 
taken orders. Into this cleft quickly pours a stream of 



wossn/ili-e: 




Chiekamauga. September 19-20, 1863. 



Southern regiments. The right under McCook is isolated, 
taken in reverse and, as at Murfreesborough, speedily hud- 
dled into shapeless masses. 

The absence of the instinct of command is apparent. 
Thomas' flank is completely turned. The fate of the 



1863. ] CHICKAMA UGA. 181 

battle hangs by a hair. No aid can now come from the 
right. Thomas re-forms by a retrograde movement upon 
Horse Shoe Ridge. Granger's divisions advance oppor- 
tunely from Rossville Gap, which Longstreet might have 
seized, thus forces the latter back, and occupies a ridge 
on Thomas' right. Ammunition is getting low. Cold 
steel is used. The enemy is unremitting in his blows : 
his onslaught is redolent of success. As at Stone's River, 
everything seems lost. The entire right of the army, with 
Rosecrans and his staff, is driven from the field in utter 
rout. But, unknown even to the commanding general, 
Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, stands there at bay, 
surrounded, facing two to one. Heedless of the wreck of 
one-half the army, he knows not how to yield. No more 
splendid spectacle appears in the annals of war than this 
heroic stand of Thomas in the midst of a routed army, 
and in the face of an enemy the power of whose blows is 
doubled by the exultation of victory. Slowly riding up 
and down the lines, with unruffled countenance and cheery 
word, it is his own invincible soul w^hich inspires his men 
for the work they have to do. It is on his courage that 
every soldier leans. 

Rosecrans' frantic efforts to rally the right are wasted. 
The rout is complete, disgraceful. The panic-stricken regi- 
ments pour by, heedless of entreaty or command. Reaching 
Rossville, in the belief that Thomas too has been routed, 
Roseorans sends Garfield, his chief of stafi", to hunt 
him up and bid him to protect the rear with whatever 
force he can collect. He himself rides back to Chatta- 
nooga, thinking there to rally and re-form his troops 



182 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

to meet the pursuing foe. Unhappy day for Rosecrans' 
fame ! 

Night supervened. Bragg had torn his columns into use- 
less shreds by dashing them against immovable Thomas. 
Nor was he able to follow Thomas up, when, with broken 
but undaunted ranks, this silent hero led back his men to 
Rossville. Here he re-formed at his leisure. And before 
morning he was joined, after a weary circuit over the hills, 
by Sheridan, who had been cut off in Rosecrans' disordered 
retreat, but who had kept his troops together, and was still 
in condition and temper to do efficient service. 

Next day Bragg could do no more than 

Sept. 21. 

observe our movements with his cavalry, 
Sept. 22. . . '' 

and thirty-six hours later, the Army of the 

Cumberland was concentrated at Chattanooga, and in fair 
shape for service. 

Rosecrans had been badly worsted on the field of battle. 
Chickamauga was one of the direst mishaps of the war. 
But the result of the campaign was that he had manoeuvi'ed 
Bragg out of his key-position, and Thomas' stanch de- 
fense had so weakened him that he could not, for some time 
at least, undertake the offensive. On the other hand, Bragg 
had practically got Rosecrans cooped up in Chattanooga. 
Honors were easy between them. 

Rosecrans ascribed his unfortunate division of forces to 
the failure of his subordinates to obey orders. Both Mc- 
Cook and Crittenden were relieved from command till a 
Court of Inquiry could make disposition of their cases. 

In this bloody battle, the Army of the Cumberland lost 
sixteen thousand out of sixty-two thousand men on the 



1863.] CHICKAMAUGA. 183 



field, thirty-six guns and much material. Bragg's loss 
was over eighteen thousand out of a considerably larger 
effective. 

There is no doubt much difference of opinion as to Rose- 
crans' ability. He also belongs to that large number of 
excellent generals upon whom Fortune did not smile. 
Without being a great soldier, he possessed many of the 
qualities of one. He was tried in the balance and found 
wanting. But w^as the balance itself true ? " It was inev- 
, itable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the na- 
' tion's ignorance of war." At that time our public would 
I not exhibit the patience which became necessary in after 
I days if success was to be enticed to our banners. 
< The Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga was really 
I in a state of siege. The Confederate Army held the south 
i bank of the Tennessee, and from the end of the railroad 
I which supplied our troops, at Bridgeport, around the long 
j ' bend here made by the river, was a haul of sixty miles. 
I This distance was over roads axle-deep in mud, and daily 
j liable to interruption by cavalry raids. Rations began 
I speedily to fall short. The situation was grave. 
I Under these circumstances, the arrival of Hooker with 
I fifteen thousand men from the Army of the Potomac was 
by no means an unmixed gain ; but Rosecrans soon found 
! use for his corps in an operation designed to open commu- 
I nications across the loop of the river, via Brown's Ferry. 



T 



XXXV. 

THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 

HE Departments of the Ohio and the Cumberland 

were now merged into the Military Division of the 

Mississippi under Grant. Rosecrans was 
Oct. 16-20. ^^ 

relieved and Thomas became commander of 

the Army of the Cumberland. 

The advantao^e of openino^ the Brown's 

October 27. ^ , ° •!.-,. i i 

±erry road was mamiest, and with the 
cooperation of Hooker, the left bank of the Tennessee 
opposite Bridgeport was seized by a coup cle main, and 
his command, consisting of the Eleventh and Twelfth 
corps, was posted on the spot. 

The enemy had been unable to interrupt the movement, 

though made under his very eyes ; but loth to have the 

' city so easily revictualled, Lono^street e^ot 

Oct. 28-29. -^ . -^ . . 

together his troops and assailed Hooker in 

force. He must be driven from his ground, or starvation 

in Chattanooga would no longer be the Confederates' ally. 

A short and sharp action at Wauhatchie ensued ; Hooker 

drove Longstreet back; the road was finished, and the 

siege of Chattanooga was raised. 

Bragg now despatched Longstreet into East Tennessee 
184 



] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 185 

to dispose of Burnside, who was still in the vicinity of 
Knoxville, where he was a constant threat to Bragg's right. 
Grant ordered Sherman to join him at Chattanooga with 
the Fifteenth army corps. The other three corps of the 
army which captured Vicksburg remained on the Missis- 
sippi. While his enemy's forces were depleted was the time 
for Grant to push home with his sixty thousand men. 

How to drive Bragg's army from our front was the im- 
mediate problem before him, and Grant's restless activity 
would not allow him to sit do^vn and wait. 

Bragg's right lay substantially along Missionary Ridge, 
its advance strongly entrenched at Tunnel Hill ; his centre 
across Chattanooga Valley ; his left holding the supposed 
inaccessible heights of Lookout Mountain. In whichever 
direction the eye was cast formidable defenses had to be 
pierced, and these were manned by forty thousand muskets. 

The battles of Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, and 
Missionary Ridge, which shortly came about, may be con- 
sidered as parts of one single engagement, having for object 
to drive Bragg from the position he had chosen. The plan 
of action was as follows : Sherman was to move up the 
river on the north side with four divisions, cross near the 
mouth of Chickamauga Creek, under cover of artillery, on 
a pontoon-bridge to be thrown for the purpose, attack and 
capture the north end of Mission Ridge, and advance along 
it. Thomas was to concentrate in Chattanooga Valley and 
feel the enemy strongly to hold him there in force ; while 
Hooker's share was to patrol Lookout Valley and make a 
diversion to assist Sherman. For on the latter Grant sup- 
posed the main task was to fall and desired that it should. 



186 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1863. 



Knowing Sherman's method better than that of his 
newer lieutenants, Grant felt that he could rely on the 
work being done as it should be if entrusted to him. 




Chattanooga. Novembep 23, 24, 25, 1863. 



Some delay occurred in Sherman's crossing, but two days 
later than ordered he j^ut over his command 

Novembei- 24. 

and drove the enemy from the north end of 

the ridge. The entire range had been supposed to be con- 
tinuous ; but Sherman found a deep gap which must be 



1863.] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 187 

passed before he could arrive at Tunnel Hill, and his pur- 
pose was summarily arrested by this unexpected physical 
obstacle, of which the enemy had taken full advantage for 
defense. 

Meanwhile Thomas makes a reconnoissance in force in 
the Valley, which develops the enemy in his front, and suc- 
ceeds in advancing his line some distance, while Hooker 
pushes round the end of Lookout Mountain 

November 24. 

and fights his eccentric Battle above the 
Clouds, driving the enemy from every position. Next day 
Hooker operates towards Rossville on Bragg's left, while 
Sherman makes another heavy onslaught on the enemy in 
his front. Beino^ met with stubborn oppo- 

^ ^^ November 25. 

sition from Hardee's troops, Thomas is or- 
dered to attack seriously all along the defenses in his 
front. 

This attack is meant by Grant to be merely in the na- 
ture of a diversion to lighten Sherman's task. But the 
Army of the Cumberland, eager to show that lack of stom- 
ach did not lose the fight of Chickamauga, as well as jeal- 
ous of the glory to be won, assails the field-works at the 
foot of Mission Ridge and captures them at the point of 
the bayonet. Breckenridge is quite unable to hold head 
against them. After which triumph, the troops, emulating 
each other's ardor, and without orders, press gallantly on 
up the ridge in full view of both armies, with deafening 
cheers, heedless of the deadly fire belched into their very 
faces, and overrun the works at the summit like a torrent, 
capturing thirty-five guns and prisoners wholesale. It has 
I all been the work of an hour, and so completely has it 



188 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863. 

flanked the line opposing Sherman, that he is at once re- 
lieved of opposition. 

In this triple action Sherman's loss was fifteen hundred ; 
Thomas' nearly four thousand ; Hooker's not great. Bragg, 
thus worsted at every point, found it necessary to withdraw 
to Ringgold with a loss of sixty-six hundred men. 

Granger, with fifteen thousand men, was now sent to 

Burnside's assistance. Longs treet was besieging the Army 

of the Ohio in Knoxville, and had made a very heavy 

assault on the place. Alarming reports com- 

November 29. r. i • n 

ing from thence, especially as to the want 
of provisions, Sherman was also despatched to his aid. But 
as Longstreet retired towards Virginia on his approach, 
Sherman shortly returned to Chattanooga. He had not 
found Burnside in so great a strait as reported. 

During the succeeding winter months minor operations 
alone were undertaken. 

Early next year Schofield succeeded to 

Februaiy, 1864. * ^ 

the command of the Army of the Ohio. 
Transportation being difficult, the troops had suffered bit- 
terly from lack of victuals during the winter. As spring 
approached Longstreet was withdrawn to the more im- 
portant field of operations in Virginia, and Schofield became 
free to join Sherman. 

That heau sahreur, Forrest, about these 

March, 1864. 

days made another of his chronic raids, 
notorious on account of the Massacre at Fort Pillow. The 
furthest point reached by him was Paducah, where a stub- 
born resistance rendered threats and attacks alike vain. 
On the return march, he visited Fort Pillow, garrisoned by 



1863.] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 189 

negro troops. Here he at first met a stout rebuff; but 
during a subsequent parley for surrender of the garrison on 
honorable terms, the Confederates advanced their lines while 
hostilities had ceased, and, thus surrounded, 

AprU 12, 1864. 

the fort was surprised and captured. It is 
not probable that Forrest personally had anything to do 
with the events which followed. But his troops, maddened 
by the sight of their ancient slaves in arms, began butcher- 
ing wholesale after surrender had been made. It is a black 
page in the story of the war, and one to be quickly turned. 



XXXYT. 

FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 

"TV "T~0 more than a bare mention can be made of a few 
J^M of the numerous small expeditions which were under- 
taken on the outskirts of the Confederacy. 

For about a year from the beginning of the war, the 

town of Norfolk was held by the enemy. But shortly 

after the fiffht of the Merrimac and Monitor 

May-Oct., 1862. • . {i • , . i W ^ 

it agam tell mto our hands, completmg tor 

us the possession of the mouth of the Chesapeake. 

After the capture of Fort Sumter the enemy held un- 
disputed possession of Charleston for a twelvemonth. It 
was then deemed advisable in Washington to make some 
attempt to recover possession of this politically, if not 
strategically, important city. Admiral Dupont and Gen- 
eral Hunter first tried their hand at the 

May, 1862. , , ^ ^ ^ ^ _ 

work, but made no headway ; and Hunter 

was relieved by Mitchel. The latter soon after died, 

and Hunter resumed command of the 

'^^TTnT^^' I^epa^*"^^^* of t^e ^o^th- Three months 

thereafter Hunter made a further attempt 

upon the city, which again had no result, and Gilmore 

superseded him so far as the operations 
June 12. ^ ^ 

against Charleston were concerned. 
190 



1862-3.] FURTBER OUT SKIRT OPERATIONS. 191 

Durino- the next month, Gilmore made 

11 • 1 T^ , 1 , . J^ly 10- 

a lodgment, with Dahlgren s assistance, on 

Morris Island in Charleston Harbor, and Fort Wagner — a 

strong work there situated — was attacked. 

Failure followed two assaults with a loss of 

some eighteen hundred men. Fort Sumter was demolished 

bv the fire of the fleet, and though a naval 

, . n ., 1 , , Aug. 23-Sept. 9. 

assault on it lailed, the enemy evacuated 
Morris Island. Further operations were then suspended, 
and the city of Charleston remained in the possession of 
the enemy until Sherman marched through the Carolinas 
nearly two years later. 

General Foster made a raid from his base 
at New Berne on Goldsborough, N.C., but 
accomplished no result which proved to be of permanent 
value. 

A minor campaign between Generals Blunt and Hind- 
man in Missouri took place at the close of 

• December, 1862. 

the second year. Blunt had marched some 
seven thousand Union troops from Missouri into Arkansas, 
driving the Confederate horseman Marmaduke before him. 
Hindman, who was in general command, deeming it 
essential to arrest his progress, advanced and confronted 
Blunt, whom a body under Herron was on the way to rein- 
force. Hindman was held in check for two days. The 
Confederate then feinted on the Union front, stole by its 
left and attacked Herron at Prairie Grove ; but being held 
up for three hours, Blunt reached his rear, and the two, in 

a sharjD action, in which over one thousand 

December 7. 
men were lost by each combatant, forced 



192 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863-4. 

Hindman to permanently withdraw south of the Arkansas 
river. 
September, 1863. Steele occupies Little Rock, Arkansas. 

An expedition from New Orleans against 
Sabine Pass, Louisiana, fails. 

Blunt and Cabell indulge in a skirmishing 

September. 

campaign in Arkansas. 

The guerilla Quantrell assails Lawrence, Kansas, but 

is driven off after creating great confusion 

August 21. 

among the settlers. 

Banks sends out an expedition which takes 

November 6, 

Brownsville, at the mouth of the Rio Grande. 

Gilmore despatches Seymour and six thousand men to 

Jacksonville, Florida. From here an advance is made 

into the country, and at Olustee an eno^ao^e- 
Feb.20, 1864. . , , i -,. , 

ment with the enemy results disastrously 

for our arms, with a loss of one-quarter the effective force. 

But Jacksonville is held. 

Galveston had early been occupied by the 

^ ° ^' * Union forces ; but Mao^ruder recaptured it 

Jan. 1, 1863. * ^ 

somewhat later, and it was thenceforth held 
by the Confederates. 

An attempt to release our prisoners at Libby Prison, 
Richmond, was made by the cavalry gen- 
eral, Kilpatrick. But this operation, made 

March 3, 1864. ' r ^ r ' ^ 

noteworthy at the time by the death of 
Colonel Dahlgren, fell short of success. 

The Red River expedition deserves perhaps a larger 
treatment. But as it had no influence upon the great 
strategic fields, a passing notice must suffice. 



1864.] FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 193 

As the third year began General Banks conceived the 

idea that the trade of Western Louisiana 

1864. 
could be opened by the medium of the Red 

river, and projected an expedition to take possession of the 
country adjacent to its course. This river is open for navi- 
gation by larger vessels, only during the high water of 
March and April. Porter was to command the fleet of 
twenty of the finest vessels on the Mississippi, and Sherman 
was persuaded to lend some of his troops for the purpose. 
A.J. Smith was to start from Vicksburg with ten thousand 
men, while Banks would proceed up river from New 
Orleans, with Franklin's division. Steele from Little 
Rock was to operate towards Shreveport to join the main 
army. 

Kirby Smith was in command of the enemy's forces in 
Shreveport ; Taylor led an army in the field. 

The fleet started up the Red River in company with the 
transports carrying A. J. Smith's column. 

March 14. 

Fort De Russy was captured, the enemy re- 
tiring before our troops, and Alexandria and March 16. 
Natchitoches fell into our hands as the joint April 2. 
force advanced. Banks put in an appearance 
a week later. There was more or less skirmishing with 
the enemy's horse and outposts along the entire route ; and 
near Mansfield, at Sabine Cross-Roads, the vanguard met 
the enemy in force. SuflScient care had not 

•^ . April 8. 

been taken to keep the several bodies con- 
centrated. Taylor fell smartly on Franklin, defeated and 
drove him back with a loss of three thousand out of eight 
thousand engaged. Emory stopped the Confederates, but 



194 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

we fell back on our supports. At Pleasant Hill, A. J. 
Smith made a stand for the possession of what had been so 
far gained, but despite stanch fighting the 
^^^ * result could not be changed. An immedi- 
ate retreat was made, without waiting to bury the dead. 
The casualties now numbered about four thousand men. 
The situation was threatening. 

The fleet meanwhile had reached Grand 

Mid-April. 

Ecore. High water was coming to an end, 

^^ ' and Porter was obliged to return down river, 

to Alexandria. Here it was found that most of the vessels 

were of too heavy draught to pass the falls below the town ; 

and the loss of most of them would have been certain, but 

for a dam and water-way ably constructed by Colonel 

Bailey, an eno^ineer remarkably fertile in ex- 
May 12-13. .^ ' o p -, . 1 . 1 ^ 

pedients. By means of this device the fleet 

was safely floated over. 

On the retreat, Alexandria was burned by accident, 
traceable to no particular cause, though, nat- 
urally enough, laid by the Confederates to 
our spirit of revenge. 

The failure of this expedition came near to fatally com- 
promising the force of General Steele, who had begun his 
march down from Little Rock, and to whom no word of our 
disaster could be conveyed. But with good luck his small 
army was eventually withdrawn in safety, though with the 
loss of much material. 

The harbor of Mobile was protected by three works. 
Forts Gaines, Morgan, and Powell. It was determined to 
make a joint land and naval attack upon them, to break up 



1864-5.] FURTHER OUT SKIRT OPERATIONS. 195 

the illicit commerce of the city and, if possible, to reduce 
the place. Farragut's fleet was increased by the addition 
of some monitors, and he rendezvoused in the harbor with 
Gordon Granger, selected by Canby to command the land 
forces for this purpose. Farragut proposed 

p . ^ . IP August 5. 

to employ his old tactics of isolating the forts 
by running by them in column. This was done, — the 
gallant Admiral in command of the flag-ship Hartford, — 
with the loss of only one vessel. The Confederate ram 
Tennessee made a brave resistance, but was captured. 
Fort Gaines surrendered to Granger ; Fort 

August 5, 23. 

Powell was abandoned ; and Fort Morgan 
surrendered later. But the city itself, though cut ofl" from 
the outside world, maintained itself a^^ainst Grang-er's 
efforts, and was not reduced till the close of 

April 11, 1865. 

the war. It then surrendered to Canby. 

Price makes an extensive raid into Missouri and pene- 
trates to within less than one hundred miles 
of St. Louis. Curtis defeats him and drives ^^ ^™ ^\^^^ 

October, 1864. 

him from the State. 

A noteworthy combat between the Confederate cruiser 
Alabama and the United States ship Kearsarge occurred ofl* 
Cherbourg, France. Among the vessels 

June 19. 

depredating on our commerce three English- 
built cruisers had been preeminent, the Alabama, Florida, 
and Georgia. The two last were captured respectively in 
Bahia Harbor and at sea. 

The Alabama, under command of Captain Semmes, had 
been sought by the Kearsarge, Captain VYinslow, and 
sailed out of Cherbourg to accept her challenge. The 



196 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

tonnage and crews of each were about equal. The arma- 
ment of each was what the English and we considered 
the best for war vessels of that size. They were typical 
craft. The Alabama was an English vessel, mounting 
English guns and carrying an English crew ; the Kearsage 
an American vessel, with American guns, and out of ont 
hundred and sixty officers and men all but eleven were 
American-born citizens. Both were wooden vessels, but 
the Kearsarge hung her chain cables over the sides to protect 
her engines. 

It was a fair fight, but of short duration. The fire of 
the Kearsage was the more dehberate and proved very 
destructive. The Alabama surrendered within an hour in 
a sinking condition. Semmes was picked up in the water 
by an English vessel, and escaped capture. The loss of 
the Alabama was about forty men. On the Kearsarge, 
which was but slightly injured by her opponent's fire, only 
three men were wounded. 



xxxvn. 

THE WILDERNESS. 

FOR three long years the operations of our armies had 
been conducted without united effort. The campaigns 
of the East and West, though nominally directed by 
Halleck, had really been of so isolated a character that the 
enemy could at need detach troops from Virginia to Ten- 
nessee, or the reverse, according as the tide might turn on 
each strategic field. The nation had now learned that war 
could not be carried on by political methods alone ; that 
the South must be exhausted before peace could be won ; 
that systematic warfare was the least costly means of bring- 
ing this to pass ; and that the unhampered work of one 
man, in whom the confidence of all could be centred, was 
essential to a successful issue. 

The choice of the nation fell naturally upon General 
Grant. He was commissioned Lieutenant 

March 9, 1864. 

General and placed in supreme command. 

Grant gave over the control of events in the West to 
Sherman. For himself he reserved the special field of 
Virginia. He knew that he left in Sherman's hands a well- 
tempered weapon with which to fight. 

Grant's own success on other fields not unnaturally led him 

197 



198 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

to believe that the Army of the Potomac had never been 
fought au fond; he imagined that Lee and the Ari&y of 
Northern Virginia could be beaten by the same means as 
Pemberton and Bragg, and he set himself the task to make 
the rugged old army do that which he thought it never yet 
had done. Moreover Grant at this time openly gave his 
preference to hard blows over manoeuvring. " Continuous 
hammering^ " was his motto. His belief seems to have been 
that the use of skilful tactics exhibits weakness. Other 
and greater soldiers have sometimes for a while been sub- 
ject to this delusion. He was to discover his error in his 
first clash of arms, and to recognize the fact that he had 
never yet faced a captain such as was the man who through 
so many campaigns had borne the proud banner of the 
South on the Old Dominion soil, nor yet had led stouter 
hearts against more valiant foes. 

Grant's objective was Lee's army. So long as Lee held 
to the defense of Richmond, this city was the goal. But 
to destroy Lee's army was the work cut out. " On to 
Richmond" was an empty phrase. 

The Army of the Potomac lay in and about Culpeper ; 
the Army of Northern Virginia around Orange. A move- 
ment by our right possessed the manifest advantage of more 
open ground, and the yet greater disadvantage of grad- 
ually lengthening our lines of communication and supply. 
A movement by our left gave the Army of the Potomac 
lines of operation easy to keep open, because the base 
could be constantly shifted to points on the coast in rear of 
the operations actually going on, but it carried the army 
through a country essentially unfitted for manoeuvring. 



1864.] THE WILDERNESS. 199 

• 
Grant liad in theory favored moving on Richmond from 

the James river. The overland route he deemed too cost- 
ly in time and men. But he eventually adopted a plan 
savoring of both. Only his great numerical superiority 
could excuse his dividing his forces. Concentric operations 
are always weak, because the several detachments are liable 
to be separately overwhelmed. 

The plan was this. Grant, with the Army of the Poto- 
mac under Meade, and the Ninth corps under Burnside, was 
to take the overland route on the east of Richmond. Butler, 
with thirty thousand men (the Army of the James) , was to 
move up James River. Sigel, who was near the Potomac at 
the mouth of the Valley, and Crook, who was in the Ka- 
nawha region, were to operate from the debouches of the 
Shenandoah. 

The Army of the Potomac had had ^\q corps. These 
were now consolidated into three, perhaps unwisely. For 
the new ones became too bulky for the difficult country 
through which they were to operate, and the esprit de corps 
of the ancient organizations was destroyed by their dis- 
bandment and merger into the new. 

There were now Hancock's Second Corps, Warren's 
Fifth, Sedgwick's Sixth, and Sheridan's Cavalry Corps. 
These, with the Ninth, numbered one hundred and twenty- 
two thousand men " for duty equipped " and over three hun- 
dred guns. Head-quarters were at Culpeper Court House. 

Lee confronted this splendid army with the corps of 
Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell, not far from seventy thousand 
men and over two hundred guns. He was ready for the 
fray. But he must have anxiously watched for the first 



200 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

sign of the movement of his new opponent, whose set pur- 
pose he knew as well as the strength of the army he led. 

Grant purposed to turn Lee's right. No time was lost. 
Marching orders were issued. The army was perfect in 
discipline, equipment, and material. One 
day sufficed to put the hundred thousand 
men across the Rapidan. Warren led, Sedgwick followed 
over Germanna Ford ; Hancock crossed at Ely's, further 
east. Burnside was to remain in camp for a day later. 

Grant's route was through the Wilderness, due south. 
This was the same dense forest where the Army of the 
Potomac, just one year before, had been so nearly wrecked. 
Lee made no effort to dispute Grant's crossing, but pur- 
posed to strike him while traversing these dreary woods. 
From Orange towards the route pursued by Grant were 
two parallel roads, known as the Plank road and the Turn- 
pike, which cut the north and south roads used by us at 
right angles to our line of march. 

Meeting with no opposition in crossing the river. Grant 

believed that Lee had retreated to more favorable ground. 

He had no idea of fighting here, in the forest which had 

proved so nearly fatal to Hooker. On the 

May 4—5. 

night succeeding the passage of the Rapi- 
dan both armies camped near by each other, Grant un- 
suspicious of the close presence of the enemy, and far from 
assured that Lee would accept battle when his position 

was turned. But orders were issued to 

May 5. 

attack, and next day Ewell is met by 
Warren, who is moving by the flank through the wood 
roads. Grant and Meade, at Old Wilderness Tavern, 



1864.] 



THE WILDERNESS. 



201 



suppose this to 
be the affair 
ofa simple rear 
guard. At 
this moment, 
had Ewell 
been vis^or- 
ously pushed 
by Warren, 
he might have 
been badly- 
used up, for 
he was unsup- 
ported. But 
as the resist- 
ance to Ewell 
was propor- 
tioned only to 
Grant's idea of 
his strength, 
before Sedg- 
wick could 




Wilderness. May 5-6, 1864. 



come up on 

Warren's right, Ewell had inflicted a loss of three thousand 
men upon the Fifth corps. Still Warren clung tenaciously 
to ground in advance of Old Wilderness Tavern. 

Grant's eyes begin to open, but, with his usual determi- 
nation, he is ready to accept the gage of battle here. 
Sedgwick is ordered to join on to Warren's right. Han- 
cock, away off at Chancellors ville, with his head of column 



202 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

at Todd's Tavern, is hurried up along the Brock road. On 
his arrival he promptly moves out the plank road, south of 
Warren, and attacks Hill. Both the Warren-Ewell and 
Hancock-Hill combats are isolated. No tactical connection 
exists between them. In fact grand-tactics are impossible 
on this ground. Night closes the engagement. 

Both Grant and Lee determine to attack on the morrow. 
Burnside is ordered up to take place between Warren and 
Hancock. Lee awaits the arrival of Longstreet, whom he 
will place opposite Hancock's right. 

The Wilderness is covered by a scrub growth of small 
trees and underbrush, so dense that one can see but a few 
hundred feet in the clearest places. Cavalry can not leave 
the roads, which are few and poor. Artillery is useless, 
except occasionally where a section may fire down a road. 
There are next to no clearings. Manoeuvring is impossible. 
Bodies of troops have to march by the compass. Success 
or failure can only be guessed from the advance or recession 
of the infantry fire. In this blind place, familiar enough 
to Lee, but quite unknown to Grant, the two old enemies 
are again to grapple. 

Grant orders an attack along the whole line at 5 A.M. 
Lee determines, so soon as Longstreet shall have ar- 
rived, to turn Grant's left and throw him back upon the 
river. To divert attention from Longstreet's absence, he 
strongly feels our right. 

Hancock falls upon Hill at five, and drives him over a 
mile down the plank road. Confusion among the troops is 
natural in these woods. Hancock stops to rearrange the 
ranks. He has been cautioned to beware lest Longstreet 



1864.] THE WILDERNESS. 203 

fall upon his left along the Brock road, for Grant considers 
it probable that Lee may use this approach. Part of the 
Second corps has thus been kept there, the presence of which 
in the advance might have insm^ed a larger success against 
Hill. While thus pausing, Longstreet comes upon the 
field. The suddenness of his assault takes Hancock 
unawares, and drives him back to his old lines on the Brock 
road. Here he rallies. Longstreet is wounded. The 
violence of the attack subsides. 

Later in the afternoon, Lee again attacks Hancock. 
Aided by afire in the woods, which the wind blows into our 
faces, he drives our line in some distance, but once more 
we rally and retake the ground so lost. Night again 
supervenes. Nothing has been decided. Grant's loss of 
eighteen thousand men should make him rate his own new 
army and his adversary's skill at a higher value than he 
did two days ago. Lee's loss is probably less by several 
thousand men. 

Beyond a cavalry fight by Sheridan against Stuart there 
are no further operations on this ground. Both armies are 
exhausted. Neither has gained aught but added respect for 
the other's mettle. 

Note. — Anderson succeeded Longstreet. But, for convenience, thia 
Corps is still referred to by the name of its old commander. 



XXXVIII. 



SPOTSYLVANIA, 



a RANT, having found that Lee is able to check any- 
direct advance upon his lines, concludes to resort to 
manoeuvring, and attempts to oust the Army of Northern 




Spotsylvania. May 8-21, 1864. 



Virginia from its position by a flank movement. It is .y 
painfully apparent that no gain can be made by continuous j| 

hammering here. He orders his trains to Chancellorsville, 

204 ' 



1864.] SPOTSYLVANIA. 205 

and heads the left of his army for Spotsylvania Court- 
House. Warren is to lead and march by the Brock road 
upon that place ; Hancock to follow ; Sedgwick and Burn- 
side to march on roads leading in the same direction from 
Chancellors ville. 

Warren's advance was unfortunately delayed by a block- 
ade of the roads and by some opposition of the enemy's 
cavalry. The trains of so large an army can not be speedily 
or quietly moved. Lee soon became aware that Grant was 
about to shift his ground and divined that it would be 
either towards Spotsylvania or Fredericksburg. Longstreet 
was ordered to protect Spotsylvania. 

By a lucky accident for him Longstreet started so as to 
reach the place before Warren. A summary attack might 
have brushed him away. But our troops were weary and 
by no means in high spirits. So Warren waited for 
Sedgwick. Before the latter's arrival, night had fallen. 
Hancock had been kept back some hours 
by Meade, lest Lee should attack our rear, 
which Meade thought not unlikely. As a consequence of 
all these mishaps, Lee had managed to plant himself athwart 
Grant's path. 

The Army of the Potomac files into line in front of Lee's 

position, — in order from the right, Hancock, Warren, 

Sedo^wick, Burnside. One of the first mis- 
May 9. 
fortunes on this fatal ground is the death of 

gallant Sedgwick. W^right succeeds to the command of 

the Sixth corps. 

Hancock is ordered to make a demonstration south 

of the Po, but is withdrawn without accomplishing any 



206 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1864. 

result. The loss is severe. Although probably too late to 

turn the enemy's left, the manoeuvre, having been begun, 

should have been pushed home. Towards 

May 10. . ^ 

evenmg two assaults are made on a position 
in Warren's front. It can not be carried, even at a loss of 
five or six thousand men. Further on the left Upton does 
manage to effect a lodgment. But unsupported he can 
not hold it. 

Up to this moment Grant's hard blows have punished 
only the Army of the Potomac. Lee is neither Pembertou 
nor Bragg. Grant has met liis match in all but material 
resources. 

Among Grant's qualities is wonderful staying power. 

Up to a certain point this is one of the highest virtues of a 

soldier. But it can be pushed too far. Grant is altogether 

too blind to the advantages of combining manoeuvring with 

direct assault. He can not believe that Lee has even 

greater endurance than himself; that the Army of Northern 

Virginia can longer resist his masses. He has yet to learn 

how tough is the grain of that w^onderful body of men. 

An attack in force upon the centre is or- 
May 12. . ^ . 

dered. Hancock, in two lines of columns 

of regiments, at early dawn, assaults the Confederate posi- 
tion, where the first line is thrown out in a saHent. The 
troops rush over the intrenchments with a cheer, capturing 
four thousand prisoners and many guns. But the second 
line still remains. It too must be taken. The elated men, 
without pausing to re-form, push forward, intent upon the 
fruits of victory. But our loose-strung lines are met by the 
enemy with serried ranks, and break against their wall of 



1864.] SPOTSYLVANIA. 207 

steel. A countercharge hurls us back to the salient. 
With extreme difficulty these works are held, the Sixth 
corps sustaining Hancock's right. 

Grant, who by this stubborn defense has got the impres- 
sion that Lee has weakened his right and left to sustain his 
centre, orders an immediate attack by Warren and Burn- 
side. Though stoutly made, each fails with grievous loss. 
Lee determines to recapture the salient at any sacrifice. 
Five distinct assaults are made during the day. The 
defences are taken and retaken ao^ain and ao^ain. The 
breastworks are alternately crowned by the rival flags. 
For twenty hours the tide ha's surged doubtfully to and 
fro. Our loss this day has been eighty-five hundred men. 

Grant might readily flank the enemy out of his position. 
But he can not give up the contest. He will not yield to 
Lee. He knows him to be vastly his inferior in men, and 
will not believe that he can not be crushed by weight alone. 
For a week after he makes partial attacks at all points, 
shifting divisions from place to place along the line, seek- 
ing a weak point in the harness of the Army of Northern 
Virginia through which to thrust his weapon. Lee meets 
his every onset. No impression can be made. 

The assailant labors under the disadvantao^e of attacking: 
intrenchments. To offset this he is able secretly to mass 
his men and attack a single point, while his enemy must 
keep all portions of his line equally manned until he divines 
where the blow is to fall. To attack without studying your 
opponent's position is to throw away this manifest advan- 
tage, to refuse to add skill to mere strength of arm. 

In this short campaign of little over two weeks, Grant has 



208 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

lost thirty-six thousand men in casualties, nearly one in 
three of bis " for duty " force. He has accomplished nothing 
which manoeuvring could not have compassed, unless he has 
weakened the morale of his antagonist more than he has 
his own. This he has not done. The Army of Northern 
Virginia is elated at its successful defense. The Army of 
the Potomac is disheartened at its losses with so little tan- 
gible result. 

But for all that, the courage and sense of duty of our 
brave old army are unshaken. It knows that the hopes of 
the nation are in its keeping, and not a weak heart beats in 
its ranks. 

Courage is a common virtue in the soldier. That com- 
bination of physical and moral courage which enables a 
general to inflict and unflinchingly to resist heavy blows is 
the rarest and best. But this courage must be tempered 
with skill to be of the greatest use, and skill implies a dis- 
creet use of power. Though it was FalstafF hiding behind 
his shield at the battle of Shrewsbury who exclaimed that 
the better part of valor is discretion, yet there is, for the 
commanding general of a great army, a far deeper meaning 
in these pregnant words. 

Failing to make any impression by hard 
blows, Grant again issues orders to move by 
the left — straight on Richmond. 



XXXIX. 

THE MINOR ARMIES. 

DURING all this heavy fighting, the like of which has 
not been seen since Borodino, the minor armies were 
cooperating towards the general goal. 

Sheridan, with the cavalry corps, started 

May 9. 

on a raid around to the west of Richmond. 
At intervals he measured swords with Stuart, with uniform 
success, for he largely outnumbered him. Finally after 
much destruction of roads, bridges, and material of war, he 
tm-ned up on the James river, where Butler's army lay, 
and from thence rejoined the Army of the 

May 25. 

Jrotomac. 

Butler, with his new command, moved to 

I^av 4. 

City Point and Bermuda Hundred, and in- . 
trenched. His instructions were vague. When Grant, 
in his overland march, should reach the vicinity of Rich- 
mond, Butler was to cooperate from this point and 
move so as to lean with his left upon the James beyond 
the city. This plan appears weak because Butler's rear 
would thus be quite at the mercy of Beauregard, who 
was certain to approach from North Carolina, as Gilmore 
had been withdrawn from there to join the Army of the 

209 



210 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

James. Without the possession of Petersburg and the 
line of the Appomattox, there was no safety whatever in 
Butler's position. 

But the capture of Petersburg was, strangely enough, no 
part of Grant's plan at this time. He perhaps thought 
that Lee could be annihilated before the vicinity of this city 
was reached. And before Butler himself saw the necessity 

of so protecting his rear, Beauregard had 

May 7. 

reached the place and Butler's demonstra- 
tions ao^ainst it became useless. 
May 13. 

Butler now moves toward Richmond. 

The enemy's line extends from the river at 

May 16. 

Di-ury's Bluff westerly. We purpose to 
attack. But Beauregard is again too quick. He plans to 
break Butler's right and seize his communications. The 
attack falls heavily on the centre, but meets with no suc- 
cess. A dense fog prevents intended combinations on both 
sides. A diversion from Petersburg against the Army of the 
James fails. But Butler is none the less compelled to 
withdraw, for his position is compromised. 

He has in this battle of Drury's Bluffs lost four thousand 
men to Beauregard's three thousand. He retires to Ber- 
muda Hundred. Here, as Grant expresses it, he is "bottled 
up," and the greater part of his force is ordered to the Army 
of the Potomac, wliile the rest remains to hold a footing on 
the James. 

The other force cooperating with the Army of the Poto- 
mac from the Valley, consisting of Crook's Kanawha Army 
and Sigel's troops, were under command of the latter. The 
work cut out for this command was to destroy the railroads 



1864. J THE MINOR ARMIES. 211 

in the Valley so as to cut Lee from his communications 

with the West by way of the East Tennessee Railroad and 

from his source of supplies in the Shenandoah. Sigel lay 

along the Potomac; Crook in the Kanawha region. 

The latter was the first to get to work, and debouching 

into the Valley he and Averell did some 

May. 
excellent work in demolishing the railroads. 

Sigel moved southward about the same time, but sud- 
denly brought up against Breckenridge at 
New Market. Here he suffered a sharp de- 
feat, and retired to the line of Cedar Creek, 
where he was superseded by Hunter. 

This general again moves up the Valley, 
and runs across Imboden at Piedmont. In 
a smart combat he defeats the enemy, capt- 

. June 8. 

urmg one thousand five hundred prisoners, 

and occupies Staunton. Crook and Averell now join him, 

makino^ his effective some eiofhteen thousand 

-r. -. 1 1 1 T . June 12. 

men. Four days later he reaches Lexmg- 

ton, and should have at once advanced to Lynchburg. But 

delays supervene and when he does leave 

June 16. 

Buchanan to march towards this key of the 
Valley, he finds that he is too late. 

Lee can by no means afford to lose Lynchburg. Breck- 
enridge occupies its defences in force, and Early is hurried 
from Cold Harbor to strike the Valley in Hunter's rear 
with Jackson's old corps. 

But first Early throws his troops into Lynchburg, 
Hunter assaults, but is thrust back, and 

June 18. 

retires, followed by Early, who is so placed 



212 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

as to be able readily to cut off Hunter's line of retreat down 
the Valley. Hunter, who is entirely out of provisions, 
determines to retire by way of the Kanawha, where Crook 
has left a supply-camp at Meadow Bridge. But on reaching 
the place he finds that a skilful guerilla-raid has destroyed 
the depot. Luckily, a train of supplies reaches him at 
Gauley River. From here Hunter moves 

June 27. 1^ , . , ^ 

around the mountains to the upper I'otomac. 
The march is full of difficulties. 

Sheridan had been sent out from the Army of the Potomac 
to work in unison with Hunter, but he could not success- 
fully cope with Early, and he returned to White House, 
after considerable interchange of hostilities with the enemy 
and a loss of not far from one thousand men. 

The cooperation of the Valley forces with Grant's main 
army had thus been summarily cut short, in part by ill luck 
and in part by Lee's clever dispositions. 



XL. 

AGAIN BY THE FLANK. — STALEMATE. 

/~^ RANT'S flank operations were uniformly well con- 
vU" ducted. They exhibited skill in conception and exe- 
cution, and commanded success which his favorite method of 
hammering as uniformly failed to compass when his opponent 
was his equal. The orders after Spotsylvania were for 
Hancock to withdraw from the riffht, and, 

° May 20. 

marching behind the other corps, to push 
towards Bowling Green. Lee was not slow to divine the 
movement, but was too weak to attack during its prosecution. 
To meet the threatened danger, however, he started 
Longstreet on the parallel turnpike in the same general 
direction. When Warren followed Hancock, Ewell fol- 
lowed Lono^street ; Wrio^ht and Burnside 

^ ' ^^ ^ May 21. 

brought up the rear, Hill followed suit. 
As a result, the roads being somewhat shorter for Lee, 
when the Army of the Potomac reached the North Anna, it 
descried the Army of Northern Virginia 

. . . May 23. 

drawn up to welcome it on the opposite side. 

Our left column under Hancock strikes the North Anna 
near the railroad crossing; Warren, with the right, at 
Jericho Ford. The latter finds his passage undisputed and 

213 



214 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1864. 



crosses some troops at once. On the other side he has a 
sharp exchange with the enemy, the result of which is to 
capture one thousand prisoners. Hancock finds that the 
enemy occupies a bridge-head and some strong field-works, 
formerly erected, on the other side. He 
forces the passage at considerable loss, and 
puts his corps across. 



May 24. 




MILCS 

North Anna. May 23-26, 1864. 



Lee's position is masterly. His centre is thrown forward 
and holds the river. The wings form an obtuse angle, with 
their flanks well supported on difficult natural obstacles. 
Burnside attempts to force a crossing at the centre but quite 
without success. Hancock is across on the left. So is 
Warren on the right. But each is separated from the centre 
by the river, and from the other wing by Lee's army. A 
more complete stalemate can not be imagined. There 
is not even a chance to hammer, unless Lee should now 



1864.] AGAIN BY THE FLANK. 215 

assume this role. But Lee is wise enouo^h to refrain. He 
is better suited with Grant's pursuing this policy. 
The Army of the Potomac must ao^ain 

. , . May 26. 

withdraw. At night, speedily but cautiously, 

the Second corps acting as rear guard, the operation is carried 

out. A wide easterly circuit is made to strike the Pamunkey. 

While the army was at Spotsylvania, its base had been 
at Fredericksburg. On moving to the North Anna, the 
base was transferred to Port Royal. It will now be estab- 
lished at White House, on the York river. 

No time is lost. The order of march is systematically 
carried out. The entire army reaches Han- 

, T^ May 27. 

overtown next day and crosses the Pamun- 
key. But Lee is again on hand, facing north-easterly and 
covering the line of the Chickahominy. 

Grant develops his position by reconnoissances. From 
Hanovertown there are direct roads leading to Richmond. 
These Lee defends with his entire force. It is evident that 
only a hard struggle, or the cleverest tactics, will dislodge 
him. His position can not well be broken, 

^ . May 28. 

and Grant again moves across Tolopotomoy 
Creek and towards Cold Harbor. 

Lee does the same, and his interior lines enable him to 
excel the speed of the Army of the Potomac. 

Lee is of course glad to have Grant bear the brunt of at- 
tack. Grant has been steadily playing this part. But an 
effort can be made so to manoeuvre as to make Lee attack. 
Opportunities are not wanting. To match Lee in skilful 
movements, if we can not break him down by fighting, is 
indeed an honor worth the seeking. 



216 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

The two armies are on the old ground. Gaines' Mill is 
close bj. Singularly enough, each army occupies the 
position its opponent held at the beginning of the Se^^en 
Days. But we are now the assailants. Two years ago it 
was Lee who forced the fighting. He had not then to hus- 
band his means so stingily. Now he can afford to fight 
only when pushed, or when the advantage is manifestly 
his. 



XLI. ' 

MORE BLOOD.— COLD HARBOR. 

SHERIDAIN" with his cavalry has seized Cold Harbor, a 
centre of roads of great value. The Sixth corps is 
despatched from the right to this point with orders to hold 
it. Meanwhile General Smith, with sixteen thousand men 
from Butler's force, has arrived and is ordered to cooperate 
with Wright. Lee has divined the manoeuvre and has 
moved Longstreet to the same cross-roads. Wright and 
Smith are forced to drive him out of a commanding position 
beyond Cold Harbor at a loss of two thousand men before 
they can secure the place. But the roads are held. Han- 
cock moves to the left of the Sixth corps ; Warren remains 
on the right, with Burnside in support. Sheridan protects 
the lower fords of the Cliickahominy, and the roads 
towards White House. 

Grant is impelled to try one more blow. His faith is 
yet strong that he can break Lee's lines by sheer mo- 
mentum. This might still be possible if he would call to 
his aid the resources of grand-tactics. He ought to seek 
the key of his enemy's position and mass his assault there. 
But, unlike the Army of the Potomac, he has not learned 
the wonderful vitality of Lee and his veterans. Orders 

217 



218 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

are once more issued to attack along the 
whole line at 4.30 A.M. on the morrow. 

The want of definite plan is painfully apparent. Skilful 
manoeuvring might more than once have placed Lee where 
he would have to be the assaulting party or forfeit his stake. 
New Bridge over the Chickahominy could have been seized 
at this very time with this result. 

Grant in his despatches stated that Lee would not come 
out of his intrenchments to fight. But Grant had never 
tried the proper means to make him do so. In lieu of 
moving upon Lee's communications and thus compelling 
him to leave his works for the open, Grant had constantly 
hurled his men against field-works which he should have 
learned, by the experience he had recently been through, 
that he could not take. Grant's method was just what Lee 
preferred. He was right in not coming out of his intrench- 
ments to fight. 

Moreover an "assault all along the line "was useless. 
To obtain advantages from the great loss of life which 
was inevitable, the dominating point of the line should have 
been developed and the assault massed there. No reserves 
were apparently ready to follow up any advantages which 
might be gained. The extreme care in arranging details 
which should have been exercised was not to be seen. No 
picked troops were selected for the heaviest work. The 
orders were only for " an assault all along the line." The 
rank and file did not even know Cold Harbor was to be a 
battle. Tlie old method of selecting your point of attack, 
picking your troops, and properly supporting them, is by no 
means obsolete. But Grant did not deem its use advisable. 



1864.] 



MORE BLOOD. 



219 



Within a few 
moments of the 
appointed time 
this general assault 
takes 2)lace. Out 
of the grey dawn, 
eighty thousand 
men rush forward 
upon the enemy in 
his intrenched 

lines, meet a 
bloody repulse, 
and retire to cover 
themselves with 
such Avorks as they 
can most speedily 
erect to hold the 
advanced ground 
which some of 
them have gained. 
The assault has 
failed in a brief ten Cold Harbor. May 31 -June 12, 1864. 
minutes. All the 

fighting is over in less than an hour. Six thousand men 
have fallen. The enemy has lost but a tithe of this num- 
ber. 

It would have been proper on this day for Grant to ask 
a truce to bury the dead and care for the wounded who 
lay between the lines. 

It was not pleasant to acknowledge defeat ; but it was 




220 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

the part of humanity. And no great military necessity- 
called for the continuance of the battle for the succeeding 
four days. But diu'ing all this time the wounded lay upon 
the field. Many perished from hunger and exposure. 

Grant at first proposed to himself to take the position by 
regular siege approaches. But he soon abandoned this idea 
and reverted to the old plan of a transfer of the Army to the 
James. 

The object of Grant's overland campaign was to capture 
or to destroy Lee's army. He had done neither. But he 
had lost sixty thousand men in ^\q weeks without inflicting 
corresponding loss upon the enemy. The Second corps 
alone had lost four hundred men a day, from the time of 
leaving the Rappahannock. The full significance of this is 
apparent when the force of each army at the inception of 
the campaign is called to mind. Grant had numbered one 
hundred and twenty-two thousand men ; Lee some seventy 
thousand. This fearful loss was the residt of assaults in 
mass undertaken without the aid of that skill which Grant 
knew well how to employ, though he neglected to do so. 
Whenever Grant resorted to manoeuvring, he succeeded 
measurably. Whenever he attacked all along the line, he 
failed utterly. "Turenne," says Napoleon of the campaign 
of 1655, "constantly observed the two maxims: first, 
Never attack a position in front when you can obtain 
it by turning it ; second, Avoid doing what the enemy 
wishes, and that simply because he does wish it. Shun 
the field of battle which he has reconnoitred and studied and 
more particularly that in which he has fortified and in- 
trenched himself." 



1864.] MORE BLOOD. 221 

The theory has been advanced that there had to be about 
BO much hammering, about so much loss of Kfe, and con- 
sumption of energy and material, before we could hope to 
3nd the war ; that so long as the South had any men or 
means, the struggle would continue. There is a ground- 
work of truth in this. The Confederacy was practically 
exhausted before it yielded. 

But the corollary is likewise true. If the South would 
certainly succumb when exhausted, it behooved us, on 
merely humanitarian grounds, to fight on conditions so 
nearly equal as to inflict the same loss upon the enemy as 
we ourselves must suffer. This had not been done. And 
the student of this final campaign in Virginia looks in vain 
for the master-stroke by which our forces, numbering two 
to one of the enemy, could compel the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia without losses to us greater in 
number than the total eflTective of that gallant body. Lee 
undoubtedly was fighting at a great advantage, on interior 
lines, in his own State, on the defense. But how was he 
overmatched in force ! 

Criticism can not depreciate the really great qualities or 
eminent services of General Grant. His task was one to 
tax a Bonaparte. That he was unable to put an end to 
the struggle by means less costly in lives and material, if 
not indeed by some brilliant feat of arms, can not detract 
from the praise actually his due for determined ^ unflinching 
courage. It rather adds to the laurels of Lee. It cannot 
be asserted that any other Northern general could here 
have accomplished more against the genius of this soldier. 
And it was Grant who, in the face of the gravest difficul- 



222 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1864. 

ties, political and military, was able to hold the confidence 
of the nation and to prevent that party at the North, which 
was clamoring for peace, from wrecking our success now 
all but won. But his truest admirers, indeed he himself, 
admit Cold Harbor to have been a grievous mistake. And 
all who appreciate at its solid worth Grant's ability as a 
leader, regret that, in this great struggle with Lee, he 
should have failed to employ the full resources he so abun- 
dantly possessed. 



XLIL 

SHERMAN LOOKS TOWARDS ATLANTA. 

"TITTE have seen three parallel columns, west of the 
V ▼ AUeghanies, slowly working their way southward 
from the Ohio river into the heart of the Confederacy. 
The Army of the Tennessee had hugged the Mississippi. 
The Army of the Cumberland had advanced with varied 
success and failure along the railroad from Louisville to 
Nashville and thence to Chattanooga, branching off for a 
while to Shiloh and Corinth, where its identity was merged, 
for the moment, in the great body there manoeuvring 
under Halleck. The Army of the Ohio had left Eastern 
Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap, and had long had 
its head-quarters atKnoxville. In the winter of 1863-4 
these armies were commanded respectively by Sherman, 
Thomas and Schofield, under the supreme control of 
Grant. 

When, towards the end of 1861, the Department of the 
Ohio was first created and Buell was placed in command, 
his forces had been known as the Army of the Ohio. 
A year later the Department of the Cumberland was 
created for Rosecrans, and Buell's old army, now ad- 
vanced to Nashville, became the Army of the Cumber- 

223 



224 BIRD'S-ETE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

land. Later still, the Department of the Ohio was 
narrowed to Eastern Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee, and 
the troops in the new command received the old name of 
Army of the Ohio. 

Opposite Thomas, at Dalton, Ga., lay Joe Johnston, 
now devoting himself to the personal command of Bragg's 
old army. For this and the army of Northern Virginia 
were then the sole forces on which the South could rely to 
save the Cause from its threatening doom, if saved it might 
be. Longstreet, until ordered back to the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, confronted Schofield. 

Sherman, who had rejoined McPherson and Hurlbut at 
Vicksburg, was commissioned to capture Meridian, in 
Eastern Mississippi, and destroy the railroads there center- 
ing. This work he accomplished in so thorough a manner 
that the State of Mississippi was rendered 

February 3, to , , e - . n • xi 

March 6 1864 harmless tor mterference m the campaign 
immediately to ensue. He was severely 
held to task by the Southern press for what were termed his 
ruthless methods of warfare. But Sherman was a soldier, 
and when he had work to do, he did it without fear, favor, 
or affection. An instance of unnecessary cruelty or 
destruction of property by him has yet to be substantiated. 
After the Meridian campaign the bulk of Sherman's force 
was rendezvoused at Huntsville, Ala., to join in the great 
onset towards Atlanta. 

Sherman assumed command of the above named three 
armies upon Grant's appointment as Lieutenant-Gen eral, 
and to McPherson fell the command of the Army of the 
Tennessee. Joe Johnston still lay at Dalton. 



1864.] SHERMAN LOOKS TOWARDS ATLANTA. 225 

Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert. 
While the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond, 
his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta. 
And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to 
Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the 
Western armies. 

Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of 
transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the 
lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example. 
Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be 
carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past ; comforts 
to be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's 
lot. Probably no officer in such high command ever lived 
so entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his 
military family during the succeeding campaigns. The 
entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have 
shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861. 

Spring was to open with a general advance. It was 

agreed to put and keep the Confederates, 

May. 

on the defensive by a policy of constant 
hammering. 

Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the 
South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. 
Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the 
Department, had personally undertaken to hold head 
against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither 
the President's good will nor that of his new adviser, 
militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign. 

Sherman's forces held a front twenty 

May 6. 

miles long in advance of Ringgold, just 



226 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the 
Tennessee was on the right with twenty-five thousand men 
and one hundred guns. Thomas and the Army of the 
Cumberland held the centre with sixty thousand men and 
one hundred and thirty guns. Schofield and the Army of 
the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was 
fifteen thousand men and thirty guns. This grand total of 
one hundred thousand men and two hundred and sixty guns 
formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and 
the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in 
their leader was unbounded. 

Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly 
defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine 
character as well as his judgment as to what the existing 
conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited. 
Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army, 
Johnston had some sixty-five thousand men. Recog- 
nizing the difference in the strength of each, and knowing 
that Sherman must follow the railroad, Johnston was wise 
in adopting this Fabian policy. He could divine what 
Sherman's general strategy must be. The tactics of each 
manoeuvre he could meet as occasion offered. He was 
able to calculate his task, and he acted accordingly. He 
intrenched every step he took; he fought only when 
attacked ; he invited battle only when the conditions were 
largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise 
beyond his critics he could be. 



XLin. 

SHERMAN MOVES ON ATLANTA. 

SHERMAN took the measure of the intrenchments at 
Dalton with care, and though he outnumbered his 
antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such 
odds when he might force one on better ground. This 
conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the 
latter first met his opponent at this same moment in 
Virginia. 

Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the 
railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions to capture the 
town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a 
ffeneral advance was made upon the Con- 

P T 1. -, n . . . May 7 to 12. 

federate Imes, and after tactical man«euvring 
of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston 
conchided to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had 
strangely failed to seize Resaca, though an excellent chance 
had offered, and at this place the Confederate army took up 
its new stand. Had McPherson been a trifle more bold, 
Johnston would have been reduced for supplies and retreat 
to the poor roads to the east of Dalton ; and at the very 
outset of this campaign might, perhaps, have been seriously 
compromised. 

227 



228 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

This was Sherman's first earnest bout with Johnston . The 
former was by nature eager, sanguine, restless, and venture- 
some ; the latter of quiet, steady nerves, unsuited to attack, 
unsurpassed on the defense. Yet Sherman was to beat 
him at his own game of patience. Nothing characterizes 
Sherman's versatile ability more than this. 

Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek 
in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the 
Oostanaula. From this position he operated by uninter- 
mitted tapping upon Johnston's defences at constantly 
varying points, without, however, bringing on a general 
engagement. The latter, well aware that Sherman could 
make his position untenable by crossing the Oostanaula 
below, as indeed Sherman was preparing to do, evacuated 
Resaca and crossed the river. Sherman 

May 15. 

speedily followed. 

Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied 
indefinitely in details, consisted, as will be seen, in forcing 
the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, while with 
the right or left he operated upon either flank as chance 
or ground best offered. 

Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless 
all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at 
Adairsville, twenty miles south of Eesaca, but shortly 
withdrew to Kingston and Cassville. Each captain manoeu- 
vred for a chance to fioht the other at a disadvantao^e. 
Each was too wary. But either would have welcomed 
the other's attack in force, if only on his own chosen 
terms. Johnston, in fact, here issued an order looking 
to a general engagement, but some dissensions between 



1864.] SHERMAN MOVES ON ATLANTA. 229 

himself and his lieutenants, Hardee, Hood and Polk, 
operated to change his mind. Both Hood and Hardee 
bitterly opposed Johnston's defensive policy. Its expedi- 
ency appeared later. 

Opportunities were not infrequent for an attack on 
one or other wing of the Union Army, which, from the 
exigencies of the manoeuvring or the march, might become 
isolated at a distance from the rest of the 
army. But Sherman had abundant faith in 
his lieutenants, and believed that under almost any condi- 
tions either of them could hold his own lono- enouo-h to 
enable him to bring up his other forces to their assistance. 
And Sherman was eager for a general action, if only it 
could be brought about on ground not all too favorable to 
his enemy. For he desired to weaken the Confederates by 
the attrition of battle before he forced them in retreat too 
far from his own base. 

From Cassville, Johnston retired across 
the Etowah. So far this campaign had been 
one of manoeuvres. Neither combatant had suffered ma- 
terial loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each 
other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold. 
Neither would risk giving odds. 

Field comforts had been very sparse, but the men had 
borne their privations cheerily. The example of their 
superiors and especially the promise of the campaign had 
made it easy to bear with short rations and the discomforts 
of the rainy season. And within the enemy's lines, the 
brave men were accustomed to look upon privation as a 
daily necessity. Though in this campaign, the Confederate 



230 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

army had in the fertile fields of Georgia an immediate 
source of supply usually much more rare. 

The Union army was growing skilful. Local difficulties, 
multiplied many fold by bad maps and hostile population, 
were overcome in considerable measure by an able corps of 
topographical engineers. Their peculiar duty was to accom- 
pany the daily reconnoitring parties and furnish detailed 
information as to the ground on which approaching manoeu- 
vres were apt to be conducted. 

The division of engineers under Colonel Wright became 
singularly expert. To the enemy fell the duty of destroying 
as they fell back ; to us the task of reconstructing. Bridges 
were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the re- 
treating Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far 
as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with 
interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed 
wdth a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the 
Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose 
as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always fol- 
lowed hard upon the heels of the army. 

Johnston was never in a better situation for attack than 
about these days. For every mile that Sherman advanced, 
the Federal army was losing in numbers, by leaving de- 
tachments to protect its lengthening line of operations. 
Johnston, on the contrary, was gathering in his own and 
was daily gaining in eflfective strength. If he was to fight, 
the occasion was good. But Sherman would give him no 
opening. 



XLIV. 

ON TO IMARIETTA. 

MAKIETTA was Sherman's next objective. But to 
advance upon it along the raiboad was impracticable. 
The Etowah river as well as Allatoona Pass lay athwart his 
path. He had in ante bellum days become familiar with 
this section, and had no mind to force a passage of the river 
and defile beyond, if he could manoeuvre Johnston out of 
this strong defensive position. He knew that the water-shed 
between the Etowah and Chattahoochee offered an easier 
route. 

Leaving to his enemy the possession of the railroad east 
of the Etowah, he put over his army at various points 
south of Kingston, and moved direct towards Dallas, 
intendino: from here to operate on Marietta. 

° ^ May 23. 

Thomas, in the centre, was the column of 
direction. 

Johnston accepted the change of route and shifted 
position to the east of Dallas on the line of Pumpkin 
Vine Creek. Here the rival armies closed in a struggle 
of more or less severity, almost rising to the dignity of 
a general engagement. While Hooker at- jj;ay25 27. 
tacked the enemy's lines at New Hope 

231 



232 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 




Church, Howard essayed to break them at Pickett's 

Mills. 

"We had not as yet been weaned from the old ideas of 
'.tack in columns of brigades. The Napoleonic theory of 

momentum, well suited 
to the short range mus- 
ket and open ground, 
will not work against 
arms of precision and 
intrenched field-works. 
Neither Hooker's nor 
Howard's columns were 
able to effect a breach 
in the enemy's lines ; 
and except once there- 

Piekett's Mills and New Hope Church, j^f^er, at Kenesaw, this 
May 25-27, 1864. ' 

formation for assault 

was abandoned. A single line, followed by a second 

one at a suitable distance, and yet another, proved to be 

more effective, and saved much loss. This is the origin 

of the successive slender lines of infantry, each able to take 

advantage of the accidents of the ground in moving to the 

assault, that were later employed against the still more 

accurate wea|)on of the day. 

Our Civil War was full of suo^orestions as to methods of 

coj^ing with the rapidly growing destructiveness of 

small arms and artillery, both on land and at sea. As 

arms of precision and heavy guns were not at that time 

perfected, neither did we leave perfect means to the future 

soldier. But nearly all the changes in the tactical forma* 



1864.] ON TO MARIETTA. 233 

tions of later European armies had their prototype in 
methods adapted by us to the conditions then existing. 
American ingenuity is by no means confined to the 
machine-shop. 

It has been said that, in this campaign, one man behind 
field-works proved equal, on whichever side, to three in 
attack. Two would be nearer the truth. And every mile 
of ground from Dalton to Atlanta was covered with sub- 
stantial works, erected whenever and wherever either army 
halted in the presence of the other. 

During this three days' fight along Pumpkin Vine Creek, 
Sherman proved Johnston's line too strong to carry by 
direct assault. He must resort to his old tactics and turn 
Johnston's right. For this purpose he withdrew his own 
right wing piecemeal towards his left. Johnston seized 
the opportunity himself to attack during this 
manoeuvre. But he was repulsed in good 
style by Schofield. 

For a month the troops had now been unceasingly under 
fire. Nothing more nearly approaching a general engage- 
ment than New Hope Church and Pickett's Mills had been 
brought on, but Sherman had suffered a loss of fifteen 
hundred killed and seven thousand five hundred wounded, 
and Johnston a similar loss of five thousand five hundred. 
Contact with the enemy had never ceased. Skirmishing 
had been severe and incessant, and the troops were kept 
on the alert every minute of the time. But the health of 
the army remained excellent. 

By Sherman's movement towards his left, the Army of 
the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio had forced 



234 BIRD' S-ETE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

themselves into a position in whicli they enfiladed a salient 
in Johnston's line. The latter once more deemed it 
expedient to retire to a new position nearer Marietta, 
between Lost, Pine and Brush Mountains and in advance 
of Kenesaw. Sherman followed him sharply up by a 
movement towards his left ; Schofield standing fast, while 
Thomas and McPherson passed in his rear. The new 
disposition threw Schofield on the right, Thomas in the 
centre, and McPherson on the left. Johnston opposed it 
with Hardee on the left, Polk in the centre, and Hood on 
the right. 

By this flank operation Sherman reached and reestablished 

his line along the railroad ; the supply-trains 

quickly appeared, and a new base of 

supplies was set up at Ackworth. Thus ended the first 

stage of this campaign. 

If Sherman had exhibited great vigor and patience in 
pushing Johnston back, so had Johnston shown wonderful 
dexterity in parrying Sherman's powerful lunges, and in 
preventing an antagonist of such superior strength from 
opening a weak spot in his harness. 

The forces had been about as three to two. 



XLV. 



MARIETTA. 



ALLATOONA is now made a secondary base from 
which operations against Johnston may be con- 
ducted. 

During this entire campaign Sherman sought constantly 
to compel his antagonist to an open field engagement, sure 
that his heavier battalions would carry the day. With 
praiseworthy shrewdness Johnston as constantly declined. 
The open ground to the east of Marietta again tempted 
Sherman to move by his left in the hope of bringing John- 
ston to battle. But, inasmuch as an eastward movement 
might afford Johnston too ready an opportunity to strike at 
his line of communications, which such a direction would 
somewhat uncover, Sherman determined to forego his pur- 
pose and to operate by his right instead. 

This campaign resembles a bout with the foils. Both 
fencers are in guard. Sherman is constantly at play with 
his weapon, disengaging, cutting over, beating, lunging, 
using every art to draw into action his antagonist. John- 
ston warily follows every disengagement, skilfully parries 
each lunge his strong-armed adversary makes, with an 
occasional cautious 7'iposte, which in turn is invariably 

235 



236 BIRD*S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

countered. Johnston constantly retires, Sherman as con- 
stantly advances. At every retrograde movement you 
expect Johnston to make a return assault. But it never 
comes. Nor can all Sherman's skill find the weak side of 
his guard, or an opening through which he can manage to 
plant his button squarely on his breast. 

The rains had been continuous and heavy. Only those 
acquainted with the soil and streams of the South appreciate 
the full meaning of this statement. By the utmost energy 
only could artillery be moved, or supplies and ammunition 
be distributed to the troops. The lines had been laboriously 
advanced close to the enemy's works and a partial demon- 
stration upon his front was begun. The situation promised 
serious pounding. 

Sherman gives the word. Thomas throws the Army of 
the Cumberland upon the enemy's position ; Hooker gal- 
lantly assaults, but is foiled by the intrench- 
Junc 14. 

ments at Pine Mountain, while Cox makes a 

partial lodgment in the line near Gilgal. 
June 15. 

The fire on the advanced posts is irritating in 

the extreme. Blair effects a breach in a part of Hood's 

works. The latter retires behind Noonday 
June 17. . '' 

Creek. Again on the morrow Hardee with- 
draws his left to a new set of previously thrown up intrench- 
menls, followed smartly by Sherman's right. 

Johnston's line is weakened by several salients which the 
successful issue of the partial attacks of the last few days 

have left. He is on the point of falling 

back, when Sherman launches Howard's 
corps upon him, and quickens his retreat. The new Con- 



1864 ] 



3IARIETTA. 



237 



federate works are nearer Marietta, with Hardee on the left, 
Hood on the right, and Loring (temporary successor of 
Polk) holding Kenesaw in the centre. 

Since the first of the month there has been an uninter- 
rupted downpour of rain. All the streams are swollen, and 
the artillery and wagon trains fairly engulfed. Movements 




Operations about Marietta. June 14-28, 1864. 



are correspondmgly slow. The question of supplies be- 
comes more tlian troublesome. The long line of operations 
is in danger of being cut. Several Confederate raids have 
already interfered with the communications, though skilful 
management has quickly rej^aired the damage. And it is 
not feasible to cut loose from the rail, owing to the impossi- 
bility of using the country roads for heavy amounts of 
transportation. 



238 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

The left is advanced, while the entire army 

prepares for attack, moving by the right. 

This manoeuvre is continued to such a point as to seriously 

leopardize Johnston's left. Hood is'conse- 
June 20-21. "^ ^ 

quently transferred from the right to the ex- 
treme left. No sooner on the line, than, fretted with inac- 
tivity, he rushes like a hound unleashed upon Hooker and 

Schofield, in an effort to reo^ain lost ground. 
June 22. -^ , . \ , tt- • 

But he IS handsomely met. His impetuous 

onslaught is repulsed with a loss of a thousand men, our 

own being slight. 



XLYI. 

KENESAW. 

SHERMAN had left no stone unturned to bring on a 
general engagement upon favorable ground. But 
wily Johnston had never afforded him an opportunity to 
iight unless he was behind field-works too solid to promise 
aught but fruitless slaughter. Johnston would not be 
drawn into the open. Since Hood had been transferred 
from the right, however, the defences at Kenesaw were not 
so fully manned. 

Inaction would not do. Sherman must choose either to 
move about Johnston's left, which the bad state of the roads 
scarcely warranted, or else to break through his lines. 
Failure to take some decisive action would allow Johnston 
time to operate seriously against our communications. 
Sherman decided to try once more the fortunes of assault, 
and selected for the attempt the bluifs of Kenesaw, as the 
key of the situation. 

Schofield makes a heavy demonstration 

•P .11 June 26. 

on the right to draw troops, if possible, 

away from Kenesaw. In so doing he is able to seize some 

advanced ground which compromises the security of Hood's 

239 



240 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

left. This he defends by a strong redoubt. At the same 

time an attack in force is ordered to be made on Kenesaw. 

McPherson entrusts the details of his front to Logan, who 

presses in with M. L. Smith and Walcutt. 

June 27. 

Howard pushes Newton forward in column 

from his front, and Palmer sends in Davis on Newton's 

right in like formation. Hooker is in reserve . Meanwhile, 

on the right, Schofield supports this onset by pushing his 

advantage against Hood to the utmost, with the railroad 

south of Marietta as a goal. 

The attack on Kenesaw has been preceded by general 
artillery fire ; and the columns advance with confidence. 
But, as was demonstrated a month ago, heavy masses are 
found useless against intrenched lines and rapid musketry. 
Newton and Davis both fail to effect a lodgment, but with 
obstinate gallantry each holds and intrenches a line within 
a few hundred feet of the works from which they have 
recoiled. Smith carries and holds the skirmish pits, but is 
brought up standing against the works of the line. 

The enemy has quickly comprehended that the real 
attack is against the key of their position at Kenesaw, and 
so soon as the first rush is over, and the works still remain 
theirs, the lines are at once reinforced and all chance of 
success is past. 

The loss has not been as great as might have been ex- 
pected. Our own adds up about three thousand men ; 
the enemy's barely five hundred. Whether the works 
could have been carried by a sturdier onset is uncertain. 
But the days of massed columns are numbered. Their 
weakness has now been doubly proven. The only gain 



1864.] KENESAW, 241 

has been by Schofield on the right. The enemy has won 
the battle of Kenesaw Mountain. 

It has been alleged that the impossible nature of the task 
made the assault on Kenesaw unjustifiable ; and the loss 
of life has been characterized as mere wilful slaughter^ 
It is difficult to answer such criticism. But if it has any 
weight, what can be said of Fredericksburg or of Cold 
Harbor? Who shall decide upon what is justifiable in 
war? What, indeed, becomes of the art of war itself? 
Must not all swords be forthwith beaten into ploughshares 
and all spears into pruning-hooks ? The same criticism 
has been passed on other soldiers — notably on Gustavus 
Adolphus for his assault on the Alte Veste. But Gustavus 
was in the right, and so was Sherman. 

The rainy period now came to an end. The roads agahi 
began to harden. Sherman saw that his advantage lay in 
moving around Johnston's left, as he could now with less 
danger leave the vicinity of the railroad. Jolinston began 
to fortify Atlanta and make new lines to defend the Chatta- 
hoochee. For this purpose he employed large bodies of 
negroes, always fortifying positions in the rear to which he 
could withdraw at will. McPherson was moved to the 
right of the army, as the first step in a new flank march. 
But Johnston did not wait ; he evacuated ^ , , „ 

' July 1-2. 

Marietta. Thomas at once advanced 

through the town, while McPherson moved on Turner's 

Ferry, obliging Johnston to defend the crossing. 

The casualties in June had been seventy-five hundred 
men, of which fifty-five hundred were from the Army of 
the Cumberland. This meant a daily loss of some two 



242 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

hundred men in the constant bickering at the advanced 
posts. Johnston's may have been five thousand men. 
The habit of both contestants had been to intrench the 
skirmish as well as the main line. Every advance on 
either side called for the capture of field-works. 

The only great physical obstacle now in Sherman's path 
is the Chattahoochee. Beyond this lies Atlanta. But his 
problem is a grave one. To cross tliis river in face of 
an enemy intrenched and well equipped is no simple 
matter. 

Johnston had spent a month on his Ute de pont at the 
main Chattahoochee crossing. But he could not presume 
to hold it beyond a few days, for he was exposed to being 
turned out of it by Sherman's putting over a part of his 
force above or below to move on Atlanta, while observing 
Johnston with the balance. 

Sherman, after some days, discovered an 
unused crossing above the railroad near Soap 
Creek, and passing over a few regiments, intrenched a 
bridge-head on the east bank. Other fords above were 
utilized, and the cavalry kept up a constant demonstration 
below to distract the enemy's attention from the operations 
up the river. Rousseau was despatched on a cavalry raid 
south of Atlanta. Stores were accumulated at Marietta. 

Johnston now entirely withdrew from the 

July 9. "^ 

west side of the Chattahoochee. Sherman, 
after long deliberation, made ready to cross his army by the 
left around the north of Atlanta. By this means he might, 
after seizing the railroad, intercept any reinforcements 
which should be sent from Virginia. In this movement. 



1864.] KENESA W. 243 

Thomas was to cross and establish the Army of the 
Cumberland as the new right, and press towards Atlanta ; 
while McPherson was to pass in his rear and manoeuvre 
towards the left, breaking the railroad at Decatur. 
Schofield was to follow and fall into line in the centre. 

Some Southern historians claim this entire campaign 
from Dalton to Atlanta as a Confederate success. 
Johnston " had brought his army to Atlanta after inflicting 
a loss upon the enemy five times as great as his own ; and 
he had performed the almost marvellous feat of conducting 
a retreat through a difficult and mountainous country more 
than a hundred miles in extent without the loss of material 
or of a single gun. Gen. Johnston held Atlanta more 
firmly than Lee held Richmond. Sherman was tmable to 
invest the city, and to withdraw he would have to pass over 
a single road, one hundred and thu'ty-five miles long, 
traversing a wild and broken country. Johnston held him, 
as it were, suspended for destruction. The situation was 
brilliant for the Confederates." [Pollard.] It does not 
appear that such deductions from the facts do Johnston the 
justice he deserves for the very able conduct of the 
campaign now soon to close. To allow Sherman the 
credit due him for exceptional skill and vigor certainly 
throws Johnston's defense into higher relief. 

The situation of the Confederate army was far from 
brilliant. The advantage was with the Federals. 



XL VII. 

GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE. 

WE last saw the Army of the Potomac when it was 
about to leave the fatal ground on which Cold 
Harbor had been fought. Let us return to it. 

Gradually moving successive corps from the right, Grant 
extended his left down towards the crossings of the Chicka- 
hominy. Warren seized Long Bridge, crossed, and demon- 
strated along all the roads leading towards 

June 11. 

Richmond, in order to mislead Lee. Han- 
cock pushed his corps over the same bridge towards the 
James. Burnside and Wright crossed lower down and 

marched to Charles City. Smith had already 

June 12. "^ 

moved by water from White House to Ber- 
muda Hundred, whence he was sent out to seize Petersburg 

with his own and other troops. 

The Army of the Potomac reached the 
James in two marches, and, with a day's delay, was put 

over to the south side. Lee had not been 

June 14-15. /-^ , i 

slow to discover want s purpose, and, pur- 
suing the same policy as heretofore, he followed on parallel 
roads and crossed the James, near^Drury's Bluff, one day 

later than Grant put over his troops below. 
244 



1864.] GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE. 245 

The City of Petersburg acts as an advanced fortress to 
protect the communications of Richmond with the interior. 
It is a strategic point of the greatest vakie. ]^o operations 
on the James can be secure without its possession. 

But neither Hancock, who was first ordered forward from 
the Army of the Potomac in the direction of the place, nor 
indeed Meade, appears to have known that Grant intended 
that Petersburg should be at once captured. Specific or- 
ders had not been issued to this eflTect. Smith had taken 
the outer works, but had not followed up his 
success, though opposed only by militia. 
Hancock should at once have been sent to finish the opera- 
tion ; but the orders eventually issued did not reach him in 
season, and before he was prepared to act, Lee had already 
thrown some old troops into the city. 

Even then an immediate assault gave some promise of 
success. But Hancock's dispositions had not sufficient 
vigor to command a satisfactory result. 

Burnside now comes upon the ground. He and Hancock 

twice assault the enemy's lines, with some gain of ground, 

but without material result. Their loss is 

/.I -. A 1 . -. . Ju^e 16-17. 

tour thousand men. A third attempt is 

made, but still fruitlessly. Lee retires to the interior lines. 
The losses in these four days aggregate 
eleven thousand four hundred men. 

The Second and Sixth corps are now ordered to extend 
their lines to the left so as to gain ground well south of the 
town, and towards the Weldon Eailroad. During this ma- 
noeuvre, the Second corps, on the extreme flank and in the 
thickets, moves so far beyond the Sixth that it opens a gap 



June 18. 



246 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

between the two corps. Into this gap Hill, 
wide awake for a chance to check our ad- 
vance, immediately thrusts a force, taking both exposed 
flanks in reverse, and captures a number of guns and some 
seventeen hundred prisoners. The extension has proven 
costly. 

Sheridan was out on his expedition in aid of Hunter's 
march on Lynchburg. In his absence Wilson and 
Kautz, with their cavalry divisions, were ordered to 
operate against the Weldon and Southside railroads. 
These are Lee's two important lines of supply. Moving 
in light order these officers proceeded on their task, 
reached their objective and destroyed a large amount of 

o^ T , ^ rollino^ stock, track, and other property. 
June 22-July 2. => ' ' i i J 

Wilson on the return trip got rather roughly 
handled by the enemy's horse, near Reams' Station, and suf- 
fered largely in casualties and prisoners. The damage in- 
flicted to the railroad was not of a permanent nature. 

There was now no hope of carrying Petersburg by 
assault. The losses had reached sixteen thousand men. 
Regular siege operations must be resorted to. 

The army was not in good condition for any severe work. 
It needed recuperation, if any army ever did. In a little over 
six weeks sixty-two thousand men, out of one hundred and 
twenty-two thousand with which it left the Rappahannock, 
had fallen in their tracks. The drain had been particularly 
severe inexperienced officers. To be sure, these rents had 
been to a certain extent patched by reinforcements ; but they 
were none the less appalling. It was no longer the proud 
Army of the Potomac. 



18G4.] GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE. 247 

Nor do these figures cover all. The casualties of the 
Eighteeenth corps and the Army of the James had been 
ten thousand men besides. The forces now about to lay- 
siege to Petersburg had lost in battle over one-half of their 
effective strength in this short space of time. 

Success might have justified this awful sacrifice. But 
there had been no success for the Army of the James. 
Still less had there been for the Army of the Potomac. Its 
every manoeuvre had been checkmated ; its every attack re- 
pulsed. No wonder that its confidence had begun to ebb. 

But there was work in it yet if called out in the 
right way. All that it needed was to know that the reason 
was good, and it was ready for any effort. The American 
volunteer was too intelligent not to recognize when blood- 
shedding had gone too far, and too independent not to show 
his conviction. But his courage would not let him turn 
his face from work to which he had once put his hand. 



XLYIII. 

PETERSBURG. — THE MINE FIASCO. 

PETERSBURG was not besieged. It was only ob- 
served. All its lines of communication were open. 
Its defences began far beyond Grant's extreme left, and ex- 
tended round to the Appomattox. From the further side 
of this river the works continued northward so as to keep 
the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad safe from the attacks 
of Butler, who was still at Bermuda Hundred ; and from 
a force under Foster at Deep Bottom on the north bank 
of the James. 

Grant could operate against Richmond at pleasure, while 
observing Petersburg. Or he could organize a force to 
act as a flying column against the railroads west of the 
latter place. The second plan would interfere with Lee's 
supplies, and was the most dangerous thing both for the 
Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederate capital. 
For to procure supplies was already Lee's hardest problem. 

By a variety of movements Grant could keep Lee on the 

qui vive. But meanwhile, some weeks must 
July. 

be spent to perfect a system of works in 

which the army could defend itself from sorties by the 

enemy. 

248 



1864.] 



PETERSBURG. 



249 




mine 



In the prosecution of this work, Burnside had run a mil 
under one of the Confederate forts in his front. It was de- 
termined to fire this mine and to follow the explosion by an 



250 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

assault, in the hope that the crest beyond, which dominated 

the city, might be carried by the troops. Hancock, with his 

corps and two divisions of cavahy, had been across the 

James river on an expedition ao-ainst the de- 

Jnly 26-29. 

fences of Richmond, which, though it had 
failed, had drawn a large force from Petersburg to check it. 
The time was opportune. 

But the dispositions were not careful. The storming 
column, which should have been chosen from the best stuff 
of the army, was actually selected by lot from among the 
divisions in the immediate front of the mine. These were 
by no means the best, and the actual column of assault con- 
tained poor material and was not well led. No special in- 
structions were issued. There was no place cVarmes on 
which the men could speedily deploy for the attack after 
filing out of their intrenchments. No community of action 
was apparent. All the preparations were wanting in skill 
and care. 

The mine was exploded early in the morning. Heavy 
artillery fire had silenced the enemy's guns in 

July 30. 

the surrounding forts. But in lieu of the 
storming column taking advantage of the surprise by a 
rapid advance, it debouched slowly from its position, and 
far from rushing for the crest to be captured, sought refuge 
in the crater made by the exploded mine ! 

More troops were pushed in only to make the slaughter- 
pen more bloody. The enemy was not long in recovering 
from his astonishment and began to pour a heavy artillery 
fire into the crater. A few partial charges were headed by 
some of the more courageous officers in the m^Ue, but no 



1864.] PETERSBURG. 251 

semblance of efficient work was done. It was purely a 
case of bad management and worthless leadership. The 
mass extricated itself as best it might with a loss of four 
thousand men. The preparations had been such that noth- 
ing short of failure could well ensue. 



XLIX. 

WASHINGTON IN ALARM FOR THE LAST TIME. 

THE opposing forces in front of Petersburg at this 
time had dwindled to much smaller proportions. 
They numbered about seventy-five thousand on the Union 
to fifty thousand on the Confederate side. But their 
purpose was none the less set. 

Hunter's eccentric retreat had offered the enemy an ex- 
cellent chance to resort to the old Washington scare, for 
the Valley was defended by only Sigel's small division. 

Early is accordingly instructed to force 

July 1. 

his way into Maryland. Sigel retires from 

his front across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Early 

confines him to Maryland Heisjhts, and 

Julys. . *^ . 

moves around his flank to Frederick. 

Early has fifteen thousand veterans, just 
fitted for the work. There is nothing of any moment to 
withstand him, but General Lew. Wallace assembles a 
motley force of hundred-days' men and militia, and boldly 
plants himself athwart Early's path. 

Ricketts arrives opportunely in Baltimore, for Grant, on 
^ , „ receivino^ the news of the invasion, has at 

July 8. ° ' 

once hurried the Sixth corps by water to 
252 



1864.] WASHINGTON IN ALARM. 253 

the capital. The Nineteenth corps, from Fortress Monroe, 
has taken the same direction. Wallace, and Ricketts with 
two brio^ades, at Monocacy Junction make a 

. . July 9. 

gallant stand to cover Baltimore, losing seven 
hundred men killed and wounded, and then retire to Elli- 
cott's INIills, to oppose Early's advance on the capital. But 
the Confederates push on to the gates of 

July 11. 

Washington without serious loss. 

At this moment Early's vanguard might easily enter the 
city. For Washington has for its defense not much else 
than citizen-soldiery, improvised from department clerks and 
non-combatants. But seeing the fortifications of the capi- 
tal well-manned, Early imagines that troops from the Army 
of the Potomac are on hand, and delays his attack to make 
proper disposition of his corps. This delay is fatal. 
When he actually moves to the assault, the Sixth and Nine- 
teenth corps have put in their appearance, 
and his one chance of making the most 
brilliant stroke of the war has vanished. 

Early ruefully retires by way of the Valley. Lee's di- 
version has not budged Grant from Petersburg, and has 
therefore failed of its main purpose. 

Hunter reappears at Harper's Ferry before Early gets 
well back to the Valley. Wright is also on his heels. It 
seems as if Early might, in his turn, be trapped. But he 
slips from between these corps, suffering only from a 
cavalry attack by Averell, while he repels 

July 15-20. 

one by Thoburn. 

At Strasburg, Early's retreat ends. Not so however his 
activity. A few days later Crook crosses swords with 



254 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864, 

his forces at Kernstown, on the same ground 
"^ ' where Shields had defeated Jackson. But 
the result is different. Crook loses twelve hundred men 
and is driven back upon the Potomac. 

McCausland again crosses the river with a body of Con- 
federate horse. Couch makes a show of de- 
July29. . 

fending Chambersburg, but McCausland 

occupies the town and levies a contribution of $500,000 
upon it. In default of payment of this sum, which cannot 
be raised upon the instant, the Confederate leader deliber- 
ately puts torch to the town. 

This act was utterly indefensible, for Chambersburg had 
committed no overt act of war. 

From here McCausland escapes to West Virginia, while 

our infantry forces are marching purposeless hither and 

yon. At Moorfield he encounters Averell, 

who in a smart combat inflicts heavy loss 

upon him, but cannot prevent his escape. 



ATLANTA. 

THE Richmond government had become alarmed at the 
results of the inaggressive policy of Johnston. Able 
as had been his retreat in the face of Sherman's heavier 
battalions, retreat was the last thing which the Confederacy 
and its foreign policy demanded. A bolder front and more 
fighting seemed strategically desirable, — politically essen- 
tial. So judged at least the Southern President and his 
Chief of Staff, Bragg. 

Mr. Davis was a West Pointer, and while he had no per- 
sonal experience in war, he believed military affairs to be 
his strong point. He certainly interfered constantly in the 
conduct of the Confederate campaigns, and often with dis- 
astrous results. 

Hood had all along been critical of Johnston's Fabian 
tactics and was j^ar excellence a fighting general. He 
was accordingly put in command in Johnston's stead, 
though, it is claimed, with reluctance on his part. It was 
expected that he would show what aggressiveness could 
accomplish. 

Hood was certainly a stanch soldier, but his bravery ex- 
ceeded his discretion. He could not brook delay. He was 

255 



256 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

impatient in metliod ; and his whole war creed was summed 
up in the belief that a well-planned attack driven home can 
shatter any obstacle. He was the very reverse of Johnston, 
— every inch a fighter, but lacking Johnston's cool calcu- 
lation and singular absence of flurry. The one quality 
necessary to oppose Sherman's restless activity was the 
power of waiting. This Hood had not. What made Lee 
so great was that he had both this quality and the added 
power of striking a blow often marvelous when the small 
weight of his army is considered. 

Johnston had already prepared to fall upon our forces as 
they filed into line along Peach-Tree Creek. Hood, on 
acceding to the command, decided to carry through the 
plan of his late chief. Stewart's (late Polk's) corps was 
on the left ; Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's (late 
Hood's) on the right. His line lay in a semi-circle about 
the north subm'bs of Atlanta. 

So soon as the Army of the Cumberland has passed 
the Chattahoochee, it falls into position as a 

July 17-18. . . ^ 

pivot on which the rest of the army shall 

wheel into line, and soon gains a foothold south of Peach- 
Tree Creek, — a very formidable obstacle, 
July 20. . 

— with three heads of column. Meanwhile 

Schofield and McPherson are executing their delicate ma- 
noeuvre of passing Thomas' rear and filing into line on his 
left. Owing to the broken nature of the ground they are 
cautiously feeling their way to their appointed places. 

Hood, whose scouts keep him well informed of all that is 
going on, proposes to push a column in between these two 
and Thomas, and to fall in force upon the latter before his 



1864.] 



ATLANTA. 



257 



associates can come to his assistance. The character of the 
terrain separates the several detachments of the Federals 
and opens a gap of dangerous proportions in the centre of 



imiiiiiiini^3-£^-„VN- 




Operations about Atlanta. July 1 7-September 2, 1864. 

our hne. Into this gap Hood thrusts Hardee with a heavy 

force. This e^eneral falls upon Xewton at 

^ ^ Julv 20. 

Clear Creek and on Ward, Geary and 

Williams. His intention is to force a general engagement 

I while Sherman is getting into line. This is a moment of 



258 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

great danger at all times for an army in the immediate pres- 
ence of the enemy. 

But McPherson has marched with more expedition than 
Hood expects. The sound of heavy firing between him 
and Thomas quickens his stride still more. He drives his 
vanguard sharply in upon Hood's right flank. To meet 
this inopportune diversion, Hood is forced to call for Cle- 
burne's division from Hardee's corps. So considerable a 
drain cripples Hardee in his onslaught on the Army of the 
Cumberland. Hood has only done the essential. Had he 
paused, McPherson might have moved into Atlanta unop- 
posed. But Hardee, thus weakened, cannot 

July 20. 

wrest any ground from sturdy Thomas. The 
first aggressive tactics of the new general have been foiled, 
with a loss of perhaps double our two thousand. 

The armies of the Cumberland and Ohio now unite upon 
a new line nearer Atlanta. A strong hill is seized and forti- 
fied by Leggett's division, from which the city can be plainly 
seen. Hood withdraws into his main Atlanta works. 
The siege begins by another advance of Thomas and Scho- 
field, while the engineers are bridging the river, and heavy 
guns are coming to the front. 

McPherson has extended the extreme left around to a 

point southeast of the city. Hood, still determined to carry 

things with the strong hand, assigns the task of dislodging 

him to Hardee. This general, familiar with the ground, 

makes a circuit of McPherson's exposed flank before the 

latter has fully completed his field-works, and falls upon his 

^ , „„ rear. In the confusion McPherson is killed. 
July 22. 

Logan assumes command. The troops, 



1864.] ATLANTA. 259 

hardened to surprises, face steadily about and receive the 
enemy from the other side of their breastworks. Cheat- 
ham again assails them upon their new rear, intending to 
cooperate with Hardee. Again the breastworks are re- 
versed and a cheerful defense offered, for the stout-hearted 
troops of the Army of the Tennessee are not easily discon- 
certed, even by surprises such as these. 

Hardee and Cheatham are attacking at right angles to 
each other and do not readily work together. Their as- 
saults, if simultaneous, would have been fatal to the Feder- 
als. But McPherson's old soldiers, though hard put to it, 
repulse each foe in turn. Our loss has been three thousand 
five hundred ; the Confederate, much heavier, was never 
officially reported. 

In after days Hood passed serious criticism upon Hardee's 
conduct of tliis battle of Atlanta, but without justice. 
Hardee had behaved with unusual discretion and skill. He 
had simply met his match. 

Hooker was senior to both Schofield and Thomas. He 
was in a measure entitled to succeed McPhersou. But liis 
peculiarities made Sherman fear that he would not find in 
Hooker a cordial support, coupled with such deference to 
his judgment as supreme control demands. Howard was 
appointed to command the Army of the Tennessee. Hooker 
sullenly retired and Slocum was given the Twentieth corps. 
Sherman thus retained lieutenants who were in warm sym- 
pathy with his plans, and able to second him in their effi- 
cient conduct. 

The railroad had been finished to the rear of the Army of 
the Cumberland. So far Sherman's manoeuvre around 



260 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

the north of Atlanta did not promise success. 

He reconsidered the situation and proposed 
to try an operation on the west and south of the city, 
instead of the one now going on on the north and east. 
From the new side he might wrest from Hood the 
Macon Railroad, a manifest advantage. Stoneman was 
sent on a raid towards Macon, and Howard was with- 
drawn from the battle-field of Atlanta to the extreme 
right. 

Hood had been placed in command to fight. He had 
fought — boldly and skilfully, but so far with most disastrous 
results. But to fight was the condition on which he held 
command. He determined to attack Howard on the march 

over towards the ris^ht, and to repeat the 

tactics, topographically reversed, which he 
had employed against McPherson. Advancing along the 
Lickskillet road he fell upon Howard at Ezra Church. But 
again he was repulsed, with a loss much exceeding our 
own, which was about a thousand men. 

Sherman's troops have acquired the instinct of victory. 
They are almost invincible. Hood's vast waste of life, 
without gain of any kind, goes far towards vindicating 
Johnston's defensive policy. 

Schofield moved upon the heels of Howard and speedily 
got into line. Sherman's purpose was to hold the bridge- 
head at the Chattahoochee, and swing the entire army upon 
that pivot into position west and south of Atlanta. Hood 
began to see that his tenure of Atlanta depended on a 
slender tie. So far his fighting policy was barren. Good 
speed enabled Sherman to anticipate him in the possession of 



1864.] ATLANTA. 261 

Jonesborough, south of the city a dozen miles. Attacking 
at a venture, Hardee was here repulsed by the Army of the 
Tennessee. 

Schofield was meanwhile engaged in de- 
stroying the railroad between Jonesborough 
and Atlanta. Hood ordered Hardee out to drive him 
back, as a last means of holding the city. Sherman 
endeavored to surround Hardee, and a serious combat 
resulted. The loss on each side was about two 
thousand, but we captured fully that number of 
prisoners. 

Unwilling to be cooped up, an event which he now could 
not but foresee, Hood reluctantly evacuated 

September 2. 

Atlanta and moved towards Macon. The 
Army of the Cumberland at once occupied the city, while 
the Army of the Tennessee remained at East Point, and 
the Army of the Ohio held Decatur. A season of rest 
and preparation for the new conflict ensued. 

It is difficult to gauge the relative losses of the opposing 
armies during the campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta. 
The Union forces outnumbered the Confederate on the 
average probably as ten to seven, if the muster rolls of both 
are estimated in the same manner. Sherman captured 
thirteen thousand prisoners all told. 

Hood manifestly understated his losses. He placed them 
at five thousand two hundred and fifty men, while Hardee 
claimed himself alone to have lost seven thousand during 
Hood's command. It is asserted that Sherman buried not 
far from four thousand Confederate dead during this cam- 
paign. There is some duplication here no doubt. But 



262 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

the War Records, which are as exact as careful compari- 
son can make them, give the Confederate losses in killed 
and wounded, from May 7 to September 1, as twenty-two 
thousand four hundred, to which number the prisoners are 
to be added. The Union losses during the same period 
were nearly thirty-two thousand men. 



LI. 

A PROTRACTED SIEGE. 

FOR many weary months, while Sherman was battling 
for Atlanta, the Army of the Potomac was detained 
by Lee at the portals of Petersbm-g. The uniform success 
with which he managed to check every attempt of Grant 
to break or turn his lines became monotonous. But 
these failures must be described in their proper sequence, 
though they had no immediate effect on the whole result. 
It was the gradually growing exhaustion of the resources 
of the Confederates which was our strongest ally. 

Another diversion against the lines of Richmond, north 
of the James, was attempted by Hancock. 

August 12-21. 

Crossing as before to where Foster held his 
lodgment at Deep Bottom, he advanced out beyond 
Malvern Hill, in the hope of finding some favorable point 
of attack. But Lee reinforced the troops on the east of 
Richmond almost as soon as Hancock arrived, and in a 
combat at Bailey's Creek, followed by desultory skirmishing 
for several days, prevented our forces from gaining any 
ground which could be held. The command returned to 
camp with a loss of fifteen hundred men. 

About the same time Warren conducts another operation 

263 



'264 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

against the Weldon Kailroad. A foothold is effected on 
this road after a smart action at Yellow 

August 18-21. . , . , 

Tavern, in which we lost a thousand men. 
Lee, unwilling to forego the use of any part of this line, 
makes strenuous efforts to recover its possession by a 
number of stout attacks, but Warren is not to be dislodged, 
and intrenches the position. What he has gained, how- 
ever, is at a sacrifice of forty-three hundred men. The 
scale on which some of these operations are conducted 
necessitates heavy work and serious losses. 

On his return from his expedition north of the James 
Hancock pushes rapidly out to the left of Warren to sup- 
plement the latter's efforts. He destroys the 
railroad to Reams' Station, and the cavalry 
operates beyond his left towards Dinvviddie Court House. 
Hancock has with him Miles' and Gibbon's divisions, 
some eight thousand men. Lee detaches A. P. Hill 
against him. Hill assaults with his usual vigor, and is 
favored by his intimate knowledge of the ground. The 
conduct of all but Miles' force and the cavalry is of the 
weakest character, and the upshot of the entire movement 
is a retreat by us with a loss of twenty-seven hundred 
men. The whole operation has been disappointing in 
the extreme. 

A few weeks of rest now supervene. But Grant is not 
content to remain long quiet. His continuous hammering 
has its valuable side. His tendency is always towards 
great activity. An attack in force on the right is this 

time projected, to sustain which a diversion 

Sept. 30-Oct. 5. 

on the left is undertaken by Warren with 



1864.] A PROTRACTED SIEGE. 265 

Parke and Gregg. Ground is gained and intrenched 
beyond Peeble's Farm. Loss three thousand. 

Butler meanwhile has been operating against the de- 
fences of Richmond, and has actually captured and held 

Fort Harrison, against a number of strong 

. TT- 1 1 1 September 28-30. 

eiiorts to recover it. His loss has been 

heavy. Beyond this the movements on the right appear to 
be attended with no success and are shortly abandoned. 

But before settling down to winter-quarters Grant was 
desirous of dealing one more serious blow to the enemy, 
in the hope that some permanent gain could be made with 
which to close the year. He again decided for a move- 
ment by the left in sufficient force to break in the Confed- 
erate right, and to seize the Southside Railroad, on which 
Lee depended for most of his supplies. The force con- 
sisted of the bulk of three corps. Warren and Parke 
(now commanding the Ninth corps) were to attack the 
extreme right of Lee's line in front, while Hancock should 
by a circuit seize the Boydton Plank Road 

"^ . '' October 25-28. 

and the railroad. 

Warren and Parke struck Lee at Hatcher's Run. Parke 
assaulted in front while Warren endeavored to turn the 
Confederate right. Parke fell short of accomplishing his 
aim, upon which Meade ordered Hancock and Gregg to 
halt on the Boydton road so that Warren and he might 
cooperate. But before these two corps could reach each 
other, so as jointly to attack Lee's flank, the latter thrust 
A. P. Hill into the gap between them. 

Moving through the wooded country, with the ease bred 
of perfect familiarity with every path, while our troops 



266 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864-0. 

blunder abowt iu utter ignorance of their own or the enemy's 
whereabouts, Hill suddenly falls upon Hancock's flank. 
The attack has well-nigh come to a fatal pass, when Egan 
changes front and pours his volleys into the rear of Hill's 
column . Unable to hold his own , Hill summarily withdraws . 

Gregg has, meanwhile, been skirmishing on Hancock's 
front and left, and has made good headway against the 
enemy's horse. But, though our losses are seventeen hun- 
dred men, and the troops have all done creditable work, the 
result has been renewed failure to make any satisfactory 
gain of ground. 

For several months to come nothing in particular w^as un- 
dertaken except along the regular lines. But before winter 
set in, Warren made one more expedition 

December 7-11. 

down the Weldon Railroad, of which he de- 
stroyed eighteen or twenty miles, much to the annoyance 
of Lee, to whose already serious difficulty in obtaining sup- 
plies this break greatly added. For it materially increased 
the length of his wagon-haul from the point where stores 
could be unloaded south of the break to the Richmond and 
Petersburg lines. 

Still another of the ineffectual manoeuvres by the left 
was made during the winter by the Fifth corps and the 
Second, — now commanded by Humphreys, — accompanied 
by Gregg's cavalry, against the Southside Railroad. 
The Second corps moved upon the right of the enemy at 
Hatcher's Run while tlie Fifth marched 

Februaiy 5-7, 1865. 

around their flank. Next day the two corps 
joined hands on either side of Hatcher's Run, at Da))ney's 
Mills, and Gregg came up from Dinwiddle. 



1865.] A PROTRACTED SIEGE. 267 

But the enemy are proof at all points. They have spent 
many months in devising means to resist an attack from 
every imaginable quarter, and are prepared to act decisively 
on the spur of the moment, while our troops must grope 
blindfold over unknown ground. Lee contrives to out- 
flank our line. Warren loses fifteen hundred men ; but 
we gain ground as far as Hatcher's Run. 

This uniform failure of movements by the left was dis- 
heartening to a deo^ree. Lee's defences had been made 
impregnable to front attack and extended far to the west of 
Petersburg. And his interior communications enabled him 
at any moment to detach heavily from his centre to check 
any operation against his right. 

It had become evident that Petersburg could not be 
taken, or the enemy's hold on Richmond compromised, by 
a continuance of the policy pursued so far. It is not im- 
probable that Grant might have made more headway by 
leaving a sufficient part of his army in the trenches in front 
of Petersburg and by moving with a heavy force far to 
the west upon Lee's communications ; or, if it were deter- 
mined to captm'e the place a 7nai7i forte ^ by making a 
massed attack upon some point in the centre after suitable 
mining operations had weakened Lee's defences and pre- 
pared for such an operation. 

But the end was to come with opening spring. To the 
far-sigljted, this was no longer doubtful. The South must 
succumb to the greater material resources of the North, de- 
spite its courage and its sacrifices. 

Hancock was unable to resume command of the old 
Second corps. His history is that of the Army of the 



268 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

Potomac. None of the corps-commanders in Virginia 
whose names are household words have earned their laurels 
by sounder, better work than he. That he never rose to 
the command of a separate army was due solely to circum- 
stances. He was too necessary to the Army of the Potomac 
to be allowed to leave it. 

Hancock was one of the most cheerful men under fire we 
ever had. In the thickest of the fight, his appearance and 
manner infused a singular confidence in the troops. He 
was an uniform favorite, rarely made a mistake, and always 
finished his work in good style. His is an enviable record 
among the great names of the war. 



Ln. 



SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 

~Tjl ARLY, after the failure of his raid on Washington, 
-i — ^ had retired into the Shenandoah Valley. His pres- 
ence there was a constant threat, and it was evident that 
Lee had no intention of recalling him. The Sixth and 
Nineteenth corps, of which Grant had sore need at Peters- 
burg, were thus kept from their legitimate duty for the 
protection of Washington. Grant therefore determined to 
make a clean sweep of the Valley and if possible prevent 
further use of it by the Confederates for campaigning pur- 
poses. 

The division of our forces in Northern Virginia into 
petty independent commands had up to this time wrought 
only mischief. Grant saw that at least one vigorous cam- 
paign must be conducted there under a 

. August 7. 

single head. He selected Sheridan for the 
task, and promised to give him sufficient force to do his 
work full justice. This promise in due time took the 
shape of the Army of the Shenandoah, and consisted of 
forty thousand infantry and a superb body of fifteen 
thousand horse. 

Sheridan had never yet enjoyed a separate command. 

2B» 



270 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

Whatever operations had been his to conduct had shown 
him to possess brilliant powers. He was now en- 
trusted with an army destined for a service of equal im- 
portance and delicacy. For some weeks he exhibited 
great caution, due in part to Grant's unwillingness that 
he should strike out beyond his depth, and in part to his 
own appreciation of the fact that in his front lay an old 
and wily tactician, who, though commanding a much 
smaller force, had both audacity and skill, and the keenest 
tools to handle. 

Sheridan adopted Hunter's position at Halltown, in the 
angle of the Potomac and Shenandoah. Of this he re- 
solved to retain firm hold, whatever his manoeuvres. He 

first moved towards the line of the Opequon. 
August 10. . 

Early retired to cover Winchester, for the 

reinforcements promised him by Lee were still on the way, 
and he must keep a clear road open for them. On his 
arrival at Fisher's Hill the reinforcements began to come 
in, under Kershaw, with Fitz-Lee's horse. These forces 
were commanded by Anderson, who was senior to Early by 
commission. Some slight friction thus engendered worked 
tardiness in the Confederate plans. 

Grant imagined that Early's force might have been in- 
creased to forty thousand men, and advised Sheridan, who 
was at Cedar Creek, not to attack. In consequence the 
Army of the Shenandoah was retired to 
Berry ville. Early followed, but could not 
advance further north without uncovering his rear. Some 
manoeuvring, however, resulted in Sheridan letting go 
Berry ville and retiring again to Halltown, w^hile Early 



1864.] SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 271 

demonstrated on Shepherdstown as if again to cross the 
Potomac. 

But Lee must have men, and ao^ain with- 

^ _ September 14. 

drew Anderson. Early retired behind the 
Opequon. Quiet reigned for a fortnight. 

In all this manoeuvring, during which each general was 
gauging the skill of his opponent, the losses had been but 
a few hundreds on each side, in occasional skirmishes of 
the outposts. Now that Early had been weakened by the 
loss of Anderson, was Sheridan's time to " go in," as Grant 
tersely formulated his orders. 

Early's position along the Opequon protects Winchester 
and at the same time threatens an incursion into Mary- 
land ; while Sheridan lies in such a position 

Mid-September, 
back of the stream as to threaten Early's 

communications if he should move in the latter direction. 

Early's first manoeuvre is to operate by his left towards 

Martinsburg. Nothing loth, Sheridan crosses the Opequon 

and advances straight on Winchester, to 

September 19. 
strike Early's right while his left is at a 

distance. But delays often incident to the movement of 
troops in battle enable Early to recall his left and save him- 
self from a crushing blow. Sheridan has twice Early's 
force. It is noon before he is ready to attack. When his 
lines advance they meet with a warm reception. But 
numbers tell. Except for a temporary check on the left, 
due to the impetuosity of Early's attack, the Army of the 
Shenandoah carries everything before it. Sheridan throws 
his cavalry upon Early's flanks. By nightfall, despite the 
utmost gallantry. Early is driven from the field, in broken 



272 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1864. 



ranks, with a loss of thirty-six hundred men, half of which 
are in prisoners. Our own loss is five thousand. 

This battle of the Opequon, or "Winchester," saved 
Maryland and Pennsylvania from future invasion. 

Early retired to Strasburg, where he could rest his flanks 
on the heights and the north fork of the Shenandoah. His 




Opequon, op Winehestep, Va. Septembep 19, 1864. 



position at Fisher's Hill appeared stronger than it actually 
was, for these obstacles could be turned by a superior force. 
Sheridan soon put in an appearance and de- 
spatched Torbert's cavalry by Luray to 
Newmarket to seize the upper end of the Valley in 
Early's rear. But before awaiting results he attacked the 



September 22. 



1864.] 



SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 



273 



enemy in his chosen position, throwing Crook in force 
around his left. 

By evening 
Crook got into 
place and moved 
in upon Early's 
flank and rear, 
while the Sixth 
and Nineteenth 
corps assaulted 
in front. Stout 
resistance availed 
Early naught. 
He was broken, 
and retreated in 
five hundred men 




Fisher's Hill. September 22, 1864. 



much disorder. Our loss was only 
Early's one thousand two hundred. 
Torbert did not get in Early's rear, being held at Milford 
by an insignificant cavalry force of the enemy. 

Sheridan pursued Early up the Yalley. The latter made 
a stand atMt. Jackson, but was driven from 
the place and retired through Newmarket. 

Lee had ordered Kershaw back to Early, on hearino- of 
the disaster at the Opequon, and Early moved towards Port 
Republic to join force with him. Sheridan marched to Har- 
risonburg. Torbert made for Staunton, where he began to 
tear up the railroad, but was interrupted with 
work half done by Early. 

Grant believed that Sheridan should now advance toward 
Lynchburg and destroy the railroads and the James River 
canal. Sheridan objected that his line of operations would 



September 28. 



274 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

be too long, and would take a Ml corps to protect, and sug- 
gested, in lieu of Grant's plan, the devastation of the Valley 
so as to render it useless to the enemy as a campaigning 
ground ; after doing which he could rejoin the Army of the 
Potomac with the bulk of his force. 

To this suggestion Grant acceded. Sheri- 
dan commenced his return march, and while 
retracing his steps he utterly destroyed grain, forage, barns, 
agricultural tools and material of all kinds over the entire 
breadth of the Valley, collected and drove oiF the stock, 
and left that section a desolate waste. Some two thousand 
barns and seventy mills filled with grain were thus destroyed, 
He then fell back and took up position along Cedar Creek. 

The destruction of provisions, forage, or any supplies 
which could enable the enemy to protract the struggle was 
no doubt justifiable. It is very questionable, however, 
whether the burning of barns, agricultural implements, and 
means of future thrift not applicable to the conduct of an 
immediate campaign comes under the same head. Such 
destruction is not considered defensible by the best author- 
ities. Nor does it appear to have been essential, for a new 
crop could not have been raised for many months. 

Sheridan did not expect to be followed up by Early ; but 
the latter again put his divisions afoot towards the old 
ground as soon as the Army of the Shenandoah retired. 

On the home march, Torbert, with Merritt and Custer, 
crossed swords with the enemy at Tom's 

Octobers. -r. , . , 

Brook, capturmg eleven guns. - 

Early reached Strasburg, and again reestablished him- | 
self at Fisher's Hill. From here he pushed out a sharp 



1864.] SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 275 

reconuoissance of our position, at a loss of 

,1 111 October 13. 

tm*ee hunarea men. 

The Sixth corps had been recalled, and was actually on 
its way out of the Valley. Upon the return of Early it 
was again brought back. Sheridan started for Washing- 
ton to consult with the authorities as to the best course to 
pursue, leaving Wright in command. 

Early was soon out of supplies. The Valley was no 
longer a granary for the Confederates. He must fight for 
his rations or fall back. He planned a surprise of the 
Union Army at Cedar Creek. Crook, with the Eighth 
corps, lay on the left ; Emory's Nineteenth corps held 
the centre ; the Sixth corps under Ricketts, with the cav- 
alry of Custer and Merritt, formed the right. Crook was 
covered by Averell's horse, but insufficiently. 

Gordon cautiously moves about the Union left, under 
cover of the night and foggy dawn. Kershaw is to make 
a heavy demonstration on the Union centre along and south 
of the turnpike as a feint to cover Gordon's march. 

Advancino^ with the utmost silence, even 

° _ October 19. 

leaving canteens behind, lest their clatter 
should disturb the Federal camps, Gordon passes Cedar 
Creek, moves well around Crook's flank, and falls with 
Southern vehemence upon his left and rear. The onset 
is entirely unexpected. Crook's corps is at once demoral- 
ized and soon utterly broken up in confused retreat. Gor- 
don cheerily follows up his gain and soon draws into the 
vortex of defeat the centre under Emory. The only 
sound member of the Union Army is the Sixth corps. 
Ricketts succeeds in making a rapid change of front and 



276 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1864. 



falls upon Early, checking his onset till the Eighth and 
Nineteenth corps can reach some place to rally. 

An attempt to re-form is made at Middletown, but it is 
futile. A second stand, a mile and a half farther back, is 

more successful. 
Wright patches 
up the line upon 
a nucleus of 
Getty's division, 
which this gal- 
lant officer has 
rallied on the 
pike. The troops 
have recovered 
their bearings. 
The stampede 
has not quite de- 
moralized them. 
Early makes no 
impression by 
a smart attack. 

Sheridan op- 
portunely arrives 
upon the field. His magnetic presence caps the structure 
already built. Wright is placed on the left ; Emory on the 
right ; Crook in reserve. Merritt and Custer with their 
horse fall in upon the right and left flanks. It is 4 P.M. 

A general advance is ordered upon the Confederates, 
who now approach flushed with victory, but disorgan- 
ized withal. The first onset bears Early back. He has 




thrce. top mt 



Cedap Creek. October 19, 1864. 



iSTovember 13. 



1864.] SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 277 

nothing to oppose to the heavy numbers of the Federals. 
Sheridan sweeps the field. The enemy is broken, routed, 
driven in as wild confusion up the Valley as we had just 
fled down. 

Early's loss was twenty-nine hundred ; ours fifty-six hun- 
dred, including seventeen hundred prisoners, which the Con- 
federates got quickly to the rear after the morning's surprise. 

Early next turned up at Newmarket, 

. , . -, 1 1 October 20. 

where he remamed three weeks. 

Sheridan withdrew for readier supplies to Kernstown. 
Early again followed, loth to acknowledge 
his defeat, and indulged in a needless com- 
bat with our outposts. This was the end of the drama. 
The bulk of both the Confederate and Union forces was 
ordered to Petersburg. 

The Battle of Cedar Creek finished forever the Valley 
campaigns. Sheridan had forces vastly outnumbering his 
opponent. But his handling of his troops, especially the 
cavalry, was handsome, and the w^ork done was crisp and 
clean. TK^ forces on either side were nearly forty thou- 
sand m«n ijhder Sheridan to less than half the number 
under Early. 

The Confederate general never recovered the prestige lost 
in this Valley campaign. And yet he had fought bravely, 
skilfully. But he was overmatched in numbers and found 
himself opposed by equal skill. Success could not well be 
expected. 

Except some operations in Loudon County against the 
guerilla Mosby, no further hostilities were attempted in 
Northern Virginia. 



278 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

Sheridan was a typical soldier. Men who love fighting 
are rarely the best generals. A distinguished example 
of this was Charles XII. The keen enjoyment of the 
fray does not often coexist with the power of cool calcula- 
tion and of intense mental effort essential to the commander 
of an army. But it did in Sheridan. It is hard to say 
whether he was best fitted to command a cavalry corps or 
an army. In either capacity he excelled. Wherever 
Sheridan appears in the annals of the war it is in stemming 
an adverse tide with a vigor almost unequalled, or in 
leading victorious troops to certain triumph. 

We cannot try him in the same balance as we try 
Stonewall Jackson, though he has some of the latter's 
traits ; for Jackson won his important successes with scant 
material, and almost invariably against odds, while Sheri- 
dan's means were always ample. But his methods were 
sharp, clear, exact; and his power over men equalled hia 
capacity as a soldier. His is a case of nascitur, non jit. 



LHI. 

# HOOD TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. 

LITTLE rest was to be allowed to Sherman after liis 
arduous labors in the capture of Atlanta. His line 
of operations was now one hundred and forty miles longer 
than it was at Chattanooga, and liable to interruption at 
any moment. Cooperation by Canby from Mobile had 
been part of the summer's programme. But Canby 's 
forces had been depleted by details, and he had not yet 
been able to capture Mobile. 

Sherman made his dispositions to remain in Atlanta. 
He contracted his lines for easier defense, and deemed it 
essential to remove the non-military residents. This 
course gave rise to a terrible outcry at the South, and 
some adverse criticism at the North. But the act was 
entirely justifiable as a military measure ; and the necessity 
for the removal must be held to have depended upon his 
own sole discretion. Sherman extended all possible help 
to the departing inhabitants in the matter of rations and 
transportation. 

After consultation with President Davis, Hood now 
planned to operate seriously against Sherman's communi- 
cations. Our army had largely lost in numbers by fur- 



280 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

# 

loughs, sick and wounded, and the time was opportune. 

Wheeler and Forrest were sent out to open the affair by a 

raid upon the railroad in Sherman's rear. 

Aug. -Sept. 

But their efforts had no serious results. 
Sherman cannot mistake Hood's purpose. But he does 
not propose to be ousted from Atlanta. Thomas is sent 
back to Nashville, and about the same time Hood 
moves northward. Sherman is not to be called off his 
quarry by any ordinary threat. He cautions Thomas to 
keep a keen lookout for any attempt to cross the Tennessee, 
and leaves Slocum to hold Atlanta. Howard still com- 
mands the Army of the Tennessee, and Cox, during the 
absence on political affau^s of Logan, commands the Army 
of the Ohio. 

Hood marches on Marietta. He has no doubt that he 
will draw Sherman away from Atlanta and transfer the 
seat of war to the Valley of the Tennessee. 

The Army of the Cumberland repasses 

the Chattahoochee and reaches Smyrna. It 
is difficult for Sherman to divine Hood's immediate pur- 
pose, but he has no idea of letting go what has cost so 
much. 

A detachment of Hood's army attacks 

Allatoona, but is repulsed with heavy loss. 

Sherman's forces are concentrated about 

October 12. _^ i i i 

Kome. Hood pauses at Kesaca, but shortly 
moves to Dalton. But for the continued possession of 
Atlanta it would almost seem that nothing had been gained 
by the galling summer's work. 

Hood's campaign does not, however, promise immediate 



1864.] HOOD TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. 281 

great results. Sherman proposes to keep all he has won, 
and no serious break has as yet been made in his commu- 
nications. He has absolute confidence in the solidity of 
his position. He asserted later that, if Hood had entered 
Tennessee, he could have surrounded him and compelled 
the surrender of his entire force. 

The bulk of the Union army in pursuit 

■^ ^ October 19. 

of Hood reaches Gaylesville, Ala. There 

are absent only the Atlanta and other garrisons along the 

line of the railroad. 



LIV. 

HOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE 

FOR. some months Sherman had contemplated and had 
been urging upon Grant a march from Atlanta to the 
seaboard, during which he should destroy all munitions of 
war, cotton, crops, factories and machine-shops, tear up 
railroads, and render the country useless to the Confederacy 
as a means of continuing the struggle. It seems to be well 
settled that the plan was of his own conception. And he 
urged it many months before it secured a willing ear. 

His objective would be Columbia, S.C., at which point 
he would be in rear of Lee at Richmond, and could throw 
his forces into cooperation with Grant's. But before he 
could march on Columbia, he must establish a new base 
upon the seaboard. If his manoeuvre should prove suc- 
cessful he would, by isolating Virginia from all the 
Southern States except North Carolina, deal the virtual 
death-blow to the Confederacy. 

Two general postulates only were a part of the problem. 
If Lee should turn upon Sherman, Grant must so follow 
him up as that between them they could destroy him. And 
Thomas on his part must use up or neutralize Hood. 

It was a bold game, this marching away from Hood 
282 



1864.] HOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE. 283 

while the latter was trying to lure Sherman back to the 
line of the Tenn^see by threatening his communications. 
If Hood had crossed the river near Sherman's army, the 
latter might have been seriously compromised by failing 
immediately to follow him, for he was not yet ready to cut 
loose from his base. But when he saw that Hood kept 
south of the Tennessee until he reached Decatur, Sherman's 
mind was made up. 

Schofield, Stanley, and half the horse were sent back to 
Thomas, and A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, was ordered 
to Nashville as a further reinforcement. These, with some 
recruits, swelled Thomas' ranks to a point enabling him 
successfully to cope with Hood. And Thomas w^as the 
man for the task. Somewhat too deliberate, almost indeed 
lacking the power of assuming the initiative, when he did 
move, it was with the stride of a giant ; when he struck, it 
was the blow of a battering ram. And on the defense he 
had never yet met his equal. 

After the capture of Atlanta, Governor Brown had fur- 
loughed the Georgia militia, which had been called out to 
make temporary headway against the ruthless invader. He 
had alleged, as a reason for thus disbanding them, the pre- 
eminent necessity of gathering the crops. There had been 
much friction between Hood and Hardee and the latter had 
been ordered to the coast. There was no force to oppose 
Sherman's march to the eastward. 

Beauregard had been placed in command of the entire 
military division, including Hood's territory, but with a 
caution not to interfere with the latter's field operations. 
Wheeler's cavalry alone was to stay behind to watch 



284 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

Sherman, while Hood retamed both Forrest and Jackson 
as a part of his column. 

Hood's effective was about fiftj-four thousand men. 
He expected, by crossing the river at Tuscumbia or 
Decatur, to draw Sherman back to ]N"ashville. His at- 
tempt to pass at Decatur was successfully resisted. He 
then moved on to Tuscumbia and effected a 

Oct. 29-Nov. 13. 

passage. But once on the north side he 
found himself compelled to sit down three weeks at 
Florence to accumulate the supplies of which he stood in 
urgent need. This delay, though doubtless essential, was 
fatal to Hood's success in this campaign. 

■ The Confederate armies, both in the East and West, 
were always ready to move with less transportation than 
our own, partly because they possessed less material and 
issued rations and equipage more irregularly to the men. 
Certain it is that the Southern soldier did his wonderfully 
efficient work on a basis of victuals, clothing, and ammu- 
nition which would generally have kept a Federal force in 
camp, as unfit to move. But even they had sometimes to 
delay their march for rations. 

Meanwhile Forrest raids on Jackson, Tenn., and 

on Fort Henry, hoping to draw Thomas 
Nov 10° away from Nashville. But in vain. And 

Hood is equally disappointed at not having 
decoyed Sherman from hard-won Atlanta. Beauregard 
spurs on Hood to a bold initiative. Hood surely needs no 
spur. 

November 4 Stanley's Fourth corps is concentrated at 

Pulaski. Schofield joins and assumes com- 



1864.] BOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE. 285 

mand at that place. His force consists of ^^^^^^^^„^_ 
the Fourth corps and Cox's division of the 
Twenty-third corps. Altogether Thomas numbers fifty- 
five to sixty thousand men, including Schofield's com- 
mand. 



I 



LY. 

SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD. 

N due time Sherman cut loose from his communica- 
tions. He destroyed the railroad in his rear, after 

first sending back such portions of his com- 
November 12. 

mand as would hamper in lieu of furthering 

his movements. None but the stoutest of heart and limb 

must follow him on the cominof march. 

He was now fairly launched on a great strategic ma- 
noeuvre. The hardihood of this undertaking has been often 
overrated ; its conception and its valuable results cannot 
be. Sherman himself " regarded the march as a shift of 
base, as the transfer of a strong army which had no oppo- 
nent and had finished its then work, from the interior to a 
point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other 
important results." He "considered this march as a means 
to an end, and not as an essential act of war." As com- 
pared with his progress through the Carolinas, Sherman 
gauges this march as of but slight importance. It was the 
result of the entire achievement which made it what it was. 
The boldness lay in conceiving its far-reaching advantages ; 
not in carrying through the mere details of the progress. 

Sherman was by no means certain what point on the 
286 



1864.] SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD. 287 

seaboard he should reach ; but he made his calculations to 
meet the Union fleet which was to be sent towards him, in 
the neighborhood of Ossabaw Sound. He had with him 
two corps of the Army of the Tennessee, under command 
of Howard, as his right wing, and two of the Army of the 
Cumberland, under Slocum, as the left. These troops 
numbered over sixty thousand rugged veterans, unham- 
pered by sick or off-duty men, with twenty days' rations, 
plenty of beef on the hoof, about one field-gun per thou- 
sand effective, and an excellent canvas pontoon train. 

Atlanta Sherman thoroughly destroyed, so far as future 
utility to the enemy for the creation of war material was 
concerned. In other respects it was left intact. 

His first objective was Milledgeville, threatening both 
Macon and Augusta on the way. His route lay between 
the Ocmulgee and Oconee, both of which rivers take 
their source not far from Atlanta, and flow south-eastwardly 
towards the coast, joining to form the Altamaha. 

Kilpatrick commanded Sherman's horse. His first dem- 
onstration was towards Macon, during which he encoun- 
tered some opposition from Wheeler's cavalry, which was 
constantly hovering on Sherman's right front. 

While Howard's column crossed the Oc- 

November 18-20. 

mulgee, Slocum, whose wing Sherman per- 
sonally accompanied, was engaged in destroying the rail- 
road from Atlanta to Augusta as far as the Oconee. 

Beaureofard did not lons^ remain silent. The ebullition 
of his zeal took the form of volleys of telegrams, promises, 
appeals, threats, addressed alternately to Sherman and to 
the entire population of Georgia. Anything to destroy 



288 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

or impede the invader. Sherman's sole response was an 
order that all law-abiding citizens should be protected, 
but that any person caught damaging roads or engaged in 
any overt act of war should have his houses burned and 
his property destroyed as a penalty. 

No eno:ao;ement of serious moment occurred. Walcutt's 

Brigade had a sharp skirmish with the enemy near Macon, 

sufFerincj the loss of about one hundred men, 

Nov. 22-28. • . 

and Kilpatrick defeated Wheeler in a smart 

combat at Waynesborough. But Kilpatrick's attempt to 

release our prisoners at Millen was foiled by their removal. 

Leaving^ Milledo^eville Sherman marched on Millen, and 

here broke up the railroad between Savannah 
December 3. 

and Augusta. His route now lay between 
the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, excepting the Fifteenth 
corps, which marched south of the former stream. Prog- 
ress was easy, and no further attack from the enemy was 
anticipated. 

As a permanent interruption of the railroads between 
Richmond and the Southern States was one of the great 
objects of Sherman's raid, the work of destruction was 
accomplished in such a manner as to make it difficult to 
repair the damage. The rails, after being taken up, were 
heated in the middle upon bonfires made of the ties, and 
then twisted around trees or posts in such a manner as 
to render them useless. And as all rolling-mills were 
wrecked, no means of re-rolling the rails was at hand. 
A corps, strung along the track, could in this way utterly 
ruin about fifteen miles a day. 

All supplies of food and forage, over a belt of country 



1864.] SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD. 289 

sixty miles wide, from Atlanta to Savannah, in like man- 
ner fell a prey to this march. Either the Confederates de- 
stroyed them to prevent their being of benefit to us, or else 
we in turn used or wasted them, leaving the people only 
the bare necessaries of life. Nothing remained wliich could 
subsist an army. 

The negroes who endeavored to follow " Massa Sherman " 
proved a great embarrassment. If allowed to join the col- 
umn they would have seriously jeopardized its safety. A 
few able-bodied men were carried along. Families and 
the extreme young and old could not be. 

Much criticism was passed upon this method in the 
North, by those who looked upon the war from a merely 
political stand-point, or indeed as a war waged against 
slavery, and who forgot that its conduct, to secure good 
political results, must strictly conform to military usage. 
As an instance, General Davis of the Fourteenth corps, from 
pure necessity, to carry out his order of march, withdrew his 
pontoon bridge at Ebenezer Creek before a horde of col- 
ored people could cross, who had been fully warned not to 
follow his command and yet persisted in their infatuation. 
Quite a number were drowned in frantic endeavors to swim 
the stream. A cry of horror arose at this " act of barba- 
rism " and Davis was held up to the bitterest censure, 
though absolutely in the right. He was a soldier under 
military orders ; not a humanitarian peacefully guiding the 
movements of an exodus. 

Probably no body of men ever so fully embodied the two- 
fold purpose of fighting and foraging as Sherman's " bum- 
mers." The work exactly suited the genius of the people 



290 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

composing the army, and the natural law-abiding quality 
of the American checked extravagance and cruelty. It 
would be absurd to deny that there was some looting, and 
an occasional but very rare act committed in hot blood. 
Mayhap Kilpatrick and his men earned a somewhat bad 
reputation on just grounds. But no army ever enjoyed 
such freedom and kept within such bounds. Indeed the 
Southern press complained at the time more bitterly of 
Wheeler's cavalry for their reckless vandalism than of our 
troops. And with rare exceptions the collection of sup- 
plies was systematically conducted, and the men who were 
detailed on this duty fought and foraged with equal 
alacrity, good-temper and even-handedness. 

It may be confidently asserted that no army ever moved 
through an enemy's territory with like purpose, which so 
scrupulously observed the humanities if not the amenities 
of life. The rare exceptions which occurred are quoted, 
multiplied ; the thousand instances of moderation are for- 
gotten. And war is not a gentle art. Its methods 
necessarily partake of the horrible. But during our Civil 
Conflict we may truthfully claim that its terrors were almost 
uniformly confined to the actual field of battle. 

The weather was bright, and everything tended to give 
the whole affair the aspect of a frolic. Certainly it was 
the one thoroughly enjoyable operation of the war. 
Without the stern duties of the field, all the pleasures of 
the soldier's free and hardy life were ever present ; and the 
men and animals reached their goal in far finer condition 
than that in which they started. 



LVI. 

SHERIMAN'S GOAL. 

THE city of Savannah had strong defences on both 
its sea and land fronts. Under Hardee's command 
were some eighteen thousand men. He prepared to hold 

the place, trustinof to keep open his commu- 

. . 1 ^ ' \ Xi 1 December 10, 1864. 

mcations on the north with Charleston. 

Arrived before the city, Sherman stretched out his 
left in the endeavor to cut Hardee oiF from tliis source 
of supply and means of retreat, but to no purpose. Gen- 
eral Foster, from his foothold on the coast at Port Royal, 
sent Hatch's division to cut the Charleston Railroad, but 
for once Governor Brown's militia proved to be of use, 
and Hatch's attack was repulsed with a loss of seven 
hundred men. 

Sherman closed in on Savannah and com- 

. Ill December 12. 

pleted the mvestment, save only the above 

outlet. 

To open communication with Dahlgren's fleet in the 

offing it became necessary to capture Fort McAllister on 

the south side of the town. The detail for the assault fell 

to Hazen's division and the work was sturdily _ , ,„ 

•^ Decemiber 13. 

done. The fort was taken at the fii'st rush. 

291 



292 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

Hardee continued to operate the Charleston Eailroad to 
Hardeeville, not far from Savannah, Foster's renewed 
efforts to cut it having proved unsuccessful. Sherman 
was forced to prepare for regular siege operations against 
Savannah. He drained the rice-fields surrounding the 
city and began to mount some heavy guns. The men's 
rations at this time consisted largely of rice, and the 
animals were fed almost exclusively on rice straw. 

During these preparations Sherman received Grant's 
orders to send the bulk of his forces to Virginia by water. 
For the army in front of Petersburg had been greatly de- 
pleted by the summer's campaign. While preparing to com- 
ply, though strongly urging the advantages of his own plan 
for a march overland, he partly lost his grip on Hardee. 

The latter, smelling disaster afar off, 
Deoember20. ^ , . . ^ ^ i n 

deemed it wise to evacuate the place beiore 
his sole outlet was cut. Although he lost the chance of 
capturing Hardee's forces, Sherman was thus enabled to 
make the President a Christmas present of the city of 
Savannah. 



Lvn. 

HOOD SEEKS TO CRUSH SCHOFIELD. —FRANKLIN. 

WHEN Sherman unexpectedly eluded Hood, this 
general became doubly anxious to get at Thomas, 
and retrieve the standing of the Confederacy by some 
brilliant feat of arms. But the November storms inter- 
fered so materially with his movements, that it was not 
until late in the month that he pushed from 

November 21. 

Florence on towards Duck River. This 

stream was the first serious natural obstacle in his path, 

and here also lay Schofield. 

Thomas occupied Nashville, shaping the somewhat dis- 
cordant elements now under his command into an army 
which he could handle with confidence against an active 
enemy. This was a task of no small magnitude. His 
force embraced the Fourth corps under Wood, the Twenty- 
third under Schofield, three divisions of the Army of the 
Tennessee under A. J. Smith, and Wilson's cavalry, 
beside a motley collection of clerks, recruits, and quarter- 
master's employes, of questionable utility in a fight. 
Hood's command consisted of Lee's, Stewart's, and Cheat- 
ham's army corps, and he was ably supported by Forrest's 
horsemen. 



294 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

Schofield's orders were to retreat when he must from 
before Hood, but to hold him as long as possible so that 
Thomas might finish his preparations. Schofield was anx- 
ious to Iveep south of the line of Duck Eiver and to pre- 
serve the important bridge at Columbia. But Hood flanked 
him by crossing the river above, and he was obliged to 
retire to the north side. Wilson, though 
weaker numerically than Forrest, began 
to show himself amply able to cope with this clever 
trooper, and protected Schofield's movements against his 
sudden dashes. 

Hood's next move was to despatch Forrest around Scho- 
field's left to his rear at Spring Hill, whither he himself 
soon followed, obliging Schofield to let go his hold on 
Columbia and retire by his left so as readily to form line 
to the east. 

A slight interchange of hostilities took place at Spring 
Hill, but Hood seemed here to lack his usual strong initia- 
tive, and the advantage of his manoeuvre was lost by failure 
to push the fighting while Schofield was on the retreat. 

Schofield wisely retired to Franklin, intending to put the 
Harpeth river between himself and the enemy. Lack of 
pontoons, however, prevented his crossing at once, and he 
was obliged to form line south of the town, and to intrench 
in the usual manner. He at once set to 
work, however, to improve the fords, and 
reestablish the bridges, by which means he managed to 
get his artillery across and out of danger, while it could 
still be used to advantage from the north side. He planted 
the guns on some high ground, and in a fort formerly con- 



1864.] 



HOOD SEEKS TO CRUSH SCHOFIELD. 



295 



structed on that spot. AYith considerable exertion he also 
placed his trains beyond danger. 

Hood had rather unnecessarily complained of his subordi- 
nates for what he termed their lack of enterprise at Spring 
Hill, and all were in high tension at the approaching 
opportunity to prove his strictures false. And Hood felt 
justly confident that he could crush Schofield, separated as 
he was from the main Federal army. 

Schofield had ordered the troops to begin the crossing of 
the Harpeth River, unless attacked, at 6 P.M. Himself 
was on the north of the river, where he could best watch 
operations on the other side, as well as pay heed to Wilson, 
w^ho was holding head against Forrest on our left. 

Wagner's two brigades formed the Union rear-guard, 
with clear instructions to retire, slowly and without 
bringing on a serious combat, within the main line. 
This was protected by excellent parapets, and able to 
give a good account of itself. The ground was 
open. The advance of the Confederates could be plainly 
watched. 

Our main line 
was bracing itself 
for the approaching 
conflict, expecting 
Wagner's men to 
retire in good order 
from their front, so 
as to afford a clear 
sweep for their fire. 
But, to every one's Franklin. November 30, 1864. 




296 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

surprise, Wagner opened upon the approaching Confed- 
erates, and ahnost instantly provoked a desperate charge 
upon his isolated brigades. 

With a yell, Wagner was brushed away, his men rush- 
ing frantically through our lines, followed by the victorious 
enemy, who, absolutely on the heels of Wagner's broken 
regiments, overran our parapets in the centre, and drove 
our troops back in much confusion. A countercharge by 
the reserves managed to recapture a portion of the breast- 
works, while the enemy was not to be driven from the rest. 
But our troops established a new line of intrenchments 
within tvfenty-five yards of the one they had just lost. 

This preliminary attack was made about 5 P.M., and 
heavy figliting ensued all along the lines until nearly four 
hours after dark. The combats were isolated, but desper- 
ate and sanguinary, without advantage to either party. 

Tactically Franklin was a drawn battle, but as his posi- 
tion could be easily turned, Schofield, at 11 P.M., ordered 
a withdrawal to the north side of the river. This was 
accomplished without loss. 

Nothing better proves the enemy's determined purpose 
to crush Schofield's forces in this battle, than their heavy 
loss, especially in officers. Hood confesses to six thousand 
three hundred men. Our own was twenty-three hundred. 
This disproportion savors of inaccuracy. The forces on 
the field were twenty-seven thousand Federals to a slightly 
less number of Confederates. 

Thomas now ordered Schofield to retire on Nashville. 



LYIII. 

HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. — NASHVILLE. 

ACCOEDING to his wont, Thomas took such time as 
he deemed essential to complete his preparations, de- 
spite constant, almost angry, demands for an advance from 
the War Office, the President and General Grant. With 
all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North in- 
sisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas 
either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the 
command to Schofield. 

Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the 
latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood until he was 
satisfied that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable 
weather and to increase his force of mounted men. 

But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of 
Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their 
ranks ; and every one was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's 
march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to 
Nashville to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach 
the ground, Thomas had struck his blow. 

His preparations had been two weeks before substantially 

completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesborough, 

Chattanooga, and along the railroad. Tliis latter had 

297 



298 



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 



[1864. 



been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. 
A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country 
ahnost impassable and would render the operations of the 
attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind 
to wait for clearing weather. Finally came 

December 15. _ . ^-r^ ? 

sunshine, and with it Thomas' advance. 
Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in 

the centre and 
Cheatham on the 
right, while a 
portion of For- 
rest's cavalry 
was operating 
out upon his 
right. He had 
some forty-four 
thousand men, 
but his check 
and heavy losses 
at Franklin had 
seriously impair- 
ed the morale 
of his army as 
well as thinned 
his ranks. Hood 
could, however, 
not retreat. He 
was committed 
to a death- 
struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier. 




Nashville. December 15-16, 1864. 



1864.] HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. 299 

Thomas had placed A. J. Smith on his right, Woods 
in the centre, and Schofield and Steedman on the 
left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily vs^ith his 
right, while sharply demonstrating with his left. The 
position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J. 
Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an 
advantage not to be neglected. Smith pushed in, later 
supported by Schotield, and successively capturing the 
fieldworks erected by the enemy's main line and reserves, 
disastrously crushed and turned Hood's left flank. 

Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway 
against Hood's centre, and the first day closed with remark- 
able success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this 
was not victory. The morrow might bring reverse. 
Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth. 

Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached 
on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks 
were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over 
from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the 
weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay 
intrenched upon the hills back of his former 
line, with either flank somewhat refused. 

Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way 
unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back. 

At 3 P.M. a general assault was made all along the line. 
Upon our left, Wood and Steedman met with no success. 
On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated 
at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough 
to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply follow- 
ing up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the 



300 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864. 

exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming 
all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the 
field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon 
the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck ten- 
fold. Reaching Granny White Pike, they cut the enemy 
from this outlet. Wood and Steedman charged again, 
broke through, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the 
enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization 
was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country tow- 
ards Franklin. 

Pursuit was j^romptly undertaken, but though seriously 

harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Ten- 
December 27. , , 

nessee River with the remnants of his army. 

Thomas' losses were three thousand men. Hood's were 
never ofiicially given, but our trophies included forty-five 
hundred prisoners and fifty-three guns. 

Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slow- 
ness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he 
wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army 
was so completely overthrown during our war. Nothing 
succeeds like success, and we may be content, perhaps, to 
leave the grand old soldier his full triumph. Criticism 
may be well laid aside. 

But as a pure matter of curious study, it might with some 
justice be claimed that Thomas was at any time strong- 
enough to meet Hood on the line of Duck* River ; and that 
with Schofield's force, reinforced by what he himself had, 
he mio'ht then and there have overwhelmed him as he did 
later before Nashville. 

Thomas was a Virginian. In 1861 he had been seek- 



1864.] HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. 301 

ing a college position in his native State, and some un- 
necessarily feared his loyalty. Man was never born more 
true. He vras essentially cast in a large mould, in mind 
and body; so modest that he shrank from command, to 
v^^hich he w^as peculiarly fitted ; with courage of the stamp 
that ignores self; possessing steadfastness in greater 
measure than audacity, he yet lacked none of that ability 
which can deal heavy blows ; while no antagonist was ever 
able to shake his foothold. Honesty in thought, word, 
and deed was constitutional with him. A thorough mili- 
tary training, added to a passionate love of his profession, 
and great natural powers, made him peer of any soldier. 
Sedate in mind, and physically slow in movement, he yet 
aroused great enthusiasm among his men, as well as earned 
their warm affection. Uniformly successful in all he un- 
dertook, from Mill Springs to Nashville, he has left a 
memorable name and an untarnished reputation. He per- 
haps falls as little short of the model soldier as any man 
produced by this country. 



LIX. 

SHERMAN MOVES THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 

/^ RANT'S general plan for a final campaign had in- 
\U~ eluded a march by Thomas, after he should have 
used up Hood, on a similar scale to Sherman's, to a new 
base which Canby at Mobile should open for him, destroy- 
ing in his path all the munitions of war, factories and mills. 
But Thomas considered it unsafe to leave Tennessee, and 
preferred to operate only with his cavalry. A. J. Smith 
was consequently sent to Canby, while Schofield was 
ordered to the Atlantic seaboard. 

Schofield moved by way of the Ohio and Washington, 
with the Twenty-third corps under Cox, to join forces with 
the Tenth corps under Terry, then on the coast of North 
Carolina. Here he would be ready to cooperate with Sher- 
man as the latter moved northward. 

Fort Fisher protected the harbor of Wilmington, N.C.. 
the last of the ports open to blockade runners, Savannah, 
Charleston, and Mobile having been closed by our naval and 
land forces. It was of importance to neutralize this asylum 
also. Admiral Porter had prepared a fleet of seventy 
vessels for the expedition, and Grant had selected Weitzel 
302 



1864-5.J THROUGH TEE CAROLINAS. 303 

as the officer to accompany him, with some sixty- five 
hundred men. 

As ill luck would have it, Butler had become greatly 
exercised over a scheme for blowing up the magazine of 
Fort Fisher by exploding a powder-boat near by, and not 
only did he accompany the expedition, but he undertook, 
without orders, claiming this right as senior officer present, 
to control its operations. 

On arrival of the forces three thousand men were landed, 
the c^uns of the fort havino: been silenced 

1 , , 1 Pin rT.1 Dec. 24-25, -64. 

by a bombardment of the fleet. The ex- 
plosion of the powder-boat was a complete ^asco, exciting 
only curiosity among the enemy at the moment, and 
laughter afterwards. The land forces advanced, and 
might well have captured the place, but Butler saw fit to 
recall them, alleging that Fort Fisher was so strong that 
it could not be taken, and that he was unwilling to sacri- 
fice the lives of the men. 

The folly of this course was shown within a month. 
Terry joined Porter in Butler's stead, and 
with about the same force, after a gallant as- 
sault, captured the fort at a loss of seven hundi'cd men. 
The navy lost some three hundred more. 

The Twenty-third corps having reached Fort Fisher, 
Schofield assumed command of the joint 

/•IP 1 TTTM . Februai7 22. 

lorces and soon alter captured Wilmmgton. 
From here Cox was ordered to New Berne to make a 
new base for future movements and later 
the bulk of Schofield's forces entered Golds- 
borough. 



January 15, '65. 

^jllant nfi- 

o 



304 BIRD'S-ETE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

No sooner fairly in Savannah than Sherman, glad 
enough to leave political and commercial questions to be 

settled by the civil authorities, put his army 

January, '65. 

afoot for Columbia, v^^hich had been his ulti- 
mate objective when he left Atlanta. He purposed to feint 
on Charleston and Augusta, and to march through 
Columbia to Goldsborough, while Grant, by extending his 
left west of Petersburg, would prevent Lee from turning 
against him. The projected route followed the water-shed 
between the Combahee and the Savannah rivers, as it was 
necessary to cross the intervening streams near their 
sources, where they were not wide. At this time of year, 
even small rivers in this section become swollen and im- 
passable. 

Charleston, dear to the Confederate heart, was held too 
long — Sherman's advance from Savannah not being ex- 
pected in the month of January — to enable the enemy to 
concentrate in Sherman's front. Beauregard and Hardee 
had calculated to oppose the further advance of the Federal 
Army in February with some thirty-three thousand men, 
but Sherman was well ahead of them before they awoke 
to the reality. 

The rains had been persistent and heavy. There was 
greater difficulty than usual in bridging streams. The soil 
was so treacherous that in order to pull through the artillery 
and trains, nearly the entire distance marched had to be 
corduroyed. It required exceptional energy and vast labor 
to push an army through such a country. Joe Johnston 
has complimented Sherman's veterans as being the toughest 
and most ready men since Julius Caesar commanded his 



1865.] THROUGH THE CAROL INAS. 305 

Gallic legions. And indeed, as Romans in courage and 
endurance, and as Yankees in inventiveness and adaptability, 
Csesar's legionaries were a fair prototype of Sherman's bum- 
mers. 

Tlie army reached Columbia after an 

February 17 

arduous march. Before entering the town 
Sherman ordered all public property and factories capable 
of making munitions of war to be destroyed; all private 
and educational property to be left unmolested. Not the 
slightest desire to injure the town was manifest, for no such 
intention existed. But a fire was accidentally started, and 
before it could be got under control had made such head- 
way that the greater part of the city was consumed. 

The crimination and recrimination which has been in- 
dulged in about the burning of Columbia probably resolves 
itself into the simple fact that a fire of cotton bales, 
started by the retiring Confederates, extended beyond con- 
trol. There is abundant proof that everything possible was 
done to extinguish the flames, but to no avail. And after 
the calamity Sherman did all that man could do to help the 
citizens to food and shelter. There may have been some 
drunkenness and rioting among the men. Under such 
circumstances, when are they absent? But the testimony 
before and the decision of the Mixed Commission on Amer- 
ican and British Claims, in the matter of cotton then de- 
stroyed, settles the responsibility beyond further argument. 
That body, as able as disinterested, attached no blame to 
the Federal army. 

Sherman almost immediately continued his march. 
Skirmishing was now incessant with the enemy in his front, 



306 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR, [1865. 

but the loss of life was small. Hardee, finding Charleston 
of no further strategic value and hoping still to effect some- 
thing against Sherman in the field, evacuated the city, upon 
which Dahlgren and Foster occupied it. 

The Confederates concentrated at Cheraw 

March 2. i i i i • p 

to oppose our advance, but by pusmng tor- 
ward Slocum's left wing, they were manoeuvred out of their 
position. Hampton's cavalry was very active in Sher- 
man's front. On one occasion he surprised Kilpatrick, 
who had become somewhat careless about his outpost ser- 
vice, and came near to putting a term to the latter's useful- 
ness ; but this slight success eventuated in no gain to the 
Confederates. 

When Lee found that Hardee was making no headway 

against Sherman's progress, he assumed the 

prerogative of commander-in-chief, and 
assigned Joe Johnston to command the forces, some 
twenty-six thousand men, in front of his late antagonist. 

Johnston at once took the reins in hand, 

March 16. ^ ^ i oi , t 

and bcffan to harass bhermans van. In 



the smaU affair at Averasborough, Sherman gained an 
unimportant success, but at Bentonville came near a 
grievous check. 

The army, partly owing to the bad roads and partly 
to the necessity of foraging on the country, has got 
much strung out. Johnston, well aware of this, and 
hid behind a curtain of Hampton's cavalry, concen- 
trates at Bentonville, hoping to strike a heavy l)low 
at Sherman before he can effect a junction with 
Schofield. 



1865.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 307 

Sherman himself is with the right wing, so as all the 
sooner to open communication with his lieutenant. Davis' 
division, leading the left wing, stumbles upon Hampton in 
a manner indicating the proximity of other troops. Sher- 
man is duly notified, but makes up his 

•^ ' ^ March 19-20. 

mind — rather hastily it appears — that it 
is only a cavalry force, little suspecting that Johnston, 
with twenty-two thousand men, lies massed behind it, 
ready to fall upon Slocum, whose entire force within a 
day's march is dangerously small. 

The blow falls. At first it staggers Davis, whose men 
fall back in confusion, but without panic rally and reform. 
Slocum speeds back messengers to bring up Williams' 
army corps, next in rear. Morgan and Carlin handle 
their divisions to great advantage, and yield no ground to 
the attacks of double their number of the enemy. Sher- 
man's bummers are unfamiliar with defeat. In this pict- 
uresque combat, which wavers fiercely to and fro from 
morn till dark, our troops are called on several times to 
fight on opposite sides of the same breastworks, so com- 
pletely are they surrounded by the Confederates. But 
they hold their ground without loss of courage. 

During the night, reinforcements arrive from the right 
wing, and the rear of the left wing comes up. Johnston 
retires foiled. But he has been nearer success than he has 
guessed. His loss somewhat exceeded two thousand three 
hundred men ; ours was over sixteen hundred. This 
was his last chance in the Carolinas. And he had 
lost it. 

Stoneman, accompanied by the Fourth Corps, had been 



308 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

ordered into the Valley from Nashville to 
March and April, ^^g^^^^^j^^ raOroad from Virginia to Ten- 
nessee. This was designed to cut off from Lee this 
means of retreat from Virginia, and source of supply from 
such part of Tennessee as was still in the enemy's hands. 
The raid was successfully accomplished and had no small 
effect upon the morale of the Virginia forces. Stoneman 
made his way as far as Salisbury, N.C., where he de- 
stroyed a vast depot of reserve stores. 

Wilson led a cavalry expedition into Alabama. His 
progress was opposed by Forrest. Wilson drove this 
noted partisan into Selma, stormed and carried the town. 

Forrest escaped, but only to fall somewhat 
April 2. ^ 

later into the hands of a detachment of our 

horsemen. Wilson won great credit by thus ending the 

career of this doughty champion of the Confederacy. 

Sherman was duly joined at Goldsborough by Schofield 
and Terry. This ran his force up to ninety thousand men. 
He occupied Haleigh without opposition. The end of the 
Confederacy had come within sight. 

Sherman's active field-work ends here. What has been 
said about his Atlanta campaign sufficiently stamps the 
man and the soldier. No praise can add to, no blame de- 
tract from, Sherman's splendid reputation and services. 
He, if any one, showed during our Civil War the divine 
military spark. 

In his 1864 campaign he was pitted against the strongest 
of the Confederates, always excepting Lee ; and he wrote 
his own strength upon every page of its history. It would 
have furnished an interesting study to have seen him at the 



309 



1865.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 

head of the splendid force which started from the Rappa- 
hannock when he himself started from Chattanooga. For 
Sherman's work never taxed him beyond his powers. It 
is difficult to say what he still held in reserve. 



LX. 



THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 

THE marvellous gallantry of the South had availed it 
nothing. The toils of its stronger opponent were 
drawing closer and tighter. Never had nation fought 
more nobly for what it believed to be right. No race can 
harbor a more just pride in its achievements than the 
American Anglo-Saxon may do in the splendid resistance 
of the South. Happy our Northern homes that we were 
not called on to endure to such a bitter end ! 

Sherman, in his march through the Carolinas, has drawn 
a line of steel from the Appalachians to the Atlantic. Grant 
holds Lee fast in his stronghold. The end must speedily 
come. 

Sheridan's Valley command has been broken up, and the 
Sixth and Nineteenth corps have returned to the army 
before Petersburg. 

Sheridan himself, with ten thousand sabres, is ordered to 
operate against Lee's communications at Danville. This 
is the plan Grant has been urging on him for six months. 
He moves to Staunton and from there to Charlottesville, 
crossing swords with the enemy at Waynes- 
boro. But he is unable to cross the James 
310 



1865.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 311 

on account of high water. Foregoing his purpose of de- 
stroying the Danville Kailroad he breaks up the James Kivei' 
Canal and the Lynchburg Railroad and strikes 

March 19 

across country for White House on the York 

river, from which place he joins the Army of the Potomac. 

Lee could not expect further reinforcements. There 
were still men to be had ; but the population of the 
South was growing tired of the manner in which the 
politicians were conducting the war. And there was not 
a house in which there was not one dead. The people 
saw the end if the politicians would not. The starv- 
ing wife and children called from his duty under the 
colors many a brave man who had for four years risked his 
life for the cause which he now saw was beyond saving. 
These deserters were all but impossible to capture. They 
were shielded wholesale from the provost-marshals. The 
commissariat, too, was in a condition of collapse. Only 
the despairing courage of the leaders remained, and their 
dwindling retinue. The means of carrying on the struggle 
had been exhausted. The last ditch had been reached. 

Lee had little over sixty thousand effectives. Grant 
surrounded him with more than twice the number. The 
return of the Valley troops and reinforcements had again 
placed Grant in overwhelming strength. He had one 
hundred and twenty-five thousand men. No doubt as the 
time approached for the opening of what all saw must be 
the last campaign, Lee had fully determined to forsake Rich- 
mond, and, joining to his own the forces of Johnston, to 
retreat to the mountains, where, if he could not prolong 
the war, he might, at least, command better terms of 



312 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

peace for the Confederacy. He accumulated a supply of 
rations at Amelia Court House, west of Richmond, ready 
to take with him when he should retire along the Danville 
Railroad. 

In order to be able to retire, as he desires, by the south 
side of the Appomattox river, Lee must drive Grant from 
his hold on the Boydton road. And to make the operation 
of disengaging himself from Richmond and Petersburg 
safe, he plans to attack Grant as a diversion. Selecting 
Fort Stedman, on Grant's centre, as the 

March 25. -i i i . i . i i 

most available pomt, he vigorously assaults 
the place in three columns of selected troops. 

Negligently guarded. Fort Stedman is captured by a 
couj^ de main, causing the abandonment of some adjacent 
batteries. But the assaulting force is not promptly 
supported, and Lee is forced to retire under the concentric 
fire of other batteries commanding Fort Stedman, — 
(Confederate, "Hare's Hill''). His casualties amount to 
twenty-five hundred men and two thousand prisoners, — 
a loss he can ill afford. 

Grant can not well mistake Lee's purpose. He knows 
that the attack on Fort Stedman is but a cover for some 
other operation, presumably retreat, for the prisoners re- 
cently captured have told a sorry tale of the condition of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant therefore once 
more adopts his ancient tactics of a move by the left. But 
this time he leaves a small body only in front of Peters- 
burg, and makes his turning force solid and strong. 

Sheridan is on the extreme left, moving towards Din- 
widdle. Warren, with Humphreys on his right, first finds 



1865.] TEE FINAL CA3IPAIGN. 313 

the enemy as he pushes for the White Oak road. A com- 
bat, with loss of four hundred men, results 

March 29. 

in Warren's favor. 

The Union line stretches out from the Appomattox 
Eiver to Dinwiddle Court House, in order Parke, Wright, 
Ord, Humphreys, Warren, Sheridan. AVith not much 
over fifty thousand muskets, Lee has thirty-five miles 
of intrenchments to hold. Longstreet is in the Richmond 
defences ; Mahone at Bermuda Hundred. In Peters- 
burg are Wilcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, Heth, and 
Gordon. 

Starved as he is for men, Lee still clings to his old and 
daring tactics. Stripping the lines to the barest, he col- 
lects fifteen thousand men, and once again essays his so 
often successful assault upon our right. A heavy storm 
supervenes. Grant arrests the movement 

^ March 30. 

of the Army of the Potomac. Lee com- 
pletes his preparations. 

W^arren has formed his divisions in echelon. The habit 
of moving forward in Kne enables an opponent who can 
efifect a breach in one place to bear back the whole body. 
The disposition in echelon allows easy support of one por- 
tion of the line by another, while not subject to the weak- 
ness mentioned. Ayres is sent forward to 

*^ March 31. 

seize the White Oak road. 

Lee once more makes a sudden swoop upon Warren's 
left. Ayres and Crawford are driven in ; but Griffin holds 
on, and Humphreys thrusts Miles forward upon Warren's 
right. Lee fails, but we lose two thousand men. 

Sheridan with his horse moves forward to Five Forks. 



314 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

Lee, whose safety demands that he shall hold this point, 
advances an equal number of foot upon him, and drives 
him back towards Dinwiddle. 

Grant and Meade become solicitous for Sheridan's 
safety, and send Warren to his succor. Warren throws 
Ayres forward towards Dinwiddle. Ayres is stopped for 
a few hours by a broken bridge. But in reality Sheridan 
is in no degree compromised. Lee cannot afford to leave 
so many men at Dinwiddle, and withdraws them to Five 
Forks. 

Sheridan again follows up Lee to that 
place. He is in command of the joint cav- 
alry and infantry forces. Masking the Fifth corps with 
his cavalry, and attacking smartly on the right of Lee's 
line to divert his attention, he sends a body of horse up the 
White Oak road towards Richmond to arrest any rein- 
forcements which may chance to come from that direction. 
Warren forms his corps with Ayres on the left, Crawford 
on the right, and Griffin in rear of Crawford as reserve. 

Ayres and Crawford have each two brigades in front, 
each brigade in two lines of battle, and a third brigade in 
similar formation in rear of the two advance brigades. 
Griffin is in columns by battalion. 

The march is directed by the sun, which is to be kept 
over the left shoulder. The line of advance is to be upon 
and around the left flank of the enemy, thus taking him in 
reverse. As in all such cases, in wooded country, there is 
some delay in the advance, due to no particular neglect. 
. ., , The cavalry attack in front, the foot falls 

April 1. "^ 

upon the enemy in flank and rear. The 



1865.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 315 

enemy struggles with all his old nerve, changes front 
in good style, and fights manfully ; but outnumbered 
and outmanoeuvred, he can make no headway. His line is 
broken. Part fly westward, five thousand are captured. 
Our loss is less than one thousand men. 

After the battle of Five Forks Avas over, Warren was 
relieved by Sheridan from command of his corps, and 
Griffin was placed in his stead. It can not be denied that 
Sheridan had the rio-ht to do this. But it was a hard 
blow to one of the most gallant men of the Army of the 
Potomac, who had ever made a brilliant record in all that 
he had done. To say that a Court of Inquiry found no 
want of activity or of intelligent effort in Warren's conduct 
affords little consolation. But Warren's history is written. 
Few can boast so clear and bright a fame. 

After this battle Grant opens on Peters- 
burg a heavy artillery fire, and Parke with 
the Ninth corps goes in on the right of the line. He 
carries the outer defences, but the inner works are stub- 
bornly held by a mere handful of the enemy. Wright 
with the Sixrii corps carries everything in his front and 
marches down the Boydton Plank Road towards Peters- 
burg. Humphreys does the same. 

Opposite Ord is Fort Gregg. Here some two hundred 
and fifty Confederate marksmen place five hundred of our 
men hors de combat. Longstreet brings what reinforce- 
ments he can from Pichmond to Lee at Petersburjr. 

Lee nobly meets our vigorous attack. 
None of the fire which in days of high 
emprise and brilliant hopes blazed in his assault, was now 



316 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

found wanting. But gallantry can no more avail. And 
brave A. P. Hill, whose name is written upon every page 
of the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, falls in 
this last attack. Our loss is thirty-four hundred men. 

During the night, silently, unperceived, 

April 2-3. *" 

Lee retreats from both Richmond and 
Petersburg. With twenty-five thousand men, he marches 
sixteen miles west from Petersburg along the north side of 
the Appomattox. In the morning the Union forces 
enter both the cities which they have so long and so ardu- 
ously labored to capture. 

Little caring for these empty prizes. Grant pursues by 
the south side of the river. Lee hurries along towards 
the Danville Railroad, still hoping to push beyond his 
enemy to a point where he can join to himself the forces of 
Johnston. Either Lynchburg or Danville may compass 
this end. 

A train of supplies has been ordered to remain at 
Amelia Court House. Lee proposes to ration his men, 
cut loose from any base, and push boldly for the foot-hills 
of the Alleghanies. His is the courage which does not 
forsake him. There is yet work to be done. 

It is difficult to picture Lee's utter consternation, — 
despair, when on reaching Amelia, he discovers that, 
under mistaken orders from the capital, this train of 
victuals, which is all that stands between him and sheer 
starvation, has been run on to Richmond. The authori- 
ties had wanted the cars on which to load the archives 
and valuables of the Confederate Government, intending 
that the rations should be left for Lee. The rations had 



1865.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 317 

not been unloaded, and the cars had been forwarded to 
the capital. Lee's twenty thousand men have not a 
mouthful to eat save what they can gather in little driblets 
along the road. 

Sheridan with the Second, Fifth and Sixth 
Corps pushes remorselessly onward. Both he and Lee aim 
for Burkeville, but Sheridan is the fleeter of foot and 
reaches that place first. 

Lee dares not halt. He now has Union columns press- 
ing hard upon his left, upon his rear. Sheridan's cavalry 
hurries far ahead to cut him off in the advance. 

A running fight is kept up between the armies all the 
way. Despite gallant defense, the day generally goes 
ao^ainst the enemy. At Sailor's Creek 

^ ^ , "^ April 6. 

Ewell's eight thousand men are cut off and 
captured. Our loss is twelve hundred. 

The Confederates are literally starving. For four days 
they have had nothing to eat save the crumbs of their last 
issue of rations. Even the buds of the trees are put to use 
for food. Those who are best oflp have but a few handfuls 
of corn. And yet they cling fondly to their chief and 
trust that all may yet be well. 

Lee crosses the Appomattox at Farmville and fires the 
bridges. Humphreys comes up barely in 

April 7. 

time to save one of them. On this he 
crosses and attacks the Confederate rear. But the gallant 
fellows have lost none of their soldier's pride, and repulse 
the onset handsomely, with a loss to us of six hundred men. 
Lee must escape, if at all, over the narrow neck of land 
between the James and Appomattox rivers to the west 



318 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865. 

of his present position. But Sheridan's horse is nimbler- 
footed. He reaches the ground first and closes this last 
outlet also. 

Lee is trapped. Like his old self, he promptly decides 
to cut his way through. But Sheridan 
anticipates him in his attack. The brave 
Army of Northern Virginia comes to the end of its glori- 
ous career, and its faithful commander can do no more. 
After a short correspondence, the chieftains meet, terms 
are agreed upon, arms are stacked by the 

April 9. 1 A r^ T-i 

troops, and, at Appomattox Court House, 
Lee surrenders to Grant's armies some twenty-nine thousand 
men, bearing, it has been said, but ten thousand muskets. 

The first act, upon capitulation having been made, is to 
ration the starving Confederates. Lee takes leave of the 
tearful veterans who have seconded his purpose so nobly, 
and whose very rags are a shining honor, in a few heart- 
felt words : — 

"Men, we have fought tlu'ough the war together. I 
have done the best I could for you." 

The Union loss in these closing operations was about 
ten thousand men. 

General Meade had remained in command of the Army 
of the Potomac till the close. Grant had directed the 
larger operations, but had left Meade the immediate 
control. Meade was a ripe, sound soldier. He fell short 
of greatness, perhaps, but few equalled him in pre- 
cision and steady-going capacity. Under him the Army 
of the Potomac saw its greatest triumph, and its 
greatest humiliation. Gettysburg was Meade's victory; 



1865.] THE FINAL CA3IPAIGN. 319 

Cold Harbor was not Meade's defeat. While he was in 
command the army was always in safe hands ; its discipline 
was excellent ; its esprit cle corps high. All his subordi- 
nates held him in great esteem. 

In minor stations Meade obeyed with alacrity; in 
supreme control he commanded with discretion. His 
qualities are not salient ; but he was well rounded both as 
a soldier and as a man. 

Johnston surrendered to Sherman towards the close of 
the month. There was some friction be- 

April 26. 

tween Sherman and the Secretary of War as 
to the terms granted to Johnston, but the capitulation was 
eventually completed. And gradually, so soon as the news 
had spread, the smaller armies of the Confederacy sur- 
rendered upon similar conditions. These were substantially 
the giving up of all material of war, and the signing by all 
Confederate soldiers of a parole not to take up arms again 
against the United States, and to return at once to their 
homes. Transportation and rations were furnished them so 
far as could be. 

Anger, on the one side, was swallowed up in gladness 
for the happy outcome of the war ; regrets on the other 
disappeared in the cessation of the unavailing strife. 

The men composing the vast armies on either side soon 
peacefully dispersed to their homes and were speedily 
engrossed in their ancient occupations or in new pursuits. 
No act of lawlessness is on record to stain their proud 
repute as soldiers and Americans. This remarkable fact is 
the most splendid of tributes to the value of the liberties 
of the New World. It would be impossible elsewhere. 



LXI. 

A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 

THE theory of the North that no State could leave the 
Union by its own sole act had been maintained. The 
seceding States were still part and parcel of the nation. 
But the inhabitants of this section had waged war upon the 
United States, and had thereby forfeited their civil and 
property rights. Something must be done to restore the 
status quo ante helium. 

Within a month after the close of hostili- 
May 29, 1865. 

ties the President issued a proclamation of 

amnesty to all who had participated in rebellion, ex- 
cepting only certain prominent classes, on condition that 
each person taking the benefit of the proclamation should 
subscribe an oath of allegiance to the United States and 
accept the results of the war. This would restore to such 
affiant his rights as a citizen and his rights of property ; 
but the oath itself, as well as the proclamation, expressly 
sustained the emancipation of the slaves. 

The great bulk of the Southern population accepted the 
amnesty thus offered, and gradually thereafter those per- 
sons who were excepted in the first proclamation were re- 
admitted to their citizenship upon promise of future loyalty 



A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 321 

to the laws and constitution of the United States. Legally 
speaking, the Union was once more what it had been, pro- 
foundly at peace, and without any stain of discord upon its 
garments. 

To trace the history of Reconstruction in the South ; of 
the bestowal of Civil Rights upon the former slaves ; of 
the vast frauds committed by the " carpet-bag " administra- 
tions of the several Southern States, and the unnecessary 
hardships arising from this vicious system ; of the turbulence 
thereby excited, and the cruel and sometimes bloody 
attempts to cow the negro population into its ancient ser- 
vility ; and of the gradual renewal of good feeling and con- 
cord, is beyond the scope of this little work. The actual 
war for the Union had ended ; the Union and the Con- 
stitution had been maintained ; and, as a result not antici- 
pated at the outset, freedom had been given to the slave. 
The price paid in blood and treasure had been vast. But 
the gain for future generations had been equally vast. 
North and South now recognized each other's strength, and 
each other's readiness to battle for the^right. Slavery was lo- >^;u; ^ 
buried. And the Southerner had learned that honest labor )JJ^ / 
is not only the duty, but the privilege, of every man who 
values the heritage of our common country. 

A few stray statistics must close. These come mainly 
from the War Department records and the tables of the 
Treasury Department and Pension Office. Any inaccuracy 
in approximation is traceable to paucity of Southern records. 

The average population of the North and South from 
1861 to 1864 was thirty-five millions, including four 
million slaves. 



322 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

In the North and South alike the first troops were raised 
by volunteering. But within a year, in the South, con- 
scription acts were passed and thereafter kept in force. 
In the North, volunteering obtained until late in the third 
year of the war, when the draft also went into effect in 
most of the States. 

Northern troops were furnished for various terms of 
service, from three months to " three years or the war." 
The actual enlistments were two million seven hundred and 
eighty thousand men for the armies and navies, or, 
reduced to a three years' term, ^.e., counting three one- 
year men as one three-years' man, and, estimating as a full 
man only one who enlisted for a term which could have 
lasted three full years (men who enlisted in January, 1865, 
for three years could actually serve only four months, and 
would count as one-ninth of one man each), there were 
furnished in the North about one million seven hundred 
thousand men. In the South, counting in the same man- 
ner (a man who enlisted for four years was a man and a 
third) , there were furnished about nine hundred thousand 
men. These forces came from a military population, 
according to the census of 1861, of four million six hun- 
dred thousand in the North and one million and sixty-five 
thousand in the South. Of these, about one-fifth were, as 
usual in every country, exempts. Thus, in the North, 
about four men in every nine served three years ; in the 
South, exemption being much rarer, nine out often did so. 

The regular army of the United States was never large. 
Only some sixty-seven thousand regulars served through 
the war. The bulk of the forces were called volunteer 



A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 323 

troops, though few regulars in any country were ever 
better soldiers. But the prominent general officers, and 
many of the minor ones, were men whom the government 
had educated at West Point. This applied equally to the 
South. 

In the North over two-thirds of all the men who served 
were American-born. In the South all but a small per- 
centage were so. Among the foreign-born soldiers the 
greater part were naturalized citizens. 

Much to the credit of our colored fellow-citizens, there 
were one hundred and eighty thousand negro soldiers. 

In the North the troops served in twenty-five Army 
Corps, consecutively numbered, and one Cavalry Corps. 
In the South the corps bore the names of their com- 
manders. 

The following was the strength of the United States' and 
the Confederate States' forces at various dates, present and 
absent. The Southern figures are from accurate data. If 
anything they are understated : — 

U.S. c.s. 

About 

Jan. 1, 1861 16,367 

July 1, 1861 186,751 98,000 

Jan. 1, 1862 575,917 350,000 

March 31, 1862 637,126 353,000 

Jan. 1, 1863 918,191 441,000 

Jan. 1, 1864 860,737 471,000 

Jan. 1, 1865 959,460 418,000 

March 31, 1865 980,086 175,000 

May 1, 1865 1,000,516 



324 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

This gave the North, on the average, about double the 
force of the South (17 to 9) ; but owing to the larger amount 
of garrison duty done by the invading force, in the field the 
numbers stood, up to 1865, as not far from three to two. 

Of every thousand men there were, in the North, on the 
average, seventy-three men sick, and two hundred and 
thirty-four men absent for various reasons, leaving six 
hundred and ninety-three under the colors. 

In the South, except towards the close of the war, when 
desertions became frequent, the average with the colors was 
somewhat higher, as furloughs were much more rare. 

The deaths during the war, in the North, were as 
follows : — 



Killed or died of wounds 110,070 

Died of disease (two-thirds due to service ex- 
posure) 199,720 

In Confederate prisons 24,866 

Accidents 9,371 

Murders and suicides 1,015 

Military executions 331 

Other causes 14,155 

359,528 

In the South, the losses in killed or died of their wounds 
were 94,000 men ; those dying of disease are unknown. 
The sacrifices of the Confederates were appalling. South 
Carolina {e.g.) lost in killed or mortally wounded one- 
quarter of her military population — a record probably 
unequalled in any war. 

The above table of Northern losses does not include the 



A FEW STRAY ITE3IS. 325 

great number who were discharged for disability during the 
war, and who died at home from the results of exposure, 
wounds, or disease contracted in the line of duty, and other 
causes. Counting all losses directly due to the war, it 
would be safe to say that half a million men were lost in 
tlie North, and close upon the same number in the South. 

There are buried in the national cemeteries three hun- 
dred and twenty-five thousand Union soldiers. 

At least seven hundred men a day were victims of the 
four years' war; and there was, in battle, during this 
period, a daily loss in killed and wounded of over four 
hundred men. 

These casualties occurred in some two thousand four 
hundred actions of suflScient importance to be identified 
by name ; in eighteen hundred and eighty-two of which a 
regiment or more was engaged. This is nearly two for 
each day. There were one hundred and twelve of these 
actions in which the loss exceeded five hundred men. All 
this tale makes no count of the innumerable small affairs 
on the picket-line and outpost service, and in scouting and 
reconnoitring duty. 

At the outset of the war no prisoners were exchanged 
between North and South. But, later on, better counsels 
prevailed and a system of exchange was inaugurated. The 
exchanges covered several hundred thousand men, and 
were made on equal terms. Retaliatory measures on 
prisoners were, except in isolated cases, not resorted to. 

The medical service and the ambulance system of the 
Northern armies were more efficient than had ever before 
existed. The Sanitary and Christian Commissions rendered 



326 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 

services never to be forgotten. Scores of thousands of 
men to-day owe their lives to the fidelity and skill of these 
ministers of mercy. Numberless surgeons and their attend- 
ants lost their lives on the field of battle in pursuit of their 
humane duties. In the South scant means prevented the 
same lavish outlay for this purpose. 

At the close of the war one hundred and seventy-five 
thousand Confederates surrendered. 

The South raised its means for carrying on the war by 
internal revenue and by loans of various kinds at home and 
abroad. Some of these had the cotton-crops pledged to 
secure the bonds issued. None of the debt created by the 
South has been or ever can be paid. 

The North raised its moneys from loans similarly placed. 
The United States debt was, substantially, 

June 30, 1861 $65,000,000 

June 30, 1865 2,682,000,000 

Increase of debt $2,617,000,000 

There was raised by customs, etc., in 
addition to the above, and spent on 
the war, some 783,000,000 

making the whole cost of the war . . $3,400,000,000 

or nearly two and a half millions a day, as a rough calcu- 
lation, during the entire struggle. 

Republics are said to be ungrateful. But the United 
States has paid to its soldiers, in addition to larger emolu- 
ments than any nation ever gave its troops, three hundred 



A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 327 

millions in bounties, and ha« already paid two thousand 
millions in pensions. Add to this the pensions which will 
continue to be paid until the pensioners gradually drop off 
the rolls, and we reach a total of probably four thousand 
million dollars. This is about eight thousand dollars for 
each man who died in service, or who was discharged for 
disability and died at home, in addition to his pay, rations, 
and clothing while in the service. This does not look like 
ingratitude. The like of it has never been known. 



I 



GLOSSAET 



Abatis. — Trees cut down and having the branches stripped and their 
ends sharpened and pointed towards the enemy in front of intrench- 
ments. Abatis delays the attacking party and keeps it longer 
under fire. 
%Act of War. — Any act which is incompatible with the friendly relations 
which exist among nations at peace with each other is an act of war, 
unless immediate reparation is made. War usually follows such an 
act among nations of equal strength. 

Ambulance. — A vehicle specially adapted to carrying wounded men. 
Sometimes used, in a broader sense, as the hospital system of an 
army. 

Affair. — A small engagement or action between forces which are not 
very numerous. A skirmish. 

A main forte. — •' With a strong hand." By a sudden or overwhelm- 
ing attack or movement to capture a place or do any work is to do it 
a main forte. 

Arms of Precision. — The breach-loading small-arms of to-day, which 
are very precise in their fire. 

Au fond. '■'■To the bottoTn.^' A force is said to fight or to charge au 
fond, when it does its work thoroughly, with a will, or to the bitter 
end. 

Base {of operations). — The country, city, depot or locality from which 
an army starts on its campaign, and on which it relies for victuals, 
men and material. The line of operations starts from the base of 
operations, and reaches out to the army. Along this line supplies 
are carried. The line may be a railroad, a river, or a road ; or sev- 
eral such. 

Battle. — A serious engagement between rival armies which is apt to lead 
to decisive results. An action of large proportions. 

Belligerents. — Legally, only those nations which are recognized by 
other nations as independent, and which are deemed to have the rights 
of independent powers, such as the right of carrying on war. 
Colloquially, any fighting forces. 

329 



330 GL OSSAR V. 

Bivouac. — A temporary encampment. Sometimes used when no tents 
are on hand, and the men shelter themselves as best they may. 

Blockade. — The closing of a port by an enemy's fleet or by other means, 
to prevent ingress or egress. The object is to keep the nation 
whose ports are blockaded from receiving contraband of war or from 
exporting its own commodities. To be respected by other nations, 
a blockade must be strictly kept up. 

Campaign. — A series of operations covering some period of time, or 
beginning with a definite plan and ending with its accomplishment 
or with failure. 

Cantonments. — Quarters occupied by troops for a considerable time, in 
villages or in more or less permanent barracks, huts or shelters. 
Winter quarters are often cantonments. 

Cashier. — An officer is cashiered when he is (by sentence of a Court- 
martial) dismissed from the service, and forever incapacitated from 
holding any office of trust or emolument under the United States. 

Casus Belli. — That act which is the immediate cause of war, or which 
is alleged to be the reason for a declaration of war. 

Charge. — An advance to the assault. 

Close Order. — Massed in column. 

Column. — Troops in close, compact order, many files deep. A mass of 
troops. There are many kinds of tactical means of forming column. 

Column by Battalion. — A brigade will be in column by battalion, when 
the battalions composing it are each in line and in rear of each other. 

Combat. — An engagement of no great length or dimensions. But it 
may be sharp and bloody. 

Commissariat. — The force emjiloyed to accumulate and distribute rations 
to armies. Colloquially applied to the supply of food on hand. 

Commission. — A permission granted by a government to a ship to go 
on a cruise or to do some definite act of war. The letter appointing 
an officer to his rank. 

Communications. — The line of operations. (See Base.) The route 
by which an army communicates with its depot of supplies. An 
army must keep its communications open, or else live off the coun- 
try ; this latter is always difficult for a large force. 

Concent7-ic. —Towards a common centre; towards the same objective 
from different places. The movements of the Army of the 
Potomac, the Army of the James, and the Valley Armies on Eich- 
mond, in 1864, were concentric operations. 

Conscription. — A forcible method of raising troops. Every citizen 
capable of bearing arms is enrolled (i.e., put on a list) in his own 
district, and drawings by lot are made from the list for the number 
of men apportioned to that district when a call for troops is made. 

Contraband of War. — Any stores or arms or goods of any kind whatso- 



GLOSSARY. 331 

ever which will enable a military power or force to carry on or 
prolong, a war; such as powder, medicines, rations, ship-timber. 
Almost any article may be contraband of war, according to the 
circumstances, and the use for which it is destined, or the amount 
of it on hand, etc. , etc. Such articles may legally be seized by either 
belligerent wherever found. 
Corduroy. — To mend a road wliich is deep in mud, by laying across it 
small trunks of trees, or rails, and filling the same in with dirt or 
brush. This is sometimes done very carefully and a substantial 
road produced- 

Corral. — A large enclosure into which wild horses or cattle are driven 
and captured. A stock-yard. A trap. To entrap. 

Counter. — To meet a blow by a blow, or an attack by an attack. 

Court of Inquiry. — Military tribunals may be Courts-martial or Courts 
of Inquiry. The former try officers or soldiers for crimes or of- 
fences against military law. Courts of Inquiry inquire into any 
matter, the facts of which are in dispute. They may find the facts 
such as to warrant the calling of a Court-martial. 

Counter-charge. — A charge made by the army or body of troops which 
is on the defensive upon another which is advancing upon it, in 
order to break up the onset of the latter. A charge from intrench- 
ments upon a body of troops, which has attacked and recoiled from 
them, in order to disperse the assailants more effectually. 

Counter-march. — When marching in one direction, to face to, and march 
in substantially the opj)osite. To retrace one's steps. There are 
tactical manoeuvres specifically called counter-marches. 

Coup de grace. — The death stroke. So called because it may put a suf- 
fering creature out of its agony. The finishing stroke. 

Coup de main. — A quick, sudden attack by which any place is seized or 
any object accomplished. A surprise. 

Cul de sac. — " The bottom of a bag." A blind alley. Any place hav- 
ing but one means of entrance or exit. A trap. 

Cut. — To interrupt or sever, as a road or other means of retreat or ad- 
vance. 

Debouch. — Any place from which you can unobserved fall upon the 
enemy, or so move as to compromise him. To debouch is to fall 
upon the enemy or to move from such a place. Troops may 
debouch froYn a bridge, a town, a pass in the mountains. 

Declaration of War. — A formal notice by one nation to another that it 
considers its friendly relations with the latter at an end. It is usual 
to give it before opening a war. 

De facto. — Absolutely done or accomplished, whether rightfully or 
wrongfully. A de facto government is the one actually in power, 
whether legally or not. 



332 GLOSSARY. 

Defile. — A long narrow pass which obliges troops to march through it 
in very extended order, as a bridge, or a gap in the mountains. To 
pass a defile is a delicate operation, because the troops are not in 
such order, at the moment of passing, as to be ready to meet an 
attack. To force a defile is difficult because only a few men can 
move through it abreast, and the enemy can do great damage 
to the long line of troops by firing on them as they march through. 

De jure. — A de jure right is a legal right to do or to be anything 
whether you assert it or not. One man might be de jure {i.e., 
rightful) governor of a place while another might, by usurpation, 
be de facto governor. 

Deploy. — If troops are in column or close order they deploy into line 
or open order. If in line or open order, they ploy into column or 
close order. Troops fight in line, as a rule. They used to charge 
in column. They camp generally in more or less close order, but 
taking up more space than if drawn up for manoeuvres. 

Demonstrate. — To operate against or to attack in order to ascertain the 
condition or position of the enemy, or to blind him as to what you 
intend to do. To demonstrate is to make a diversion, q. v. 

Detail. — A selection of men for any purpose from a larger body. Such 
as a detail for picket duty from each company of a regiment. The 
detail may be regular, i.e., from all the men by rote, or it may be a 
special detail of reliable men for a work requiring intelligence or 
courage. 

Develop. — To adopt means, as by a reconnoissance or by a slight attack, 
to ascertain all about the force opposing you. To do any act which 
makes the enemy develop his strength or position. 

Direction, Column of. — That body by whose movements the rest of an 
army has to govern its line of march. 

Diversion. — Any attack, large or small, which will divert the enemy's 
attention from the main object you have in view and enable you to 
carry out your plans. A diversion often draws the enemy's 
troops away from the main point where you intend to attack. 

Draft. — Conscription. The actual drawing by lot of a required num- 
ber from the enrolled men of a district. 

Eccentric. — Out of the central line on which military movements should 
be conducted, in order to protect the base of operations. If an 
army retreats along any except its line of operations, it makes an 
eccentric retreat, which may be disastrous to it unless it has an- 
other base to fall back upon. Even then, it leaves its old base open 
to the attack of the enemy. 

Echelon. — A line of columns or bodies of troops in which each succes- 
sive column or body is placed a trifle in rear of the line of the one 
next on its right or left, — like a ladder {eclielle'), or more like the 



GLOSSARY. 333 

tread of a pair of stairs. The bodies do not lap, or stand behind 
each other, but only stand in line, each one further to the rear. 

Effective. — That portion of a body of troops which is " for duty," i.e., 
ready to do effective duty ; which will be able to fight. Every army 
has many non-combatants, often not reckoned as a part of the effective. 

Elan. — Dash. That vigor or spirit which carries troops forward with 
a rush. 

Enfilade. — To fire, with artillery or musketry, along a line of troops, 
^.(;., from a position on their flanks. Such a fire is very destruc- 
tive and demoralizing. 

Engagement. — A smaller battle. 

Entrencliment. — (^See Intrenchment.) 

Esprit de corps. — When companies, regiments, and brigades have 
served beside each other for so long a time that they have learned 
to know and to have confidence in the courage and energy of each 
other, a spirit of pride and reliance animates the whole body, 
which is of the greatest value in a military sense. 

Fall in. — To take one's place in line, or column. 

Field-worhs. Intrenchments thrown up on the field out of the most 
available means on hand. Fortifications not of a permanent 
nature. 

File. — A file is the depth of a body of troops from front to rear, with 
one man front. Rank is the length from right to left. Thus, in 
a company of eighty men in two ranks, the file will be two deep, — 
the rank will consist of forty men. To file out of a place generally 
means to march out of it by the flank, for when a line faces to either 
flank, its then front has the width only of the depth of a file, and it 
marches ly file. Tactical formations, however, for ease of 
marching, generally double these files, so that a body in two ranks 
marching by the flank, has four men abreast. 

Flank. — Troops in line of battle have a front, a rear, and two flanks. 
The flanks are the ends of a line of troops. Troops can only fight 
towards their direct, or slightly oblique, front. If attacked in the 
flank they must change front in whole or in part towards the attack- 
ing party. This is more or less difficult. If attacked in rear they 
can face about ; but troops canaot fight with equal confidence faced 
to the rear. 

Flankers. — Small bodies of troops marching in the same direction as 
the main column, but at a distance on either side of it, to protect 
its flanks from sudden attack. The distance varies according to 
the site, of the columns and the nature of the ground. 

Flank March. — Troops march in action by the front ; for short dis- 
tances by the rear ; when not in presence of the enemy by the right 
or left flank. A flank march sometimes means a march with either 



334 GLOSSARY. 

flank leading ; but as generally used, it means a march around the 
flank of an enemy; a circuitous march to reach and attack the 
enemy in flank or rear. 

Flying Wing. — A body of troops out on the right or left of an army, 
and at some distance, but under independent control and command 
as to all but its general operations. It acts in a larger way as 
flankers do. 

Flying Column. — A body of troops cut loose from its base to do some 
special work, and meanwhile to live on the country or on the rations 
it starts with. 

Forage. — Food for the beasts which form part of an army. To 
forage is to go out for, capture, and bring in any kind of food or feed 
for man or beast. Foraging parties detailed for the purpose gen- 
erally do this work. 

Forced Marches. — Twelve to twenty miles a day is good marching for 
a column. If the troops are forced they can do much more than 
this amount for awhile, but not keep it up. Forced marches are 
made to reach a place where the troops are much needed, with the 
utmost despatch. 

Forlorn Hope. — A body selected to capture by assault a^very dangerous 
position. So called because the hope which each man has of sur- 
viving the attempt is a forlorn one. A forlorn hope, if it makes 
a breach in the enemy's defences, is followed up by reserves, so as 
to hold what the forlorn hope has seized. 

Furlough. — A permission to a soldier to be absent for a definite 
period. 

Garrison. — A body of men holding or defending a town or fort or 
other place. 

General Engagement. — A battle. 

Grand-tactics. — The art of moving large bodies of men on the field of 
battle. " Tactics " is also used to express the art of handling arms 
and performing manoeuvres by soldiers or small bodies of troops, 
as companies and regiments. — See Strategy and Tactics. 

Guerillas. — Irregular troops which conduct irregular warfare. Land 
pirates. Unorganized forces. " Peaceful farmers " when they are 
not making raids or shooting from behind trees and hedges. 
Troops which are raised for a sudden incursion, and then disappear 
into the population. The word means petty war in Spanish. 
Guerilla warfare is not considered legitimate. War is supposed to 
be co^jflucted only by organized bodies of troops under recognized 
leaders. For organization alone can control the actions of the indi- 
vidual soldiers. 

Honors of War. — When your enemy has made a gallant defense of a 
citadel, and you find you cannot easily reduce it, he may still per- 



GLOSSARY. 335 

haps agree to surrender it to you, if its importance has ceased, or if he 
thinks he cannot hold it much longer, on condition that you will allow 
him to march out with colors flying, drums beating, and such parade 
as to show that he has not been vanquished. Such a body so marching 
out is entitled to be saluted by you. These courtesies and parade 
are called the " honors of war." Surrender of the place alone is 
usually made, and not of the troops as prisoners of war. In an or- 
dinary surrender the troops give up their arms and become prisoners. 

Bors de {or du) Combat. — "Out of the fight"; killed, wounded or 
missing men are said to be placed hors de combat. 

Incursions. — Attacks across the border, and into the enemy's territory; 
or into territory occupied by him. 

Intrenchments. — Defensive works thrown up to help troops to hold a 
position. The simplest form is a ditch the dirt from which is piled 
up in an embankment behind which the defenders stand. Abatis, 
and various kinds of entanglements, are erected in front, when 
time allows, to keep the enemy long under fire from the in- 
trenchments. 

Itinerary. — Order of march. Instructions or minutes showing when 
and on what roads each portion of an army is to march. 

Key of a Position. — That point of a battle-field which stands in such 
relation to the enemy's position that if captured it will oblige him 
to retreat or will compromise him in some way. A hill overlooking 
or enfilading his line may be the key to a battle-field. 

Left {by the). — A body of troops moves by its left when it moves with 
its left flank in advance. An army must be so marched as most 
readily to face towards the enemy, and may be marched by its right 
or left for this purpose. 

Letters of 3Iarque. — Permission given by a government to private indi- 
viduals to equip vessels and prey upon the commerce of the enemy. 

Line. — The length of a body of troops from right to left. Troops used 
in ancient days to be fought in masses, with files many men deep. 
This depth has been gradually decreasing. In the last century the 
file was of eight, six and four men. In this it has come down to three 
and two. A line of battle of a regiment now consists of two ranks. 
But a number of regiments may each be in column and the whole 
army or part of it may be in line of such columns. 

Line of Columns by Battalion. — A common form in action for making 
a heavy line. Each battalion or regiment is ployed into column. 

Line of Defense. — A line along which troops are posted across the path 
of the enemy to resist his further advance. Such a line may be near 
our base, or out beyond it and connected with it by our line of 
operations. A river, or a chain of hills, or other natural ob 
stacle is desirable as a line of defense. Such a line is generally 
intrenched, often with permanent fortifications. 



336 GLOSSARY. 

Line of Operations. — {See Base.) The line along which an army is 
advancing or retiring and by which it is victualled, 
and such columns stand in line, with suitable intervals. 

Lodgment. — A foothold in the enemy's territory, or position, or works. 

Logistics. — Originally the art of lodging troops. (Logis.) Now the 
art of supplying troops with rations, material of war, transporta- 
tion, camp and garrison equipage, and of marching it from place to 
place. In short, the art of doing everything for an army except 
manoeuvring or j&ghting it. 

Lutige. — The fencer's thrust, to which he gives strength by a quick 
forward step so as to add to the thrust the weight of his moving 
body. 

Manoeuvre. — Any movement of a body of troops intended to accomplish 
a tactical or a strategic result. 

Material of War. — Anything in the nature of arms, ammunition or sup- 
plies which pertains to the conduct of war or the support of an 
army. The word materiel is often used to convey a larger meaning 
than the English word. 

Melee. — A mixed fight, in which the troops on either side are huddled 
together in a mass, neither party yielding. 

Morale. — That cheerful confidence in itself, or its situation, or its 
leaders, which makes an army full of courage and readiness to 
encounter danger. The converse of demoralization. 

Munitions of War. — Generally applied to ammunition, ordnance and 
fighting-material of any kind. It may be used in a larger mean- 
ing. 

Muster. — To bring together a number of men. To enrol men. Spe- 
cifically, to swear into the U. S. service. A volunteer or drafted man 
only became entitled to pay and allowances when he was sworn 
into the U. S. service, or mustered. It might be weeks or months 
after enlistment before he was mustered. In raising a regiment, 
the men were enlisted singly, and the regiment, or its companies, 
when full, were mustered. 

Non-comhatants. Any one in the military service whose duties do not 
oblige him to bear arms or to take an active part in battle. Such 
are surgeons, quarter-masters, their assistants and camp-followers. 

Objective. — That place or goal to reach or capture which is the 

object of the movement going on. 
Observe. — To keep watch of a place with a body of troops, so as to 

hold an enemy in it, or to prevent his attacking you from it. 
Offensive- Defensive. — In ofiensive warfare we attack the enemy to 
destroy him. In defensive warfare we repel his attack. In oS'en- 
sive-defensive warfare we are on the defense but we attack the 
enemy to keep him busy so that he shall not invade our territory, 
or attack us at a disadvantage. 



GLOSSARY, 337 

Open Older. — Extended in line. 

Outpost. — A small body posted out beyond an array in camp to give 
timely notice of danger, and to hold the enemy in check until the 
main body can form to resist his attack. An army in camp is sur- 
rounded by a circle of such outposts. 

Overslaugh. — When a senior officer has a junior promoted over his 
head he is said to be overslaughed. 

Ove7-t Act of War. — Communities on whose territory the operations of 
war are being conducted are by the law of nations entitled to pro- 
tection from harm if they remain peaceful, unless grave public 
necessity requires the destruction of what may be contraband of 
war within their limits, or the taking of provisions and supplies 
for the armies. But any community whose inhabitants interfere 
with these operations (as by burning bridges, obstructing 
roads or taking any part in the strife) is liable to be treated as part 
of the enemy's forces and to be visited with punishment by fire and 
sword. 

Parade Order. — With the steadiness of troops on parade. In action 
troops rarely preserve anything like such order. 

Parapet. — A breastwork. Part of an intrenchment. 

Parley. — A communication between enemies for which a temporary 
cessation of hostilities is made, in order to arrange terms for sur- 
render, or attend to the burial of the dead, care of the wounded, 
etc., etc. During a parley it is understood that neither party shall 
alter its position, or take advantage of the situation. 

Parole. — The promise on honor given by a prisoner that he will not 
take up arms again to serve against his captors. Prisoners of 
war are often paroled when they cannot well be kept and are then 
set at liberty. They are thereafter exchanged as if still prisoners 
of war. 

Patrol. — A force which moves to and fro to keep watch of a certain 
point, or which moves around from place to place inspecting the 
condition of affairs. The force which moves among the outposts of 
a camp to see that everything is in order. 

Picket. — Substantially the same as outposts. The picket-line is gener- 
ally understood to mean the line of individual sentinels furthest 
out ; the outposts are small bodies acting as reserves to the picket- 
line. 

Place d'armes. — An open spot on which troops can form in prober order 
as the successive bodies arrive. A parade-ground. It is difficult 
to deploy troops and start them on their work quickly and in good 
order, without suitable ground to do it on. Such ground is an 
essential point in the calculations of any general planning a 
manoeuvre. 

ploy. — To form close-order from ope.i. {See Deploy.) 



338 GLOSSARY. 

Pontoon. — A portable boat used to bridge rivers. Several pontoons 
anchored in line at suitable distances with their length up and down 
stream, and joined by timbers, form a pontoon bridge. Pontoons 
and their timbers are transported in wagons. The whole is a 
pontoon-train. 

Prestige. — The credit attached to having accomplished success, or to 
having acted with conspicuous gallantry. 

Provost-marshal. — An ofl&cer whose duty it is to arrest and hold desert- 
ers, spies, etc., and substantially to do the police work of an army 
or military post. 

Raid. — A sudden operation; generally upon the communications of 
the enemy, or into the enemy's territory. Cavalry, because it moves 
more swiftly, is used, as a rule. A raid which cuts an enemy's 
communications with his base seriously compromises his safety, 
unless he can at once repair damages. 

Raise a Siege. — To withdraw from besieging a fortress. 

Rank. — A line of men standing shoulder to shoulder ; a file is a line 
of men standing one behind another. " Rank and file " form any 
body of troops, and is applied to include all but officers. 

Rear-guard. — A portion of an army following at a suitable distance 
to protect it from attack. On the retreat the rear guard is large 
and important. 

Reconnaissance. — The operation of a body sent out to reconnoitre, or 
discover the whereabouts and force and probable intentions of the 
enemy. Reconnoissances often end in heavy combats, and some- 
times rise to the dignity of battles. A reconnoissance in force is one 
on a large scale, ready to do heavy fighting if it becomes essential. 

Reduce. — To capture a place. 

Refused. — When one flank of a line is bent back in crochet-form it is 
said to be refused. This is often done to protect the line from a 
probable flank attack. 

Retire vpon. — To move towards, so as to derive support from a depot 
or citadel or friendly force. 

Right (by the). — A body of troops moves by its right when it moves with 
its right flank in advance. 

Riposte. — A return lunge in fencing, after a parry. 

Salient. — A salient is an outward angle thrown out from a line of troops 
or fortifications. Its weakness consists in the fact that there is a 
point in its front from which the enemy can enfilade its sides. Still, 
a salient is sometimes useful, for if strongly held and protected 
it can flank an enemy attacking the line on its left or right. 

Sally-port. — A gate by which a force can make a dash from a fortress 
upon the besiegers. 

Scout. — A man or a party sent out to discover the enemy and his con- 
dition. Also used as a verb. 



GLOSSARY. 339 

Sieye batteries. — Batteries of heavy guns which cannot be readily 
moved with an army, as batteries of field-guns are. Siege guns are 
kept at the rear until wanted. Th ey are generally mounted on 
specially prepared foundations. 

Sit down before. — A besieging or observing force sits down before a 
fortress or strong place. 

Skirmish. — A scattering engagement of no great moment. It often 
precedes more serious work. 

Sortie. — A sudden attack from a strong place upon its besiegers, in order 
to interrupt their plans or break up their lines of approach. 

Strategy. — The art of making war on the map. The movement of 
armies out of sight of each other, after the opening of the cam- 
paign. The manoeuvres or marches by which a general seeks to 
place the enemy in such a position that he can fight him at a 
disadvantage. Strategy is the art of so moving your army that 
you may in some manner compromise or weaken the enemy's 
army before you fight it. {See Tactics and Grand-tactics.) 

Tactics. — In its lesser meaning, the instruction of the soldier or squad 
or company or regiment in bearing arms and moving as one body. 
In its larger meaning, the art of moving bodies of troops on the 
field of battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy. {See 
Strategy.) Having been brought upon the field of battle by such 
strategic movements that your enemy is less well placed than you 
are (with regard to retreat if he is beaten, or in respect to the 
ground he actually occupies, or numbers, or in any other 
way), it still behooves you so to manoeuvre tactically that 
you shall defeat him by actual fighting. E.g.^ a move- 
ment of an army or part of an army so as to threaten 
its enemy's line of operations, if at a distance, would be 
l>e a strategic movement. Such was Jackson's march through 
I'horoughfare Gap, in Pope's campaign. The same movement on 
the field of battle would be a tactical manoeuvre. Such was 
jAckson's march about Hooker's left flank at Chancellorsville. 
Again, Lee threw Longstreet upon Meade's left and Early upon his 
right at Gettysburg on July 2d, and Pickett next day upon Meade's 
centre, as tactical manoeuvres; but the operations by which the 
Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac moved 
away from and towards each other, starting at Fredericksburg 
and moving until they reached Gettysburg, were strategic. Tactics 
often trench on the domain of strategy, and vice versa. Many 
soldiers would call Jackson's manoeuvre at Chancellorsville a 
strategic one ; but it was constantly in the presence of the 
enemy. 

Talce in reverse. — To attack an enemy in his rear or well back of his 
flank. 



340 GLOSSARY. 

Terrain. — The actual ground on which manoeuvres or marches are 
conducted. Generally used in a topographical sense; i.e.., with 
reference to the surface of the land, whether flat, rolling, sandy, 
much cut up by ravines or streams, or covered with forests, 
etc., etc. 

Threaten. — So to place your army as to be able, unless your enemy 
alters his position, to attack some weak spot in his defense. 

Transj>orts. — Vessels used for transporting troops. 

Turn an enemy out of a place. — To obhge an enemy to evacuate a 
position by moving around his flank and threatening hinf*¥rem this 
quarter. 

Turn the right or left. — To march around the right or left flank of an 
enemy so as to oblige him to change front or move in retreat. 

Uncover. — An army uncovers its line or base or communications when 
it so moves that the enemy is nearer to them than itself is. Though 
not directly in front of its base an army may still cover it. 

Vanguard. — A smaller force preceding an army by a distance varying 
according to the numbers and ground, to protect it from sudden 
attack. 

Wing. — An army has a centre and a right and left wing. These 
three parts may be substantially equal, or either may be larger, ac- 
cording to the lay of the land, the position of the enemy, the work 
to be accomplished, etc., etc. 

Wo7ks. — Fortifications or intrenchments of any kind. 



INDEX 



Ackworth, 234. 

Acquia Creek, 70. 

Adairsville, 228. 

Alabama, 195. 

Albemarle Sound, 37. 

Alexandria, 73, 79, 163, 193. 

Allatoona, 280. 

Ailatoona Pass, 231. 

Allen's Farm, 66. 

Alpine, 176. 

Altamaha, 287. 

Amelia C. H., 312, 316. 

Anderson, Robt., 7. 

Anderson, R, H., 270. 

Antietam, 105. 

Appomattox, 210,248,312, 317, 318, 

Arkansas, 94. 

Arkansas Post, 101. 

Atchafalaya, 144, 163, 164. 

Atlanta, The, 35. 

Atlanta, 119, 223 et seq., 227 et 

seg., 279,287. 
Augusta, 287, 304. 
Austrians, 121. 
Averasborough, 306. 
Averell, 253, 275. 
Ayres, 313, 314. 

Bailey, 194. 
Bailey's Creek, 263. 
Baker, 60. 
Baker's Creek, 153. 
Ball's Bluff, 50. 



Baltimore, 8, 102, 252. 

Banks, 70, 162 et seq., 193, 225. 

Baton Rouge, 93, 94, 148, 1^3^ 

Battle above the Clouds, 187. 

Bayou Pierre, 149. 

Bayou Teche, 163. 

Beaufort, 37. 

Beauregard, 17, 43, 45, 83, 209, 

- 283, 287, 304. 

Belmont, 24. 

Bentonville, 306. 

Bermuda Hundred, 209, 244, 248, 

313. 
Berryville, 270. 
Beverly Ford, 132. 
Big Bethel, 14. 
Big Black River, 147, 151. 
Bisland, Fort, 164. 
Black River, 144. 
Blair, 10, 158. 
Blunt, 101, 192. 
Bolivar, 89. 
Bolton, 153. 
Booneville, 21. 
Boston Mts., 31. 
Bottom's Bridge, 62. 
Bowling Green, 213. 
Boynton Road, 312, 315. 
Bragg, 45, 84, 123, 125, 172 et 

seq., 179. 
Brashear City, 163, 164. 
Breckenridge, 94, 124. 
Bridgeport, 43, 154, 176. 
341 



342 



INDEX. 



Bristoe Station, 73, 168. 

Brock Road, 202. 

Brown's Ferry, 183. 

Brownsville, 192. 

Bruinsburg, 148. 

Brush Mt., 234. 

Buell, 25, 43, 45, 83 et seq.,%^. 

Bull Kun, 16 et seq., 72, 74, 169. 

Burkesville, 317. 

Burnside, 37, 106, 111, 127, 174, 

185, 245, 249. 
Butler, 14, 36, 38, 199, 209, 303. 

Cabell, 192. 

Caesar's legionaries, 305. 

Cairo, 10. 

Camp Creek, 228. 

Canby, 41, 195, 279. 

Canton, 159. 

Carlisle, 134. 

Carlin, 307. 

Carnifex Ferry, 19. 

Carolinas, The, 302 et seq. 

Carthage, 21. 

Casey, 60. 

Cassville, 228. 

Catlett's Station, 72. 

Cedar Creek, 211, 270, 274, 275. 

Cedar Mountain, 70. 

Cemetery Hill, 137. 

Centreville, 79, 169. 

Chambersburg, 108, 254. 

Champion's Hill, 153. 

Chancellorsville, 127 et seq. 

Charles City, 244. 

Charleston, 190, 304. 

Charlottesville, 310. 

Cljattahoochee, 231, 242, 256. 

Chattanooga, 84, 174, 182, 184 

- et seq. 

Chattanooga Valley, 185. 

Cheatham, 256, 259, 298. 

Chickamauga, 129, 179 et seq., 182. 



Chickamauga Creek, 178. 

Chickasaw Bayou, 99. 

Chickahominy, 215, 

Churchill, 101. 

Cincinnati, 86. 

City of Vicksburg, 143. 

City Point, 209. 

Clear Creek, 257. 

Cobb, Howell, 104. 

Cold Harbor, 215, 217 et seq. 

Columbia, 282, 294, 304. 

Combahee, 304. 

Corinth, 47, 82, 89, 90. 

Cox, 280, 302. 

Crampton's Gap, 104. 

Crawford, 314. 

Crittenden, 122, 124, 176. 

Crook, 199, 210, 253, 273, 275. 

Cross Keys, 57. " 

Crump's Landing, 44. 

Culpeper, 109, 198. 

Culp'sHill, 137, 139. 

Cumberland Gap, 86. 

Curtis, 22, 31, 32, 82, 95, 195. 

Custer, 276. 



Dabney's Mills, 266. 

Dahlgren, Adm., 191, 291, 306. 

Dahlgren, Col., 192. 

Dallas, 231. 

Dalton, 119, 224, 227, 280. 

Danville, 310, 316. 

Danville R.R., 311, 312, 316. 

Davis, Adm., 37, 47, 255. 

Davis, Gen., 289, 307. 

Decatur, 43, 243, 261, 284. 

Decherd, 173. 

Deep Bottom, 248, 263. 

De Russey, Fort, 193. 

Dinwiddle C.H., 264, 312, 314. 

Dix, 134. 

Donelson, Fort, 27, 28, 172. 

Dranesville, 50. 



INDEX. 



343 



Drury's Bluff, 210, 244. 
Duck Kiver, 86, 293. 
Dug Gap, 177. 
Dunker Church, 106. 
Dupont, 36, 37, 190. 

Early, 114, 211, 252, 269 et seq. 

East Point, 261. 

Ebenezer Creek, 289. 

Edward's Depot, 152. 

Elizabeth City, 37. 

Ellet, 143. 

Ellicott's Mills, 253. 

Ely's Eord, 200. 

Emmetsburg, 139. 

Emory, 164, 275. 

English, 121. 

Etowah, 229, 231. 

Ewell, 132, 199, 317. 

Ezra Church, 260. 

Fairfax, 79. 

Fair Oaks, 58 et seq. 

Falmouth, 111, 128. 

Farmville, 317. 

Farragut, 39,93, 164. 

Fisher, Fort, 302. 

Fisher's Hill, 270, 274. 

Five Forks, 313, 314. 

Florence, 284. 

Florida, The, 195. 

Foote, 30. 

Forrest, 172, 188, 284, 308. 

Fort Hill, 155. 

Foster, 37, 191, 248, 291, 306. 

Frankfort, 86. 

Franklin, 54, 60, 62, 111, 127, 

193, 293 et seq. 
Frazier's Farm, 67. 
Frederick, 103, 120, 133, 134, 252. 
Fredericksburg, 110 et seq., 128. 
Fremont, 10, 21, 22, 23, 52, 57. 
French, 114, 170. 



French, The, 121. 

Front Royal, 56. 

Gaines, Fort, 194. 

Gaines' Mill, 62, 64, 216. 

Gainesville, 75. 

Gallic Legions, 305. 

Galveston, 192. 

Gardner, 165. 

Garfield, 25, 181. 

Gauley River, 20, 212. 

Gaylesville, 281. 

Georgia, The, 195. 

Germanna Ford, 200. 

Germans, 121. 

Getty, 276. 

Gettysburg, 135 et seq. 

Gilgal, 236. 

Gilmore, 37, 190, 209. 

Glendale, 67. 

Goldsborough, N. C, 191. 

Goldsborough, Adm., 37, 303. 

Gordon, 275. 

Gordon's Mills, 177, 

Gordonsville, 70. 

Grand Ecore, 194. 

Grand Gulf, 145, 147. 
Granger, Gordon, 181, 188. 
Granny White Pike, 300. 
Grant, 26, 42, 84, 89, 94, 142, 151, 
160, 184 et seq., 244 et seq., 
248 et seq., 263 et seq., 310. 
Grapevine Bridge, 64. 
Greenbrier River, 20. 
Gregg, Fort, 315. 
Grenada, 95, 97, 145. 
Grierson, 148. 
Griffin, 314. 
Groveton, 76, 78. 
Haines' Bluff, 99. 
Halleck, 23, 24, 68, 80, 82, 84, 

103, 133. 
Halltown, 270. 
Hampton, 306, 307. 



344 



INDEX. 



Hancock, 63, 114, UO, 199, 206, 

245, 2G3, 267. 
Hanover C.H., 58. 
Hanover Town, 215. 
Hardee, 45, 124, 256, 258, 259, 

283, 291 e^seg.,304. 
Hardeeville, 292. 
Hare's Hill, 312. 
Harper's Ferry, 8, 14, 57, 103 

et seq., 133, 253. 
Harpeth River, 294. 
Harrisburg, 134. 
Harrisonburg, 64, 273. 
Hatcher's Run, 265, 267. 
Hatchie River, 92. 
Hatteras Inlet, 36. 
Hawkinson's Ferry, 151. 
Hay market, 75. 
Hazen, 291. 
Heintzelman, 58, 62. 
Helena, 32. 

Henry, Fort, 26, 27, 284. 
Henry House Hill, 79. 
Herron, 191. 
Hill, A. P., 60, 62, 113, 134, 169, 

199, 246, 264, 316. 
Hill, D. H., 62. 
Hilton Head, 36. 
Hindman, Fort, 101. 
Hindman, Gen., 191. 
Holly Springs, 95, 97. 
Holmes, 166. 
Hood, 255 et seq., 282 et seq., 

286 et seq., 293 et seq., 297 

et seq. 
Hooker, 53, 78, 105, 114, 127, 

134, 167, 183, 259. 
Hoover's Gap, 173. 
Horseshoe Ridge, 181. 
Howard, 131, 260, 280, 287. 
Huger, 62. 
Hurlbut, 142. 
Humphreys, 266, 312, 313. 



Hunter, 37, 190, 211, 253. 
Huntsville, 82, 84, 224. 

Imboden, 211. 
Imperial, 166. 
luka, 89. 

Jackson, Stonewall, 18, 51, 55, 

63, 70, 73, 75, 129, 131. 
Jackson, Miss., 95, 145, 159, 160, 

284. 
Jackson, Fort, 39. 
Jacksonville, 192. 
James River, 65, 244. 
James River Canal, 273, 311. 
Jericho Ford, 213. 
Johnston, A. S., 25, 42, 46, 61, 86. 
Johnston, J. E., 50, 59, 97, 103, 

145, 152, 158, 159, 160, 224, 255 

etseq., 306, 319. 
Jonesborough, 261. 

Kanawha, 199, 212. 

Kautz, 246. 

Kearney, 53, 67, 78, 79. 

Kearsarge, 195. 

Kenesaw, 239 et seq. 

Kentucky River, 86. 

Kernstown, 51, 254. 

Keyes, 58, 62. 

Kilpatrick, 192, 287, 290, 306. 

Kingston, 228. 

Knoxville, 83, 174, 188. 

LaFayette, 177. 

Lagrange, 148. 

Lander, 51. 

Lawrence, 192. 

Lee, R. E., 19, 63, 102, 115, 128, 

137, 141, 252, 256, 263 et seq., 

310. 
Lee, 298. 
Leesburg, 60. 



INDEX 



345 



Leuthen, 118. 

Lexington, 22. 

Libby, 62, 192. 

Lickskillet, 260. 

Little Rock, 192, 194. 

Little Round Top, 137. 

Logan, 258, 297. 

Logan's Cross-Roads, 26. 

Long Bridge, 244. 

Longstreet, 53, 62, 75, 134, 137, 

139, 167, 179, 188, 199, 206, 313. 
Lookout Mt., 176, 185. 
Lookout Valley, 176. 
Loring, 154. 
Lost Mt. , 234. 
Loudon County, 277. 
Luray, 272. 

Lynchburg, 211, 273, 316. 
Lyon, 10, 21, 22. 
Macon, 261, 287, 288. 
Macon, Fort, 37. 
Macon R.R., 260. 
Magruder, 53, 62, 192. 
Mahone, 313. 
Malvprn Hill 67, 263. 
Manassas, 50. 
Manassas Gap, 167. 
Manassas Station, 73. 
Manchester, 173. 
Mansfield, 106, 193. 
Marietta, 231 et seq., 235 et seq., 

280. 
Marmaduke, 191. 
Marshall, 25. 
Martinsburg, 271. 
Marye's Heights, 112, 130. 
Maryland Heights, 252. 
McAllister, Fort, 291. 
McClellan, 13, 19, 49, 62 et seq. 
McClernand, 45, 95, 97, 101, 102, 

109, 142, 157, 159. 
McCook, 122, 124, 176, 
McDowell, 17, 52, 70, 75, 78. 



McDowell, Va., 56. 
McLemore's Cove, 176. 
McPherson, 142, 224, 226, 256, 

258. 
Meade, 106, 113, 134, 137, 140, 

169, 318. 
Meadow Bridge, 64, 212. 
Mechanics ville, 64. 
Memphis, 47, 89. 
Meridian, 162, 224. 
Merrimac, 38. 
Merritt, 276. 
Middletown, 276. 
Miles, 104. 

Milledgeville, 287, 288. 
Millen, 288. 

Milliken's Bend, 147, 159. 
Mill Spring, 26. 
Milroy, 56, 133. 
Mine, Petersburg, 248 ct seq. 
Mine Run, 167 et seq. 
Missionary Ridge, 185, 187. 
Mississippi, 184. 
Mitchell, 42, 82, 84, 190. 
Mobile, 162, 194. 225, 279. 
Monocacy, 103. 
Monocacy Junction, 253. 
Monitor, 38. 
Monroe, Fort, 134. 
Montgomery, 162. 
Moon Lake, 144. 
Moorfield, 254. 
Morgan, 307. 
Morgan, Fort, 194. 
Morgan, John, 122, 172. 
Morris Island, 191. 
Mosby, 277. 
Mud March, 127. 
Mulligan, 22. 
Mumfordsville, 86. 
Murfreesboro', 85, 122, 172. 
Nachitoches, 193. 
Nashville, 85, 283, 293, 297 etseq 



346 



INDEX. 



Natchez, 93. 

Nelson, 86. 

New Berne, 37, 303. 

New Bridge, 218. 

New River, 20. 

New Carthage, 147. 

New Hope Church, 232. 

NeAV Madrid, 29 et seq., 211. 

Newmarket, 272, 277. 

New Orleans, 38, 92, 162, 225. 

Noonday Creek, 236. 

Norfolk Navy Yard, 8, 190. 

North Anna, 213. 



Ocmulgee River, 287. 

Oconee River, 287. 

Ogeechee River, 288. 

Old Wilderness Tavern, 200. 

Olustee, 192. 

Oostanaula, 228. 

Opelousas, 164. 

Opequon, 271. 

Orange, 198. 

Orange & Alexandria R.R., 168. 

Orange Turnpike, 200. 

Ord, 50, 90. 

Ossabaw Sound, 287. 

Oxford, 97. 



Paducah, 10, 188. 

Pamlico Sound, 37. 

Pamunkey, 215. 

Parke, 37. 

Patterson, 18. 

Peach Tree Creek, 256. 

Pea Ridge, 31. 

Peeble's Farm, 265. 

Pemberton, 92, 145, 151, 160. 

Perry ville, 87. 

Petersburg, 70, 210, 245, 248 et 

seq., 263 et seq., 316. 
Phillipi, 13. 



Pickens, Fort, 36. 

Pickett, 140. 

Pickett's Mills, 232. 

Piedmont, 211. 

Pigeon Mt., 176. 

Pillow, 10. 

Pillow, Fort, 47, 188. 

Pine Mt., 234, 236. 

Pipe Creek, 135. 

Pittsburg Landing, 43. 

Pleasant Hill, 194. 

Pleasonton, 109. 

Po, 206. 

Polk, 10, 179. 

Pope, 23, 29 e^seg., 84. 

Pope's Campaign, 69 et seq. 

Porter, Adm., 93, 97, 100, 143, 

148, 302. 
Porter, Fitz John, 39, 58, 60, 62, 

64, 78, 80, 99, 101, 156, 193. 
Port Gibson, 149. 
Port Hudson, 144, 162 et seq. 
Port Republic, 57. 
Port Royal, 36, 215, 291. 
Powell, 194. 
Prairie Grove, 191. 
Prentiss, 45, 166. 
Prestonburg, 26. 
Price, 22, 31, 89, 195. 
Providence, Lake, 144. 
Prussians, 121. 
Pulaski, 37, 284. 
Pumpkin Vine Creek, 231. 

Quaker Road, 67. 

Quantrell, 192. 

Queen of the West, 143. 

Raccoon Mts., 176. 
Raleigh, 308. 
Rapidan, 168. 
Rappahiinnock, 167. 
Raymond, 152. 



INDEX. 



347 



Ream's Station, 246, 264. 

Red River, 144, 163, 164, 192. 

Reno, 37. 

Resaca, 227, 280. 

Reynolds, 113, 136. 

Richmond, 86, 313. 

Rich Mountain, 13. 

Ricketts, 76, 252, 275. 

Ringgold, 225. 

Rio Grande, 41. 

Roanoke Island, 37. 

Rocky Face Ridge, 227„ 

Rome, 280. 

Rosecrans, 19, 88, 89, 121 et seq., 

172 et seq. 
Rossville, 182, 187. 
Rossville Gap, 178. 
Round Top, 137, 139. 

Sabine Cross Roads, 193. 

Sabine Pass, 192. 

Sailor's Creek, 317. 

Salisbury, 308. 

Sandtown, 260. 

Savage Station, 60, 6G. 

Savannah, 37, 291 et seq. 

Savannah River, 288, 304. 

Schenck, 56. 

Schofield, 32, 188, 226, 256, 283, 

293 etseq., 299, 302. 
Sedgwick, 128, 130, 199. 
Selma, 308. 

Seminary Ridge, 137, 140. 
Semmes, 195. 

Sequatchie Valley, 85, 176. 
Seven Days' Battle, 62 et seq. 
Seven Pines, 59. 
Sharpsburg, 104. 
Shelbyville, 173. 
Shenandoah Valley, 55, 269. 
Shepherdstown, 252, 271. 
Sheridan, 125, 203, 209, 217, 246, 

269, 278, 310, 312, 317. 



Sherman, T. W., 36. 

Sherman, W. T., 24, 25, 95, 97, 

101, 142, 156, 159, 160, 185, 

188, 223 et seq., 227 et seq., 255 

et seq. 
Shields, 51, 57. 
Shiloh, 42. 
Ship Island, 38. 
Shreveport, 193. 
Sibley, 41. 
Sickles, 139. 

Siege of Vicksburg, 156 et seq. 
Sigel, 22, 70, 199, 210. 
Slocum, 259, 287. 
Smith, A. J., 193, 245, 283, 299, 

302. 
Smith, Kirby, 86. 
Smyrna, 280. 
Snake Creek, 45. 
Soap Creek, 242. 
South Mt., 104. 
Southside, 246. 
Spotsylvania, 204. 
Spring Hill, 294, 295. 
Stanley, 172. 
Staunton, 310. 
Stedman, Fort, 312. 
Steedman, 299. 
Steele, 192, 194. 
Stewart, 256, 298. 
Stone, 50. 

Stoneman, 260, 307. 
Stone's River, 119, 122. 
St. Philip, Fort, 39. 
Strasburg, 272. 
Stringham, 36. 
Stuart, 61, 72, 108, 132, 203. 
Sturgis, 22. 
Sudley Springs, 76. 
Sulphur Springs, 73. 
Sumner, 60, 62, 106, 111, 127. 
Sumter, Fort, 7, 191. 
Susquehannah, 134. 



348 



INDEX, 



Tallahatchie, F/S, 144. 

Taylor, 164, 193. 

Tennessee River, 300. 

Tensas, 144. 

Terry, 302, 303. 

Thomas, 26, 85, 86, 122. 173, 176, 
179, 181, 187, 226, 280, 283 et 
seq., 293, 297 et seq., 300 etseq. 

Thoroughfare Gap, 72. 

Tipton ville, 29 et seq. 

Todd's Tavern, 202. 

Tolopotomoy Creek, 215. 

Tom's Brook, 274. 

Torbert, 272. 

Trenton, 176. 

Tullahoma, 174. 

Tunnel Hill, 185. 

Turkey Bend, 67. 

Turner's Ferry, 241. 

Turner's Gap, 104. 

Tuscumbia, 284. 

Tybee Island, 37. 

United States Ford, 129. 

Valley Head, 176. 
Van Dorn, 31, 89, 92. 
Vicksburg, 93, 94. 
Vienna, 15. 

Wagner, Fort, 191. 
Wagner, Gen., 295. 
Waynesboro', 288, 310. 
Walker, Fort, 36. 
Wallace, 252. 



Walnut Hill, 155. 

Warren, 168, 199, 263, 312, 31 

315. 
Warrenton, 72, 109. 
Washington, 250. 
Waterloo, 73. 
Wauhatchie, 184. 
Weehawken, 35. 
Weitzel, 163, 302. 
Weldon R. R., 245, 264, 266. 
WestVa., 13, 19, 20. 
Wheeler, 172, 290. 
White House, 54, 65, 212, 215. 
White Oak Bridge, 67. 
White Oak Rd., 313. 
Wilderness, 128, 197 et seq. 
Williams, 93, 94, 307. 
Williamsburg, 53. 
Wilmington, 302, 303. 
Wilson, 246, 294, 299, 308. 
Wilson's Creek, 22. 
Winchester, 133, 270. 
Winslow, 195. 
Wood, 180, 299. 
Wright, Col., 230. 
Wright, Gen., 253, 275, 276. 

Yazoo, 99, 143, 144. 
Yazoo City, 156. 
Yellow Tavern, 264. 
York, 52, 134. 
Yorktown, 53. 
Young's Point, 142. 

ZolUcoflfer, 26. 



t 



